Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume II - 2006: Issue 3, October by Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS)
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Homeland Security Affairs (Journal)
2006-10
Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Volume II -
2006: Issue 3, October
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School




         Lacy E. Suiter 
             1936-2006 
 
This past summer, the nation lost one of its most experienced and respected emergency 
management and homeland security leaders, Lacy Suiter. For more than forty years, 
Lacy Suiter helped shape the nation’s emergency management system and in recent 
years guided its fledgling homeland security programs. This issue of Homeland Security 
Affairs is dedicated to him.   
 
It is often said that emergency management and homeland security are first and 
foremost about leadership and management. Lacy Suiter was living proof of this maxim. 
A study of his leadership style provides numerous lessons for today’s homeland security 
leaders as they work to establish new organizations around shared missions and forge 
working relationships between diverse agencies and levels of government. Homeland 
Security Affairs Senior Editor David O’Keeffe had the honor of speaking at a memorial 
service for Lacy Suiter. Below are excerpts from his remarks, highlighting Lacy Suiter’s 
hallmark approach to leading organizations and motivating staff by building a culture 
founded on personal trust, respect, risk taking, and generosity.  
 
Working with Lacy was like no other work experience. Lacy did not believe in co-
workers, he believed in family, so when you worked with him you were not 
joining an office or organization you were joining a family….. 
 
Lacy didn’t just want people to come to work each day, he wanted them to be 
excited about coming to work and to have fun. He knew how to motivate and 
encourage people to take risks and tackle difficult problems.  Lacy was a man of 
“big ideas,” always challenging those around him to come up with the next policy 
or strategy that would make what he called a “quantum leap,” in emergency 
management or homeland security.   
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He went out of his way to develop a personal connection with everyone he came 
into contact with – making sure he remembered where they were from, whether 
or not they were married or had kids.  
 
Family came first and Lacy’s family was his pride and joy……No conversation 
with him was complete without him asking how your family was. And if you had 
been traveling a lot or working long hours, you usually received a scolding and 
were told to go home …. 
 
Lacy had a talent for bringing people together and making things happen. This 
was a talent he put to good use after 9/11, assembling teams of subject matter 
experts to conduct homeland security seminars for governors. It didn’t matter 
what type of expert was needed; Lacy would make some calls and experts would 
appear, willing to help out in any way because they knew that if Lacy was 
involved, it must be important, it would make a difference, and Lacy would make 
it fun.   
 
Lacy’s secrets to success were simple – he focused on what was best for others, he 
took the high road and stayed above the fray, and he led by example. His 
contributions to emergency management and homeland security are legendary. 
Yet he was always quick to reflect praise and honors on to others – often singling 
out an individual and declaring, “I want to be just like you when I grow up.” 
 
But in reality, it was always Lacy who set the standard for who many of us wanted 
to be. Lacy has many legacies but I think the most impressive is the number and 
diversity of people he influenced during his lifetime. Lacy was one of a kind but 
thanks to his leadership, mentoring, advice, and friendship, he has left a legacy of 
thousands of individuals across the nation who, every day, draw on their 
experiences with him to solve problems, lead organizations, serve the public, and 
be a role model for others. 
 
You can go to http://www.chds.us/?lspolicyforum for more information on Lacy Suiter’s 
career and his significant contributions to emergency management and homeland 
security. 
 
Death of Lacy Suiter Leaves Large Void in 
Emergency Management Community 
Eileen Sullivan 
 
This article was first published by Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security on 
August 17, 2006. 
 
 
The emergency management community has lost one of its greatest mentors. 
Many consider Lacy Suiter, a former state director and FEMA executive, one of 
the fathers of modern emergency management. Suiter was integral in forming 
FEMA in the 1970s and played a significant role in the agency’s revival in the 
1990s. He reorganized state officials into a strong lobbying body in Washington, 
and most recently he worked to educate governors on how to prepare and 
respond to natural and man-made disasters. 
Suiter, 69, died of a heart attack on August 8, 2006, but he left behind a strong 
legacy in Washington and across the country. Several changes currently under 
way at FEMA reflect his vision and passion for responding to disasters — from 
planning for catastrophes to pre-positioning supplies before a hurricane and 
promoting an all-hazards approach to emergency management. 
“Lacy brought civility, decorum and practicality to just about every public 
policy debate that I ever saw him weigh in on,” said George W. Foresman, 
Preparedness undersecretary at the Department of Homeland Security. 
Foresman knew Suiter for more than twenty years and said Suiter was one of four 
people who influenced him to accept the job as head of Preparedness. “There are 
thousands of men and women in this country who, in terms of the programs that 
they operate, the education [and training] they receive, are in many ways being 
touched by Lacy Suiter.” 
 
Suiter worked in the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency for thirty years 
and was director from 1982 to 1994. During that time, he emphasized the 
importance of preparedness for all types of hazards. He worked with local 
agencies to help build their emergency management programs, and he 
understood the importance of strengthening emergency management at the 
grass-roots level.  
In 1978 a train derailed and exploded in Waverly, TN, killing sixteen people — 
many of whom were first-responders. It was at this point that Suiter became 
committed to providing training and exercises so officials were prepared to 
respond to all kinds of emergencies, a mission DHS is committed to today.  
Harvey G. Ryland, a former deputy FEMA director, met Suiter in the 1980s 
during a training seminar on the integrated approach to emergency management 
(using a common plan to respond to any type of disaster). 
“He was a giant in the field,” said Ryland, now head of a nonprofit institute that 
researches preparedness. Suiter soon became Ryland’s mentor. And in 1989, 
Suiter asked Ryland to go to the Central United States Earthquake Consortium in 
Memphis, which Suiter co-founded, for one week. “I stayed four years,” Ryland 
said. “People wanted to work for him. They’d go out of their way to work for him. 
. . He inspired his employees to go above and beyond.” 
Those who knew him and worked with him said Suiter was always good for 
morale. 
“He would burst into your office, singing ‘Happy Birthday’ when it wasn’t your 
birthday, just because he liked the song,” said Martha Braddock who worked with 
Suiter while he was at FEMA. And when his employees were working long hours 
responding to a disaster, Suiter would ask, “Have you called your mother, have 
you talked to your mother?” Braddock said. Then Suiter would pull a post card 
out of his pocket and hand it to the employee. “Write your mother a post card,” 
he’d say. And Suiter would put a postage stamp on it and mail it off. 
 
Suiter also knew how to work with politicians. He served in Democratic and 
Republican administrations at both the state and federal levels.  
When Suiter would testify before Congress as a state director, he always 
wanted to be the last witness, said Braddock, who ran legislative affairs at FEMA. 
“I loved taking him up on the Hill because there was none of this fancy footwork 
stuff,” Braddock said. Suiter would listen to the witnesses who testified before 
him. He took note of all the questions lawmakers asked but for which they never 
received answers. And when it was Suiter’s turn to testify, he would forgo his 
opening statement and address each lawmaker directly — by name — and answer 
the questions previous witnesses dodged or danced around. 
“He was a visionary, a planner, a coach, and a teacher,” Braddock said. “The 
number of people who are in the profession because he inspired them is 
absolutely legion.” 
Emergency management has been a popular topic among lawmakers, experts, 
and the media since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast nearly one year 
ago. And FEMA has received the brunt of the criticism. Currently, lawmakers are 
considering several different legislative proposals for reform. Many say FEMA 
atrophied when it became part of DHS in 2003, and Katrina brought the 
problems into the public light. Relationships between the federal government and 
state and local agencies, which Suiter made a priority during his time in 
Tennessee and at FEMA, had deteriorated by the time Katrina hit, and FEMA 
suffered from poor management and low morale. 
When Katrina exposed fundamental problems in the way emergency 
management functioned at all levels of government, Suiter thought it was a 
shame that all the hard work he and his fellow emergency management officials 
had done in the past did not bare fruit, said Bruce Baughman, director of 
Alabama’s Emergency Management Agency and former director of FEMA’s 
planning and readiness division. 
But although Suiter eventually saw some of what he built in FEMA fall apart, 
he was always an advocate for the department and FEMA’s role in it, said Trina 
Sheets, executive director of the National Emergency Management Association. 
“He understood that we need to be preparing for all things that might happen on 
U.S. soil,” Sheets said. After he left FEMA, federal officials continued to go Suiter 
for advice. “He has been a mentor to truly an entire generation of emergency 
managers and now homeland security professionals,” Sheets said.  
“One of the things Lacy always cautioned was, ‘don’t forget who we serve, and 
that’s the American people,’ ” Baughman said. Suiter was very focused on 
customer service, always looked for ways to make things work and streamlined 
assistance to disaster victims. Current FEMA Director R. David Paulison is once 
again making customer service a priority, said Baughman. “Dave Paulison is 
making strides to bring it back to the way it was,” Baughman said. Paulison also 
called Suiter a mentor and a friend. 
One local emergency manager from Tennessee called Suiter “the best director 
FEMA never had.” No one could say why Suiter never became FEMA director, 
though some chalked it up to politics and timing. But Michael Lowder, deputy 
director of FEMA’s response division, said with Suiter, “it was never about Lacy. 
It was not about him becoming director. He was always about somebody else.” 
On Saturday, August 19, it will be all about Lacy Suiter, as his friends and 
family gather for a memorial service at 2 p.m. at Mount Vernon United Methodist 
Church in Alexandria, Va. Foresman and James Lee Witt will be among the 
speakers.  
“We’ve had a tremendous loss in emergency management and public safety in 
the country because we’ve lost Lacy,” Witt said. “We lost someone that had the 
historical knowledge and the capability to help make America better prepared, 
and we need more Lacy Suiters.”  
 
 
Eileen Sullivan is a reporter with Congressional Quarterly in Washington, D.C. She 
has been covering emergency management since 1999 when she started out as a 
municipal beat reporter at the Courier-Post in South Jersey. For the past three years 
she has been in Washington, D.C. writing on homeland security and emergency 
management issues for several publications. She holds a bachelor's degree in English 
from Villanova University. Eileen Sullivan can be reached at esullivan@cq.com.   
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Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command:  
Lessons Learned 
 
Dr. Peter K. Forster 
  
 
In July 2006, Russian officials announced that Shamil Basaev, the Chechen extremist 
guerilla leader who masterminded some of the most notorious terrorist acts against 
Russia, had been killed. Although the long-term impact of Basaev’s death, much like 
that of Abu al-Zarqawi in Iraq, remains to be seen, it does represent a significant success 
for the Russian government. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to renew interest 
in the lessons learned from the attack in Beslan, perhaps Basaev’s most notorious 
operation. 
From September 1 – 3, 2004, Russia experienced a tragedy as damaging to its 
national psyche as the 9/11 attacks were to the United States’ three years prior. A 
terrorist assault on School Number 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia resulted in more than 300 
hostages, including 186 children, perishing as the Federal Security Service 
(Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnozi  or FSB) attempted to rescue them by storming the 
school. Beslan represents a complex incident that exposed significant failures in 
preventing terrorist situations through the mismanagement of intelligence. 
Furthermore, it offers insight into the effect that past events have on decisions made 
during terrorism crises, the “fog of war” that influences decision-making in counter-
terrorism operations, and the failure of effective incident command that results in mis-
managed objectives, ineffective transfer and chain of command, and errors in the 
dissemination of public information and intelligence. All of these contributed to the 
tragedy. This article critiques the Russian government’s efforts at prevention, 
protection, and response to arrive at the lessons learned. It then proceeds to explain 
how some of these lessons might be applied to improve anti- and counter-terrorism 
operations in the United States. 
The on-going Chechen conflict has created a range of political and security concerns 
for Russia. The first, and perhaps greatest, of these is that Russia’s improved 
suppression of insurgent actions in Chechnya has facilitated the conflict’s migration into 
other parts of the North Caucasus. Second, in addition to perpetrating attacks across the 
North Caucasus region, the insurgents have demonstrated a capability to execute 
terrorist operations as far away as Moscow, further embarrassing the Putin government 
and spreading insecurity among the population. Third, the terrorist assault on a Beslan 
school was another in a series of deadly attacks by secessionist and Islamic extremists 
seeking to oust the Russians from North Caucasus and was representative of the 
Chechen conflict’s trademark reliance on “catastrophic terrorism.”1 Previous attacks had 
resulted in eighty killed and 106 wounded in a raid on a Ministry of Interior 
(Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del or MVD) armory in Nazran, Ingushetia in June 2004; 
forty killed by an alleged suicide bomber in the Moscow subway in February 2004; and 
129 killed during an FSB rescue attempt at the Dubrovka Theater in October 2002. 
Undoubtedly, these experiences influenced the response at Beslan.      
The Beslan siege started on September 1, 2004, when terrorists, primarily ethnic 
Ingush and Chechens, seized School Number 1 and created a tactical and strategic 
dilemma for the Russian government. After seizing the hostages, the terrorists 
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demanded the release of prisoners captured during the Nazran raid and the complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. To prove their resolve, the terrorists 
executed nearly twenty adult male hostages during the first day.  
The initial failure in the Beslan incident occurred when local authorities failed to 
execute an effective anti-terrorism strategy. Prevention and protection require a strategy 
based on deterrence and intelligence. Deterrence seeks to make the cost of terrorist 
action too high and intelligence informs authorities of possibilities, thus enabling them 
to prioritize the implementation of deterrent measures. The efficient gathering, analysis, 
dissemination, and, ultimately, use of intelligence is crucial in identifying potential 
threats, prioritizing their credibility, and deploying counter-measures. Operationally, 
Russian security forces failed to deter the incursion into North Ossetia or to make 
potential targets unattractive by increasing protection. The terrorists’ ability to infiltrate 
North Ossetia and the town of Beslan indicated that border control was ineffective or 
may have been compromised, as some suggest.2 Considering the existing hostilities, the 
lack of more stringent border control is hard to understand and may give credence to a 
conspiracy theory. Furthermore, intelligence was misinterpreted or not used. In spite of 
arresting a potential collaborator (who disclosed the possibility of school attacks) and 
indications from local sources as early as August 28 that rebels had penetrated Beslan, 
no local counter-measures were implemented. No police were deployed near the school 
nor did authorities take more extreme measures such as canceling or “locking down” the 
schools.3  
Compounding these operational mistakes was a strategic failure on the part of 
Russian security forces to become a learning organization. The Beslan crisis exposed the 
limits of integrating prior experiences into institutional learning within Russian 
intelligence and security forces, thus precluding enhanced preparedness. Russian 
intelligence forces did not exhibit “out of the box” thinking that might have recognized 
connections among terrorist operations or have assisted them in identifying linkages 
between non-combatant targets. Terrorists seek to have their attacks impact society’s 
psyche or, more precisely, make the secure seem insecure. In June 1995 Basaev seized 
the city hospital in Budennovsk, Dagestan. After negotiations, Basaev’s forces were 
allowed to return to Chechnya, leaving behind 147 dead hostages.4 Intuitively, a linkage 
between taking over a hospital and taking over a school is clear both from a societal and 
terrorist perspective. Society perceives both as offering security, safety, and a sense of 
care; striking a school or hospital exposes society’s fundamental vulnerability to 
terrorism. In any case, schools do not appear to have been identified as future targets 
following Budennovsk. 
While the connection to Budennovsk required sophisticated counter-terrorism 
analysis, the failure to properly assess the Nazran raid, also coordinated by Basaev, 
better illuminates an apparently compartmentalized, rather than holistic, approach to 
counter-terrorism. The Nazran raid took place on June 21, 2004. It was the first “large 
scale” rebel infantry attack in several years and the first outside of Chechnya since 
1999.5  Threatening and attacking targets outside of Chechnya was a shift in strategy  
missed by Russian intelligence. Second, no thought was given to the fact the raid might 
have offered either an opportunity to test deterrent measures or acquire weaponry for a 
future attack. The failure to effectively analyze the objectives of the Nazran raid is 
particularly evident because the armory target had insignificant psychological or 
publicity value. Thus, the attack had other objectives. A broader assessment of Nazran 
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may have produced sufficient information to raise the threat awareness level elsewhere 
in the North Caucasus.  
When deterrence failed at Beslan, the Russian government reacted. Response is 
influenced by broader political agendas, past experiences, and local events; at Beslan, 
government frustration over another hostage situation converged with a perceived 
opportunity to recover the prestige it had lost from the costly counter-terrorist 
operations at Nazran and the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. Since the Dubrovka Theater 
incident, government patience to negotiate a resolution had waned. At Nazran, for 
example, negotiations were not pursued even though they may have proved fruitful, 
particularly since the raid was not a suicide mission.6 At Beslan, the Russian 
government shied away from a negotiated settlement and focused instead on a military 
solution. This preference was evident in the arrival of General Vladimir Pronichev, the 
operational commander of the Dubrovka Theater rescue, and in the rhetoric and 
planning of the FSB response team. Furthermore, the public relations spin portraying 
the terrorists as crazed extremists sought to engender public support for military action. 
Third, the FSB’s request for tanks and APCs to augment spetsnaz units already deployed 
signaled a commitment to a military operation. Securing the release of the hostages 
appeared to blend with improving a diminished public perception of FSB competency, 
and thus resulted in an FSB commitment to using force to improve the FBS’s public 
image while securing the hostages’ release.    
Although one cannot advocate acquiescence to terrorist demands (e.g. releasing the 
prisoners captured during the Nazran raid, as was demanded by the Beslan 
perpetrators) entering into serious negotiations should have been considered, 
particularly given the directly relevant and ancillary information available. Again, 
Russian security analysts failed to thoroughly scrutinize the incident and instead 
accepted the premise that an assault would be needed. In the case of Beslan, their 
decision may be justifiable. The situation deteriorated quickly with the execution of 
hostages, which warranted an immediate response. However, security forces did not 
respond. The question is “why not?” The most plausible answers revolve around three 
issues.  First, it appears that since Putin was on vacation on the Black Sea and returned 
to Moscow before issuing orders, no one had the authority to authorize action.  
Considering the Soviet legacy of centralized command, Putin’s unavailability is a 
legitimate reason for not responding. The second reason relates to readiness.  The forces 
on site were not sufficient in number or preparedness to execute an attack. The third 
reason is that on-site officials believed that, with bombs placed in the school (a point 
that was communicated at the outset of the crisis), an attack might result in the 
terrorists initiating a suicide mission that would kill all hostages.7 
They based their assessment on the fact that, in spite of efforts to negotiate in 
previous cases (Budennovsk, Dubrovka Theater, and Nazran), deaths still resulted. 
Moreover, in the latter two circumstances, assaults were ultimately needed to try to free 
the hostages. What officials on site at Beslan missed was that at the Dubrovka Theater 
negotiations prior to the assault had resulted in some hostages being released, 
undoubtedly saving their lives. In hostage situations, negotiations serve multiple 
purposes.  One is certainly to facilitate the release of some hostages and perhaps achieve 
a non-violent resolution to the crisis. At Beslan some moderates advocated negotiations, 
hoping they might result in the release of some of the children.8 Second, the time 
needed to conduct negotiations increases the pressure on the hostage takers. It extends 
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the length of time they need to guard the prisoners, stay awake, and protect their 
perimeter. Third, it increases the time frame in which law enforcement and military 
units can acquire intelligence and refine a rescue plan. The time gained from negotiation 
represents an advantage that should not be quickly discarded by security forces. 
These errors in judgment were exacerbated by operational and tactical mistakes. 
Notwithstanding the trauma of day one, the incident did stabilize to some extent. While 
concerns of a suicide attack undoubtedly were piqued during that first day, it should 
have become apparent that while a suicide operation remained an option for the 
terrorists, it was not their primary plan. As critical as misinterpreting the perpetrators’ 
intent was the security forces’ failure to achieve situational awareness. Security forces 
underestimated both the number of hostages and terrorists.9 The inaccuracy of these 
estimates provided an unrealistic picture of the situation, negatively impacted the 
effectiveness of planning and logistically coordinating the counter-assault, and 
undoubtedly reinforced the unrealistic belief that using force was less risky.  
Further operational mistakes were made in establishing and maintaining clear 
incident command. Incident command is responsible for defining the operating 
characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of responding units 
during the incident.10 Upon their arrival on the scene, overall command was vested in 
the FSB. While transfer of command is often authorized in complex multi-agency 
circumstances, the FSB failed to execute their leadership responsibility in this instance. 
When transferring command, essential information needs to be transferred as well.11 
The FSB did not seek a briefing from the MVD commander (the previous incident 
commander) who had deployed forces. It also ignored local expertise that might have 
been able to provide valuable situational, as well as environmental, intelligence. 
Meanwhile, the confrontational tone of public information releases did little to assist the 
security forces; it further alienated the terrorists, lessening the chance for negotiations 
and diminishing the opportunity to surprise the terrorists with a rescue attempt. 
The impact of these operational oversights probably was minimized by the decision to 
forego potentially lengthy negotiations and resort to the use of force. However, other 
tactical decisions, such as minimally securing the site and choice of weaponry for the 
assault, did impact the situation. Whether malfeasance or simply misfeasance, 
neglecting to establish a secure cordon around the incident allowed unauthorized and 
armed vigilante groups to gain close proximity to school. This jeopardized operational 
command, planning, and ultimately discipline, which became apparent when the initial 
shots were fired absent a proper command.12 The choice to use incendiary RPGs and 
tanks, reminiscent of the U.S. federal raid on Waco, ensured military effectiveness in 
terms of eradicating the terrorists’ presence in the structure, but did little to minimize 
collateral casualties; weapons capable of high lethality have trouble differentiating 
between hostages and perpetrators but are effective killers. 
The means used to recover from an event is important as well. Terrorist attacks 
shake societal confidence in government’s ability to provide protection. In the recovery 
process, government cover-ups, such as those that occurred in the aftermath of Beslan, 
are counter-productive. Although some independent investigations occurred, none was 
commissioned by the Russian government. Nor is there any indication the Russian 
government accepted any of the findings. Many in government rationalized the Beslan 
cover-up on the basis that full disclosure of the activities surrounding the crisis might 
have ignited ethnic violence between Ingush and Chechens bent on revenge killings. 
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Others were simply unwilling to publicize another embarrassment involving a less-than-
effective response by the security forces. What became most apparent in the time 
following the Beslan incident was that the government was unwilling to accept that 
mistakes were made. Although any assessment of the incident uncovers glaring mistakes 
at various stages of the operation, the re-assignment of the primary incident 
commanders to posts that could only be considered promotions indicates the 
government did not see significant errors in their approach. For example, Pronichev is 
now the First Deputy Director of the FSB.  
 
Only the realistic assessment of an incident encourages a learning organization and so 
facilitates the prevention of, and response, to further attacks. Objective assessments 
should identify gaps in policies and encourage responsible organizations to develop and 
implement means to close those gaps. The Report of the 9/11 Commission, the National 
Response Plan, and the Nationwide Plan Review are intended to provide such 
encouragement in the United States. In Russia, the Nalchik raid in October 2005 
illustrates the risks of failing to embrace a learning organization concept. Security forces 
failed to identify and correct the gaps that allowed Beslan to occur and the perpetrators 
to escape. Even though security forces had advance notice of the raids and deployed 
“hundreds of special forces” prior to it, they failed to stop the incursion.13 And, although 
security forces did succeed in inflicting significant casualties on the insurgents at 
Nalchik, many escaped – just as they did at Beslan. Although no hostages were involved 
in the Nalchik raid, the execution of the counter-terrorism operation demonstrated poor 
use of intelligence and inadequate planning.  
Beslan’s failures transcend this incident and provide empirical evidence on how to 
improve anti- and counter-terrorism operations. From an American perspective, some 
of the failures are addressed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the Nationwide Plan Review, while others are broader.14 Their effectiveness remains to 
be evaluated. At a strategic level, discriminate assessment of prior events, both recent 
and long-term, allows the organizations responsible for prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery to enhance anticipation, identify gaps in preventative measures, 
and improve response operations. To achieve this objective, it is important first to 
critically examine the actual and potential purposes of past incidents. For example, did 
an attack have military, political, socio-psychological, operational, or economic goals? 
The goals at Nazran were primarily military and operational. It provided weaponry for 
future attacks as well as developing the terrorists’ operational knowledge of weaknesses 
in preventative measures and how security forces might respond. An assessment of 
Nazran should have increased awareness of the weaknesses in border control and 
deficiencies in timely response. At a minimum, it should have increased threat 
awareness. Second, effective analysis should consider the extent to which objectives 
were met in the operation. The level of success may provide an indication of whether 
another incident is worthwhile. Third, it is important to assess whether the success or 
failure of previous events may be incentives for future actions. Has success emboldened 
potential perpetrators? What is the impact of failure? For example, might the failure to 
successfully execute an attack force a terrorist group to try again in the near term to 
maintain its legitimacy, or to re-group and spend additional time planning?   
Operationally, a number of salient points emerge. Multiple variables influence the 
response to a catastrophic event. A level of objectivity needs to be maintained to allow 
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those coordinating the response to differentiate among political agendas, past 
experiences, and events on the ground. Past experiences and political agendas have a 
role to play in formulating a strategy but it is important to recognize that while events 
may be linked, each has unique characteristics and variables that require unique crisis 
management. Second, responding forces need to be discriminating in their method of 
response and selection of weaponry. Russian security forces need to achieve more 
operational restraint, which is a factor of command and planning. In the Dubrovka 
Theater, Nazran, and Beslan counter-assaults, security forces were directly or indirectly 
responsible for nearly 500 deaths. This is a training and command issue. Nothing 
substitutes for exercises in preparing security forces and other first responders for the 
pressures associated with a high-stress event.   
All options need to be considered in responding to events. After the initial executions, 
subsequent events at Beslan did not indicate a suicide attack was in progress. If a suicide 
attack was planned, why did the terrorists not immediately blow up the school after 
penetrating the perimeter? Given this reasoning, other options should have been 
explored. Units responding to a terrorist incident need to understand the “nature of  the 
beast” (i.e., the perpetrators and their motives); this will better prepare the command to 
determine whether an incident requires the immediate use of force or restraint.  
Negotiations can be essential in this process. They increase the time to gather and 
access intelligence to determine who the terrorists are and their objectives. Moreover, 
negotiations provide time to plan an effective response and secure the area to minimize 
collateral damage and avoid vigilantism.  
This latter point becomes increasingly important in emotionally-driven incidents 
where terrorists threaten or attack schools and other facilities that serve children or the 
weak and incapacitated. These targets have a high psychological value and such attacks 
shake society’s sense of security and thus may encourage the general population to seek 
resolution on their own.   
Poor multi-agency coordination hinders effective assessment of the crisis 
environment. At Beslan, local assistance and expertise was disregarded. To be effective 
security forces need to be cognizant that, as in combat, terrorist situations have a “fog of 
war” surrounding them.  Effective use of intelligence is needed to lift the “fog” to the 
greatest extent possible. This is accomplished by utilizing all available resources. Local 
resources can be particularly valuable in data fusion because they are familiar with the 
environment. Furthermore, effective incident command requires flexibility in the 
planning and execution of operations, not only to respond to unexpected events at the 
incident but also to achieve a level of control ensuring official actions are not overtaken 
by outside events (as occurred with the vigilantism at Beslan).  
Finally, lessons learned at the tactical level may be applied to prevention as well as 
response. “All response is local” is the mantra of American emergency response. Thus, 
the Department of Homeland Security’s list of 77,069 high-risk sites does not include 
many potential targets such as schools, hospitals, or local sports facilities. The DHS list 
presumes that local and regional authorities will assume the responsibility for 
protecting these venues. Local authorities need to have appropriate response plans and 
be prepared to request additional assistance if needed. At Beslan, local authorities were 
unprepared to respond to the crisis, even though they had intelligence indicating an 
elevated threat level. They had insufficient personnel and equipment. An additional 
question, beyond the scope of this paper but warranting further research, is what caused 
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the ineffective response? Might it be attributed to multiple priorities, incompetence, or 
perhaps even a level of cooperation between law enforcement and the perpetrators? The 
collusion suggested by this last point is the most disconcerting, but it needs to be 
considered in circumstances in which local law enforcement is under-paid, poorly 
trained, and might have religious, ethnic, or familial ties to the perpetrators. 
 
In conclusion, the Beslan tragedy provides a case study on how to improve the strategic, 
operational, and tactical prevention of, and response to, a terrorist incident. It clearly 
demonstrates the importance of intelligence and analysis both as a part of prevention 
and in reducing the “fog of war” inherent to response.  Finally, it shows how political 
agendas and past events can complicate the response to the incident at hand, including 
decisions surrounding incident command, transfer of power, and ultimately the method 
of response.  
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Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case 
Study in the Development of Public policy 
 
Samuel H. Clovis, Jr. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to describe an ongoing research project that explores 
the relationship between federalism and homeland security national 
preparedness. The challenges associated with this area of public policy require 
solutions for which the existing structures and paradigms must be changed to 
ensure the greatest level of preparedness possible.  
There is a great deal to say on the subject of the policy environment of 
homeland security. Fundamental to any discussion should be a strong foundation 
in federalism and the activities associated with the intergovernmental relations 
found in the homeland security arena. In the aftermath of the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, the government of the United States launched one of the 
largest reorganization efforts since the passing of the National Security Act of 
1947. In a single piece of legislation, twenty-two separate organizations were 
brought together to form the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As with 
any new organization, the growth, maturity, and evolution of the department 
have been anything but smooth. Nonetheless, the Department was charged with 
preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from acts of 
terrorism visited on the United States and its citizens.1 The department, only 
three years old, has been challenged on a number of fronts, not the least of which 
has been the development of a national preparedness system. National 
preparedness, as outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-
8), is to be enhanced through a series of policies that will allow federal, state, 
local, and tribal governments to collectively and comprehensively address 
catastrophic events, especially those that are the result of acts of terrorism.2  
Thus, HSPD-8 has been a foundation document, spawning a series of other 
directives, guidelines and reference documents focused on developing a national 
preparedness system. As identified by Keith Bea of the Congressional Research 
Service, the key references for homeland security national preparedness are:3 
! The National Planning Scenarios, 2004; 
! The National Response Plan (NRP), 2004; 
! The National Incident Management System (NIMS), 2004; 
! The Universal Task List (UTL), 2005; 
! The Interim National Preparedness Goal (The Goal), 2005; 
! The Target Capabilities List (TCL), 2005. 
A broader context for homeland security national preparedness is provided 
through: 
! The National Homeland Security Strategy;4  
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! Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents (HSPD-5);5  
! The transcript of a speech given by then-Secretary Tom Ridge to the 
National Association of Counties in March of 2004. 
In Secretary Ridge’s speech, and in each of these documents, specific reference is 
made to federalism as the guiding principle in meeting the national demand for 
preparedness or to the need for extensive coordination with state and local 
governments to arrive at the best possible levels of preparedness for the nation. 
Though HSPD-8 was issued in late 2003, only during the summer of 2005 was 
the complete list of documents finally available for review and comment. 
Subsequently, though the public policy development process was begun in early 
2004, only with the issuance of the National Preparedness Goal did the process 
begin in earnest. 
After first becoming involved in research related to homeland security in 2003, 
I became immersed in the policy arena in the spring of 2004.6 In order to fully 
prepare for advising both clients and employers on policy matters for homeland 
security, I examined foundational documents issued by the national government 
and the nascent academic literature related to the topic. What became 
immediately apparent was the fact that, for the first time in decades, the nation’s 
essential philosophy of government needed to be reexamined. From the first 
issuance of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, it became clear that a 
common understanding of federalism on the part of all levels and institutions of 
government is the guiding principle for whatever lies ahead.7 However, as has 
become apparent over time, the national government – both the legislative and 
executive branches – has a different perspective on federalism than do other 
levels of government in the nation’s federal system.   
 In the second part of this article, I discuss three contemporary theories of 
federalism, each found in today’s public policy arena. The importance of 
discussing these theories is that, although one form of federalism seems to 
dominate the current environment, the other forms uneasily coexist. These 
confront policy makers, decision makers, and practitioners with challenges 
related to acknowledging perspectives that might differ significantly from their 
own.   
The third part of this article outlines the current homeland security national 
preparedness environment. This environment is populated by innumerable 
stakeholders whose perspectives on homeland security are found most often to 
conflict at the most fundamental level. As the goal of the national preparedness 
public policy is to gain the highest level of capability with the resources available, 
the discussion must include federal grants-in-aid in general and homeland 
security grants-in-aid in particular. Part four discusses proposed measures, based 
on the results of qualitative research and analysis, which may provide 
comprehensive methods for assessing national preparedness and formulae for 
distributing scarce federal grants-in-aid available for enhancing homeland 








The foundation of this research effort is an extensive and on-going literature 
review of the theories of federalism unique to the American experience, economic 
theories that lend themselves to the study of both federalism theory and 
intergovernmental relations, and informal interviews with homeland security 
professionals, government bureaucrats, academics, practitioners, special interest 
group representatives, and, where possible, elected representatives of the people. 
As I broadened the literature base for this research effort, three dominant 
theories of federalism emerged: Cooperative Federalism, Coercive Federalism, 
and Competitive Federalism. Descriptions of these theories will be presented in 
the next section, but one in particular deserves mention as having influence on 
the methodology used here.  In the study of Competitive Federalism, one must 
examine the Public Choice theory of economics.9 This theory of economics 
provides an excellent base from which one can more accurately assess state and 
local intergovernmental behaviors.  
 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF FEDERALISM: POSITIVE AND 
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
What follows is a brief review of the history of the evolution of American 
federalism and the development of operational theories associated with 
Collaborative Federalism, Coercive Federalism, and Competitive Federalism. 
These theories are dominant in contemporary American history and, because of 
the way in which each theory manifests, they are in conflict. The following 
paragraphs identify the characteristics of each theory and present those 
characteristics as postulates from which to make comparisons when analyzing 
intergovernmental relations found in the current homeland security public policy 
arena. 
A Brief History 
Andreas Follesdal highlighted the contributions of Johannes Althusius in 
suggesting that two levels of government have sovereignty over the same people 
in the same territory.10 This notion of federalism, a concession on the part of 
those ruled to be ruled coincidentally, is based on striking a covenant to be so 
ruled.  Foedus, the root word from which federalism is drawn, means just that – a 
covenant. This covenant may manifest itself in any number of arrangements from 
a confederal arrangement of states – which relies less on a strong central 
government and more on the individual activities of each member state – to a 
fully unitary arrangement where the states and local jurisdictions are but 
extensions of a strong central government.11 The American experience, after 
suffering a confederal arrangement that did not work, struck out to find a balance 
that became the foundation of the American federal experience, arranged 
through the covenant found in the Constitution. The Constitution – the covenant 
– arranged for a shared governance of the same people in the same territory. This 
dual-sovereignty manifested itself in what became known as dual federalism, 
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where each jurisdictional entity provided those public goods and services 
accorded to that level. 
The arrangements found in the Constitution are specific and ambiguous at the 
same time.  In Article I, Section 8 the enumerated powers (specific) are left to the 
legislative branch of the national government and in the Tenth Amendment the 
reserved powers (ambiguous) are left to the states and the people. The tensions 
between the states and the central government were at the heart of the 
Connecticut Compromise and the very essence of the debate played out in the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers supporting and denouncing ratification of 
the Constitution, respectively. Any conflicts arising between the states and the 
central government are to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The Marshall 
court did just that in McCulloch vs. Maryland, establishing the supremacy of the 
Constitution, and hence the laws of national government, to those of the various 
states. 
The major tensions in the past, continuing to present times, have been related 
to the struggle for power between the states and central government. In the 
history of the nation, however, major historical events with potential for 
cataclysmic outcomes have inevitably allowed for more centralization of power in 
the national government.12 The first real example in the country’s history was the 
Civil War, where the very causes for which each side fought were preservation of 
the union on the part of the North and states’ rights in the South. How the nation 
was to deal with the institution of slavery may have been the most visible reason 
for the war, but union and nullification were fundamental. The centralization of 
war powers in the central government of the North ultimately contributed to that 
side prevailing. Subsequently, the passing of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 
to the Constitution further institutionalized the movement toward 
centralization.13 
In the years between the Civil War and the Great Depression, Congress began 
exercising its power through application of the commerce clause in the 
Constitution. Perhaps the single greatest event to influence the struggle for power 
between the central government and the states was the adoption of the 16th 
Amendment to the Constitution, allowing the national government to impose an 
income tax on its citizens to support the activities of the government. Though the 
income taxes and methods of collection found in the country in 1914 would be 
hardly recognizable today, the inevitable swing of the pendulum of power 
between the states and the central government moved decidedly toward the 
central government, with virtually no chance of returning to anything resembling 
the dual federalism existing before the institution of a national personal income 
tax. Over time, the broadening of the base of taxation and the exponential 
increase in revenues collected allowed the national government to support more 
and more programs, providing more and more of the public goods and services 
seemingly demanded by a wealthier citizenry. With adoption of the 17th 
Amendment, allowing direct election of senators by the voting populace, state 
governments arguably lost their last source of leverage in the national legislature. 
One can reasonably conclude that passage of the 16th and 17th Amendments 
changed American federalism forever. 
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The next potentially cataclysmic event was the Great Depression. To combat 
the effects of the economic and social crises brought on by this event, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt championed the New Deal. The New Deal was 
comprised of massive public spending programs designed literally to make 
government the major force in the economy of the nation. Following the 
economic teachings of John Maynard Keynes, the national government, through 
these spending programs, stretched out its arms and gathered more power away 
from the states. Through the creation of grants-in-aid, returning collected taxes 
back to state and local governments, the national government began to preempt 
state and local governance prerogatives. As the national government created 
more and more programs, the Congress authorized the establishment of 
regulatory agencies to oversee these programs. As the states could not possibly 
deal with the persistent economic malaise on their own, the national government 
was acting in the national interest to do whatever necessary to bring the country 
out of its economic doldrums. What was clear was that private enterprise and 
laissez faire economic policies were not going to move the country forward.14 
Another element of this perfect storm of centralizing tendencies was the 
capitulation of the federal courts to the legislative branch. For the first time in 
American history, the Supreme Court began to consistently side with the national 
legislature as the Congress pressed harder to exercise power under the commerce 
clause.15 By 1937, Congress had fully established itself as being the main force in 
American governance. Thus, with a strong executive in President Roosevelt and a 
very strong Democrat majority in Congress, the nation headed into the Second 
World War with the central government very much in control of American 
governance. 
At the end of World War II, the tax base in America had expanded to include 
some eighty-six percent of the workforce.16 The nation was wealthy and gaining a 
social conscience relative to civil and individual rights. Again, the best way to 
ensure that “national priorities” received national attention was through the 
exercise of power on the part of Congress. Having gained traction during the 
depression years, federal grants-in-aid became a major mechanism for ensuring 
these national priorities were accomplished. To fully implement these social 
programs, however, Congress required the cooperation of state and local 
governments. This governance arrangement, fully documented by Martin 
Grodzins and Daniel Elazar, became known as Cooperative Federalism.17 The 
principal assumption of Cooperative Federalism was that the role of each level of 
government was agreed upon through a negotiation process.  Grodzins’ notion –
that American federalism was never a layer cake (dual federalism) but rather a 
marble cake where all levels of government are required to cooperate on all 
matters of national interest – seemed appropriate. Elazar, in advancing the 
theory of Cooperative Federalism, articulated the virtues of such arrangements, 
particularly for solving the issues of the time. 
With the ushering in of the Great Society by Lyndon Johnson and the new 
generation Democrat-controlled Congress of the 1960s, the nation witnessed the 
mutation of Cooperative Federalism into Creative Federalism, where federal 
grants-in-aid programs exploded and funding no longer went to places (like state 
and local governments) but began to be disbursed to individuals through various 
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social programs.18 The promulgation of grant programs led to the inevitable 
expansion of the national government through the creation of more regulatory 
agencies to oversee the new programs. Of particular note was that nearly all the 
federal grants-in-aid programs were categorical grants, where funds were 
reallocated to achieve specific purposes through compliance with specific 
instructions. More pernicious, however, was that many of these grants involved 
direct preemption of state and local prerogatives (at best) or full circumvention of 
these levels of government (at worst).19 As nearly all of the Great Society 
programs still exist, the apparatus and mechanisms for the mutated Cooperative 
Federalism are still in place and functioning today. 
In the mid-1970s, American voters became irritable over ever-increasing tax 
burdens and the lack of perceived benefit received from tax contributions to the 
various levels of government. Subsequently, tax payers became more sensitive to 
high marginal tax rates and began demanding accountability from elected 
representatives for the money sent to the treasury. Though Ronald Reagan was 
the Galahad riding to the rescue, the tax cuts of the 1980s did not stop the 
Congress from continuing to exercise its power. Categorical grant programs 
continued to be characterized by stringent compliance coming at the end of 
strengthened regulatory control, thus allowing the national government to coerce 
needed behaviors through the power of redistribution of funds. State and local 
governments had become dependent on federal funding, so compliance was the 
best possible political arrangement.  
Many of the programs, however, were funded for only a short period of time or 
were under-funded from the start, thus creating a financial burden for the states 
and local governments and requiring them to expend own-source revenues to 
keep programs alive.20 In order to provide not only the national programs, but 
those preferred by the citizens of the states and local governments as well, taxes 
and fees had to be raised to cover the costs of all the goods and services provided 
by those governments.  As a result, state and local taxes doubled from 1960 to the 
late 1990s.21 Further, the courts continued to support the usurpation of state and 
local power by stressing that the states had recourse “through the political 
process” rather than reigning in an ever-expanding central government. This 
brand of federalism, labeled Coercive Federalism by Kincaid, is still prevalent, in 
spite of such legislative remedies as the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, 
passed by the 104th Congress.22 The proliferation of categorical grants remains 
unabated. 
At the state and local level, however, governments compete for citizens so that 
tax revenues remain strong and citizens can enjoy the desired level of public 
goods and services provided by the local or state jurisdictions. The competition is 
manifested in economic development actions, public education, infrastructure, 
and revenue schemes that provide an acceptable balance between the taxes 
required and the goods and services provided to the consumer-voter. Consumer-
voters express their preferences by electing officials who act on those preferences. 
If the tax burden becomes too onerous, or the goods and services do not meet the 
expectations of the consumer-voter, then the consumer-voter may leave the 
jurisdiction for one where his or her preferences are better met with an 
appropriate and acceptable tax burden to support those goods and services 
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demanded.23 If the “exit” option is not convenient, then the consumer-voter still 
has a “voice” in the political process, voting for or against representatives who do, 
or do not, represent the preferences of the individual consumer-voter.24 As one 
moves from local government to higher levels, the exit option becomes more 
expensive in terms of transaction and opportunity costs. The exit option at the 
national level, though more feasible in the current global environment, is still an 
unlikely option, allowing the national government to continue its monopolistic 
behaviors relevant to the provision of public goods and services. State and local 
governments are compelled to compete with each other and must tolerate or 
mitigate the monopolistic behaviors of the central government. 
The above description of competitive interaction among governments is that of 
Competitive Federalism. Based on the idea of “public choice” introduced by 
Charles Tiebout in 1956 and expanded upon by such noted economists as James 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Competitive Federalism resonates strongly with 
state and local governments across the nation. The idea that the political 
processes at the state and local level are roughly analogous with competitive 
market behaviors is not only intriguing but also compelling. As state and local 
governments have become more professional and capable, competitive influences 
play a larger and larger role in influencing legislative and executive behaviors at 
the state and local level. 
Now that one can appreciate the historical evolution of these three theories of 
federalism, what then are the postulates or tenets of the three theories analyzed 
later in this article? For Cooperative Federalism, a survey of the literature 
suggests the following conclusions about the relevant tenets of this theory.  
Cooperative Federalism is characterized by: 
! A “first principle” being the national government would use its superior 
resources to initiate and support national programs, principally 
administered by state and local governments.25 
! The states are well-integrated parts of the overall American civil 
societies in their own right with their own political systems. 
! The states have preserved their integrity not through a sharp 
separation of political systems from the national government but 
within an intricate framework of cooperative relationships that 
preserve the states’ structural integrity while tying all levels of 
government together functionally in the common task of serving the 
American people. 
! These cooperative arrangements are negotiated between the levels of 
government (emphasis added).26 
! Each level of government possesses certain autonomous powers that 
may be exercised cooperatively. 
! No level of government may coerce any other to action. 
! The roles of Congress in Cooperative Federalism are facilitation and 
leadership. 
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! Congress uses its power to regulate interstate commerce to assist states 
by prohibiting the use of such commerce in violation of state laws.27  
Cooperative Federalism seems to work best when national priorities are managed 
through negotiated arrangements among the various levels and entities of 
government. 
What, then, are the postulates and characteristics of Coercive Federalism?  
Coercive Federalism can be characterized by: 
!   An activist Congress with tendencies to nationalize all issues. 
!   The proliferation of federal grants-in-aid programs with stronger and 
tighter conditions and more preemption of state prerogatives. 
!   The shifting of federal grants-in-aid from places (state and local 
governments) to individuals. 
!   Increased Congressional pressure on state and local tax and borrowing 
options. 
!   The decreased willingness, at all levels, to cooperate in such federal 
programs as Medicaid and transportation programs. 
!  The federalization of criminal law. 
!   Increasing interference in the business of state and local governments 
by the federal judiciary. 
!   Increased use of under- or unfunded mandates by Congress to coerce 
action and impose taxes on constituents, thus blurring responsibility 
and accountability for levels of taxation.28  
Subsequent sections of this article will demonstrate the direct application of these 
tenets to the current federal grants-in-aid programs, including those related to 
homeland security. 
What, then, are the tenets of Competitive Federalism? Competitive Federalism 
is characterized by: 
!   Citizens cooperating through the exchange of goods and services in 
organized markets; such cooperation implies mutual gain. Two or more 
states may find it mutually advantageous to join forces to accomplish 
certain common purposes. They exchange inputs in securing the 
commonly shared output.29 
!   Through the exercise of exit options or through voice, preferences 
concerning bundles of goods and services and the taxes needed to 
support procuring those goods and services, are revealed by the 
consumer-voter to elected representatives. 
!   The more homogeneous the constituency, the clearer the preferences.30   
!   The decentralization of power – to that level where the tax base equals 
the geography of services provided – leads to the most efficient use of 
resources in the public domain (Principle of Subsidiarity). 
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!   Each level of government finances its assigned and chosen tasks with 
the funds it raises itself (Principle of Fiscal Equivalence). 
!   Each level of government has exclusive, clear, and assigned tasks, 
supporting the revealed preferences of its citizens (Principle of 
Exclusivity). 
!   The condition that, if a good or service produced in one jurisdiction is 
satisfactory, the good or service ought to be acceptable across all levels 
of government (Principle of the Rule of Origin).31  
As state and local governments are the governments closest to the people, one 
can easily see the compelling adherence between Public Choice theory and 
Competitive Federalism. 
Each theory is likewise characterized by both positive and negative attributes, 
manifested in the institutional behaviors which, depending on perspective, lead 
to tensions among different levels and entities of government. In the next section, 
these tenets will be applied to the current environment of public policy related to 
homeland security. Through analysis of intergovernmental relations, I will 
identify those favorable characteristics of each theory which should be applied to 
form a new theory of federalism based on the concept of collaboration. 
 
THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY—
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 
This section examines the current homeland security public policy environment. 
The topics addressed are the Legislative (Congress) and Executive (agencies and 
departments) branches of the national government, state governments, local 
governments, federal grants-in-aid writ large, and homeland security grant 
programs in particular. Subsequently, after descriptions are completed and the 
environment analyzed, the theories of federalism described in the previous 
section will be applied to ascertain the varying levels of influence the dominant 
theories might have on the current environment. Based on the findings and 
conclusions of the analysis of the current environment, an alternative theory of 
federalism that is better suited to the current environment will be advanced. The 
alternative theory and subsequent behaviors required by the various actors will 
be addressed in the final section. 
The attacks of 9/11 represented another event of potentially cataclysmic 
consequences for the nation. As has been true in the past, such events typically 
lead to a movement in the federalism power pendulum toward centralization of 
power in the national government. Within days of the event, the Congress passed 
the controversial USA PATRIOT Act, placing extraordinary strains on civil 
liberties in the country; in 2002 it passed the Homeland Security Act to create the 
Department of Homeland Security. Similarly, emergency funds were 
appropriated and allocated to all levels of government to “combat terrorism.” The 
nation reeled from the enormity of the attacks but was not long in attempting to 
return to normal.  The return to “normal” did not seem to be as difficult for the 
citizens of the country as it was for the political institutions of the nation.  
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Congress, to this day, continues to provide more oversight to homeland security 
(a department with a budget of some forty billion dollars a year) than it does for 
the Department of Defense which has a budget ten times larger. Today, all 100 
Senators and 412 of the 435 Representatives, on some sixty-six committees or 
subcommittees, have assignments with oversight of the Department of Homeland 
Security. No other department enjoys as much supervision. Though the initial 
appropriations for homeland security were substantial, in each subsequent year 
since the attacks homeland security federal grants-in-aid have declined.32 
There may be many reasons for this hyperactivity and conflicting behavior, but 
much of the literature points to federal grants-in-aid funding focused more on 
representatives “doing well” as opposed to “doing good.” Such has become the 
behavior of elected representatives at the national level. Special interests, 
regulatory agencies, and the elected representatives have formed the proverbial 
“Iron Triangle,” which tends to exclude the preferences of consumer-voters from 
being the primary influence on elected officials. Other evidence indicates that 
more homogeneous constituencies, higher margins of victory, and lower voter 
turn-out have loosened constraints of representative behavior. Homeland 
security grants-in-aid funding is no different. It is no accident that each 
congressional district in the country has received some form of homeland 
security grants-in-aid funding. Unfortunately, the homeland security grant 
funding represents more “talking the talk” than “walking the walk.” Although 
homeland security seems to be on the tongue of every representative, less than 
one percent of the total redistribution of funds to state and local governments is 
found in homeland security grants. No fewer than eleven different executive 
branch departments distribute more funds to state and local governments than 
does DHS.33 
On a larger scale, Congress has continued to rely on categorical grants as the 
principal means of preempting state and local prerogatives, influencing state and 
local behaviors and nationalizing issues that may affect most or all the states in 
the union without being national in nature. Congress and their Executive Branch 
agency accomplices force state and local governments to comply with more and 
more conditions, increase the requirements for reporting, and diminish the 
accountability of the national government through the persistent pressure to 
increase taxes at the state and local level to accommodate administration of these 
programs. The level of redistribution of funds as a portion of total state and local 
revenue has remained stable for the past twenty years, while state and local 
revenues as a percentage of total governmental revenues have doubled during the 
same period.34 Today, Congress funds (or doesn’t fund, depending on one’s 
perspective) more than 660 programs through categorical grants. In fiscal year 
2004, Congress appropriated more than $460 billion for these programs.35  State 
and local governments would prefer that the Congress and agencies distribute 
funds through a block grant system. This would allow sub-national governments 
the flexibility to meet the preferences of the citizen-voters and to observe broader 
guidelines or standards, rather than adhering to strict, narrow items of 
compliance for programs that are inherently inefficient.36 
Unlike all but one state in the union, the national government is not compelled 
to balance its annual budget, thus allowing further erosion of its accountability 
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for spending and revenues. Deficit spending has been the norm for all but five of 
the last seventy-five annual national budgets.37 Control of Congress by one party 
or the other does not seem to make a difference. 
The environment at the state and local level is quite different. First, the sub-
state levels of government are typically sanctioned or chartered by the respective 
state legislatures. Second, the sheer number of governmental units below the 
national level is compelling on its own. When all types of governmental units are 
considered, including special-use districts like water, fire, and school districts, 
there are some 89,000 jurisdictions below the national level.38 Of the 89,000 or 
so jurisdictions, some 39,000 are what would be considered general-purpose 
jurisdictions that provide public goods and services, are funded through some 
form of tax or fee structure, and are administered by elected officials. These 
jurisdictions are the units of government closest to the people.  In all but one 
state (Vermont), and in nearly every chartered sub-state governmental entity, a 
balanced annual or biennial budget is required to meet the preferences of the 
citizens in the respective jurisdictions. Similarly, forty-six of the fifty states have 
budget cycles that are opened and closed at times out of alignment with the 
federal budget cycle, with most states on a July to June cycle.39 The necessity to 
balance budgets and to pay as one goes is a direct reflection of the competitive 
influences at the sub-national governmental levels. Rather than state and local 
governments being allowed to collude and become price searchers, governments 
below the national level must become price takers and compete for citizens from 
which to extract the price of providing public goods and services.  
Although there are decided advantages to forcing state and local governments 
to operate with balanced budgets, these same levels of government become 
susceptible to fluctuations in the national economy. For example, if the country 
enters a general recession, the impact of higher unemployment and subsequent 
reduced tax revenues affects sub-national governments more than the national 
government. However, when the national economy begins to turn around, 
individual states tend to recover faster than the nation as a whole.  Witness the 
data on post-9/11 state revenues: over half the states showed surpluses in state 
budgets within two years of the attacks and nearly every state showed a surplus 
by fiscal year 2005.40 The behavior of the states, however, when surpluses begin 
to appear again, is influenced by competitive forces. Typically, states put more 
money in “rainy day” funds, lower taxes, or increase public goods and services, 
making themselves more appealing to consumer-voters. 
State and local governments also depend on federal grants-in-aid to maintain 
programs that may or may not be preferred by consumer-voters. The bargain to 
be made is whether or not to accept the money and the subsequent costs of 
managing these categorical grants, or to turn down the funds, thus allowing state 
contributions to the national treasury through personal income taxes to be spent 
in other states rather than in their own. The pernicious nature of the categorical 
grants is that benefits are often concentrated to serve particularized clientele with 
costs dispersed across the nation. When states make the decision to expend own-
source revenues on categorical grant administration, state and local elected 
officials must decide on what own-source programs to cut, what taxes to increase, 
or what combination of the two will be best tolerated by the consumer-voters. 
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Estimates are that state and local governments will spend some $220 billion in 
own-source revenues to administer the distribution of some $460+ billion in 
federal grants-in-aid. For programs like the infamous No Child Left Behind, some 
states estimate having to spend seven dollars for each dollar received in aid.41  
Some of the federal grants-in-aid programs have been in existence for decades, 
allowing state and local governments some predictability in projecting the 
funding levels required for administration. Sub-national level governments have 
built the appropriate mechanisms to deal with these long-standing programs.  
State and local executives and representatives have priorities generally reflected 
in the level of distribution of federal grants-in-aid. Typically, health care, income 
security, education, transportation, and economic development take up some 
ninety-one percent of the federal grants-in-aid redistributions and are part of 
established administration.42 However, the situation relating to homeland 
security grants is a bit more complex. 
Since the State Homeland Security Grant Program was established, Congress 
and DHS have come under considerable criticism for the slow pace of deploying 
funds to state and local governments. The grant application process, the 
conditions of compliance, the reporting requirements, and the asymmetries of 
budget cycles and cash reimbursements reflect insensitivity to the operating 
conditions of state and local governments seldom revealed in other programs. 
Over the past three years, the number of pages of instructions for applying for 
homeland security grants has increased from forty plus pages for fiscal year 2004 
to over 200 pages for fiscal year 2006.  The steps for receiving grants are as 
follows: 
1. Funds are appropriated for homeland security purposes as part of the 
national government budget cycle, with the fiscal year commencing on 
October 1 but with funds typically not available until November or later. 
2. States and their sub-state general purpose jurisdictions apply for grants, 
indicating efforts to comply with required conditions such as NIMS 
compliance or homeland security planning. Conditions for expenditure of 
funds are closely controlled. Each state aggregates individual grants and 
submits them to the department. 
3. Once plans are approved, state and local governments must then purchase 
according to the plans submitted, paying for purchases out of own-source 
revenues. Once purchases are made, receipts are turned in to the state and 
then passed along to DHS for reimbursement.   
One can see immediate problems with this approach. First, there are 
asymmetries in state and local budget cycles as related to the federal cycle. States 
are typically well into their respective fiscal years when the federal government 
appropriates the funds for that year’s homeland security grants. States have no 
way of predicting or accounting for funds that might be available. Second, state 
and local governments are required to have balanced budgets, so any purchases 
based on the current homeland security grant program funding must come from 
available discretionary funds.  Similarly, most state and local governments, to 
allow transparency of expenditures, must competitively bid all procurements. 
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Again, these requirements further delay the purchases. Typically, state and local 
governments do not get reimbursed (if they get reimbursed at all) until late in 
their own fiscal years or at some point in the next fiscal year – a totally 
unacceptable situation for consumer-voters in those state and local jurisdictions. 
In any situation where scarce resources are to be allocated, some form of 
rationing is required. Rationing is done through price, lottery, need, first-come-
first-served, or through force. With homeland security federal grants-in-aid, 
more and more jurisdictions are finding the “price” for applying to get funding 
too high. Jurisdictions without the staff and time to pursue discretionary budget 
excursions are opting out of the program. Millions of dollars are left in the 
treasury every year. Subsequently, communities without the tax base and revenue 
streams to support full-time homeland security or emergency management staff 
are opting out of the homeland security grant system. Though the data are sparse 
concerning at exactly what level full-time personnel are found, one can 
extrapolate that most jurisdictions with fewer than 50,000 citizens do not have 
full-time emergency management personnel who can pursue funding as part of 
their day-to-day duties. As a result, those jurisdictions without full-time 
emergency management personnel may be the ones most likely to opt out of the 
homeland security grant program. This phenomenon is an unintended 
consequence of the Congress and the department seeking “accountability” 
through stringent compliance measures and reporting requirements. Further, the 
requirements for acceptable compliance in current homeland security grant 
programs indicate a complete lack of awareness of – and sensitivity to – the 
operational activities of state and local governments. 
Looking at the tenets or characteristics of the various federalism theories and 
applying them to the current homeland security public policy arena, it appears 
that all three theories have application. The current homeland security grant 
program is narrowly focused, preempts state and local prerogatives, is insensitive 
to the operational activities of state and local governments, and has associated 
costs which further limit distribution of funds to communities. One can easily 
make the argument that the current homeland security grant program qualifies 
as a manifestation of Coercive Federalism. 
State and local governments, along with the federal level of government, agree 
that homeland security is a national issue requiring national, though not one-
size-fits-all, solutions. Sub-national jurisdictions would be more than happy to 
administer national programs if those programs could be shaped to local, state, 
and regional preferences and requirements. Further, any program must be 
revenue neutral, as is preferred by most consumer-voters.43 Long established 
grants-in-aid programs have administrative bureaucracies already in place, 
reflecting a negotiated arrangement to administer nationally-funded programs 
for the national government. Such arrangements are reflective of the tenets of 
Cooperative Federalism. In the homeland security arena, agencies such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) have long-standing arrangements with state and 
local emergency management and public health officials. These arrangements 
also qualify as being compliant with the characteristics of Cooperative 
Federalism. 
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State and local governments do compete and concerns over free-riders (who 
did not contribute to paying the price for goods and services) benefiting from 
public goods and services being provided to consumer-voters is still clearly a 
barrier to be overcome. The provision of a secure jurisdiction is an additional 
service to be considered in the bundle of goods and services provided by that 
jurisdiction. In today’s environment, however, the amount of public safety, 
homeland security, or emergency management being provided by a particular 
jurisdiction is by definition what is preferred by the consumer-voters in that 
jurisdiction. If more of that good or service were preferred, more would be 
purchased and provided. Thus, state and local jurisdictions are providing 
exactly what consumer-voters require. To ask them to provide more than what is 
preferred of a good or service is inappropriate. In relation to homeland security, 
local consumer-voters do not perceive the need for greater levels of public safety.   
Even though they may have concerns nationally, they do not have those same 
concerns locally. Contrary to Don Kettl’s notion that every citizen deserves a 
certain level of homeland security,44 there is little evidence to support the idea 
that citizens want more “homeland security,” particularly if they have to pay extra 
for it.45 Today’s homeland security environment, particularly at the local level, 
meets the tenets of Competitive Federalism with opportunities to “compete” 
through the addition of services to provide for safer, more secure communities as 
an addition to the bundle of goods and services sought by rational consumer-
voters. 
Another important aspect of today’s homeland security public policy arena to 
consider is that no single jurisdiction has the wherewithal to deal with major 
catastrophic events. Though all emergencies begin and end at the local level, if 
communities, states, and the nation are to cope with major incidents, some form 
of aggregation of capabilities needs to be accomplished so each level of 
government has the opportunity to marshal the resources needed to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from major disasters. There clearly is not 
enough money to “buy” the capabilities necessary, so how does the nation go 
about building national preparedness to meet homeland security mission 
requirements? The next section examines normative proposed approaches to 
meeting the need for a comprehensive level of national preparedness. 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
Lord, grant me the Serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
The Courage to change the things I can,  
And the Wisdom to know the difference. 
                                   Alcoholics Anonymous 
 
Based on the topics discussed in the previous section and looking at what can, or 
should, be changed, the appropriate solution sets are obvious.  There are policies 
and practices in the Congress, the executive agencies, the states, and local 
government that ought to be addressed. Unfortunately, some of the practices are 
not likely to be given appropriate scrutiny; but the opportunity for all actors in 
this arena to respond responsibly without incurring high costs is certainly 
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available. We should first examine those areas not likely to change, and then 
suggest actions more easily adopted. 
The Congress of the United States is not likely to change its oversight regime of 
the Department of Homeland Security, at least not right away. Representatives 
and senators are reluctant to relinquish prerogatives. Power in many committees 
is measured by the number of government workers impacted by committee 
decisions or the amount of money flowing through the committee to the agencies 
and back to constituents. The incentives to maintain the current oversight regime 
are far greater than the incentives to change. Though much could be learned from 
the Department of Defense model of congressional oversight, modifications to 
homeland security oversight will be slow in coming. 
Another issue facing Congress is the amount of money flowing through grants-
in-aid for homeland security purposes. As has been the case over the past three 
years, less and less money is being made available to the State Homeland Security 
Grant Program. What is not known to many, however, is that there are an 
additional fifteen grant programs directly related to homeland security not 
administered as part of the State Homeland Security Grant Program. These 
federal grants-in-aid total some $3.3 billion for fiscal year 2006, more than the 
funding available through the current state grant program. These grants are 
sponsored by DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of 
Transportation. Some of these programs pre-date the events of 9/11, but are 
included in homeland security grant funds writ large. As several of these 
programs reflect disbursement schedules to fund particular professional activities 
such as fire fighting and law enforcement, it is clear special interests have 
influenced the creation of these grant programs to benefit particular professions 
rather than to build overall homeland security capability and preparedness. 
Again, Congress may be seen as “doing well” as opposed to “doing good.” These 
earmarked programs are not likely to change without strong voice from 
consumer-voters or in the absence of another major attack within the United 
States that might force congressional leaders to seek more economically efficient 
distribution schemes. 
At the state and local level, we are not likely to see any particular weaning of 
jurisdictions from the seductive flow of revenue from the federal government. 
With consumer-voter resistance to increased taxes high, and enthusiasm for 
change low, state and local governments are compelled to continue to accept the 
handouts. Also, special interests work at the state level as well as the national. 
Unless a major education and socialization effort occurs, federal agencies are 
not likely to change their perceptions of state and local governments or their 
approaches to operationalizing federal grants-in-aid distributions. Agencies will 
likely continue to stress conditions, compliance, reporting, and “one size fits all” 
solutions. Agencies are unlikely to change their ways unless Congress insists on 
different approaches to program administration. 
What, then, can be changed? Much can be changed with relatively little cost to 
stakeholders, but the changes must be done in the spirit of collaboration, which 
incorporates the positive notion of cooperation, eliminates most of the negative 
aspects of coercion, and takes advantage of organizational models which 
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encourage competitive spirits while building aggregate capabilities. Is there a 
solution set for building national preparedness within the constraints of available 
resources? I would suggest there is. 
What can be changed on the part of Congress relative to homeland security is 
the bundling of the twenty preparedness-related grant programs into various 
hybrid block grant programs. The flexibility of block grants could be enjoyed by 
state and local governments to meet consumer-voter preferences while at the 
same time establishing guidance and milestones for accomplishing program 
objectives. There are some natural combinations for these grants that would 
provide streamlined administration and would allow delivery of funds to the 
appropriate level of government, in a timely manner, where those who know best 
what is needed can then spend the funds meeting those requirements. 
A second action on the part of Congress would be to fund the grant programs 
for multiple years, allowing state and local governments to plan appropriately for 
consistent and predictable revenue streams. Again, the inherent flexibility found 
in some form of block grant seems most conducive to gaining eager and 
constructive participation on the part of sub-national governments to build 
national preparedness. 
There are many actions state and local governments can take. First must be an 
“as is” assessment of where each jurisdiction – and subsequently the nation – 
stands relative to capabilities and preparedness. A proposed methodology for this 
process is found in an approach designed by the Homeland Security Institute 
which allows jurisdictions to make an “apples to apples” comparison of 
capabilities and preparedness. The basic approach is to first identify those 
jurisdictions that provide professional skills and services that fall under the 
rubric of homeland security “necessary services.” These services include such 
areas as fire fighting, law enforcement, emergency medical capabilities, public 
works, etc.46 Special districts typically do not provide these services, but general 
purpose jurisdictions do. Those jurisdictions providing their consumer-voters 
two or more of these services qualify as homeland security jurisdictions (HSJs). 
These jurisdictions are then asked to evaluate their capabilities either against the 
national planning scenarios or against thresholds at which their own-source 
services might be overwhelmed. When those thresholds are broached, the 
jurisdiction must seek outside assistance to meet the contingencies of the 
emergency. Seeking outside help can come in the form of both vertical (another 
level of government) or horizontal (same level of government) aggregation of 
capabilities. Jurisdictions go from being capability centers to being part of 
capability clusters. If capabilities still cannot be met through immediate mutual 
aid arrangements, then help must be sought from larger, more capable sources. 
Now the local jurisdiction has become part of a chain of capability clusters 
forming a capability contour, typically arrayed along major highway systems or 
other lines of communication.   
This first step allows jurisdictions to gain situational awareness of the 
capabilities available from all other homeland security jurisdictions. But what 
about those jurisdictions that might report having law enforcement capability, 
but the capability is a single part-time officer with a single patrol car? Now the 
target capabilities must be mapped to the professional skills and services so 
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jurisdictions, through the collaborative aggregation of capabilities, can finally 
arrive at an assessment of capabilities resident in provided services that assures 
some level of preparedness. This approach will ensure levels of preparedness 
greater than levels possible from individual jurisdictions, but that cost nothing 
but the time to make the mutual aid arrangements. Such a model can be found in 
collaborative economic development activities among sub-national jurisdictions. 
The benefits of collaboration (e.g., gaining from industry coming to the region) 
are greater than those of standing alone (i.e., hoping for a windfall in landing a 
new business entity in one’s particular community). Free-rider concerns are 
mitigated in collaboration, as jurisdictions provide what they can and understand 
that if the tables were turned they would be receiving assistance from other 
capability centers, clusters, and contours. 
The aggregation methodology does not stop at the state level. States, in order 
to meet regional needs, can seek mutual support agreements that provide 
solutions more appropriate to the consumer-voters. As aggregation calculations 
continue to the national level, DHS and Congress will finally have an as-is picture 
of capabilities and national preparedness, with identified shortfalls and gaps, that 
in turn would lead to optimum allocation of scarce resources. 
This first step of assessing own-source capabilities and building upon mutual 
aid opportunities allows state and local governments to cool the heat of 
competition while allowing jurisdictions to maintain sovereignty. The sub-
national jurisdictions will provide services to the level preferred by their 
consumer-voters and build capabilities beyond own-source availability.  This 
approach also raises citizen awareness of homeland security activities – 
something desired by the American people.47 By raising homeland security 
awareness among a jurisdiction’s citizens, we will likely witness positive changes 
in homeland security preferences. Those preferences will be expressed to elected 
officials and a new array of public goods and services will be provided. 
What type of governance will be most conducive to these required actions on 
the part of Congress, federal departments, and state and local governments? The 
system of governance will have to be one based on collaboration. Can one then 
develop postulates for a new compound theory of federalism? Perhaps building a 
new theory for the overall governance of the country might be a bit much, but 
building a theory for homeland security certainly seems plausible. To that end, I 
would propose the following characteristics of Collaborative Federalism for 
Homeland Security: 
! Homeland security is a national issue requiring national solutions. 
Therefore, the role of Congress and its executive agent DHS, is that of 
facilitation and leadership, providing guidelines, milestones, and enough 
funding to make a difference. 
! State and local governments have maximum flexibility in implementing 
homeland security programs to gain greater efficiency and better 
situational awareness. This is facilitated by funding provided through 
some form of block grants. 
CLOVIS, FEDERALISM 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
  
18
! Agencies, as agents of the Congress, must also be agents for the sub-
national levels of government. The agencies should be staffed with 
individuals with state and local experience and should focus on facilitation 
as well as administration. 
! State and local governments should collaborate with jurisdictions both 
vertically and horizontally to gain situational awareness of own-source and 
out-source capabilities and levels of awareness. 
! State and local jurisdictions should collaborate with other jurisdictions to 
gain from aggregated capabilities without risking sovereignty or raising 
the costs of homeland security beyond the levels preferred by consumer-
voters. 
The “bumper stickers” for a new mutation of federalism are readily apparent. 
Collaborate to Aggregate (gain situational awareness and take advantage of 
aggregate capabilities beyond those provide through own-source capabilities).  
Collaborate to Coordinate (seek out and develop mutual aid arrangements that 
will provide reassurances of being able to meet the initial surge of activities in the 
event a jurisdiction faces a major catastrophic event).  Collaborate to Integrate 
(jurisdictions at all levels of government, including the federal level, will have the 
mechanisms in place to assess and build capabilities and national preparedness).  
Collaborate to Isolate (those jurisdictions that will not or cannot collaborate will 
be quickly isolated and will suffer from the isolation imposed by others who seek 
partners with whom to collaborate). Only through collaboration at all levels of 
government will the country achieve the best possible level of preparedness. 
Anything else will lead to inefficiencies and, worse, a nation unnecessarily at risk. 
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Changing Homeland Security:  





PRELUDE TO VEXATION 
What is a homeland security future worth creating?1 Each of us could posit an 
answer to that question. After enough talk, we would probably agree on the broad 
outlines of a desirable future. Eventually we could develop a strategy for 
implementing that vision – or at least some of it – within the next ten years.  But 
as the years passed, our vision would encounter the tedium of incrementalism, 
the discontinuity of unexpected disappointment, and the surprise of unearned 
fortune.   
Nietzsche wrote about this process:  
To make plans and project designs brings with it many good sensations; 
and whoever had the strength to be nothing but a forger of plans his 
whole life long would be a very happy man. But he would occasionally 
have to take a rest from this activity by carrying out a plan – and then 
comes the vexation and the sobering up.2   
Homeland security strategy – defined as the pattern of consistent behavior over 
time – is both intentional and emergent. The homeland security community does 
a continually improving job identifying and enacting intended strategy.3 The 
community is less effective explicitly acknowledging and integrating emergent 
strategy. We can do better. 
Getting where we want to be in the next decade will be somewhat like driving 
at night. We know broadly what our destination could be. But we see only as far 
as our headlights shine and we do not know what we will encounter on the road.   
This essay describes a framework that can help keep the homeland security 
community between the white lines on the road to a future worth creating. It 
recommends a strategic process that incorporates the dynamic realities of 
complex adaptive systems. It asserts that recognizing and managing systemic 
patterns – rather than focusing on programs – would benefit homeland security.4 
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ACT ONE: PASSING ALONG THE PROLOGUE  
SCENE 1: GLAUCON IS TALKING TO SOCRATES.  
GLAUCON’S FIVE-YEAR-OLD SON HAS A BIRTHDAY NEXT MONTH, AND GLAUCON IS LOOKING 
FOR ADVICE ABOUT PLANNING THE PARTY.5 
Socrates: What is your thinking thus far? 
Glaucon:  Well, we have a birthday party strategy. The goal is for everyone to have a 
safe and enjoyable time. We have specific and measurable objectives we 
want to accomplish. We have identified the key milestones from now until 
the party. We have a timeline to follow, including a tabletop exercise. We 
are assuming a three-hour operational phase followed by a two-hour 
recovery. That evening, we will conduct a hot wash to identify any lessons 
learned to build into next year’s birthday party planning. 
Socrates:  That appears to be an efficient and sound strategy. Why do you want my 
advice? 
Glaucon:    In our past conversations, you have disagreed with everything I said.  You 
have talked me out of all my initial beliefs. I thought I would use you as 
quality control, just to make certain I did not miss anything. 
Socrates:   I really do not have anything to add. Your strategy appears to be rational 
and well conceived. I cannot imagine anything could go wrong. Shall we 
have lunch after the party so you can tell me how your strategy worked? 
 
SCENE 2: ONE MONTH AND ONE DAY LATER.   
GLAUCON MEETS SOCRATES FOR LUNCH. 
Socrates: How was the party? 
Glaucon:  If I have to do anything like that again, I will drink hemlock. 
Socrates: It did not go well? 
Glaucon:  Let me count the ways. It rained for most of the day. More children and 
parents attended than we planned for. Some of the people arrived hours 
before we were ready. They brought food, gifts, and animals and changed 
our careful arrangements into utter chaos. Some of the animals went into 
my study and scattered my projects everywhere. Organizing the children 
was like trying to get puppies to march. They did not respect or sit still for 
the devotional sacrifice. The boys constantly hit and wrestled each other. 
Many of the girls insulted and then shunned the daughter of Panagiotis, the 
wealthy merchant. The child did not stop wailing. Her mother yelled at my 
wife. They cursed my family and left. One of the children painted his face 
and hair with our clothing dye. Then all the children did. And the parents 
blamed us for not hiding the dye. No one followed the order of the games we 
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arranged. No one wanted to weave. Instead the children threw sticks and 
baskets at each other. They screeched like sea birds. The chaos went on 
forever until one child, unnoticed, left our house, walked to the end of our 
garden and fell into the sea. I have now made an eternal enemy of her 
father, the Tyrant Adamidis, and I fear for my life. 
Socrates: I see. Truly, that was a surprising outcome. Why did your strategy not 
work? What was revealed in your hot wash? Were there any lessons 
learned? 
Glaucon: I am saddened to say it was a repeat of the lessons we have learned before: 
inadequate leadership, poor communications, ineffective planning, 
inadequate resources, and poor public relations.6 Can you help me 
understand why my strategy did not work? 
Socrates: I am wise. But I am not that wise. Have you asked the women? 
Glaucon: The women? Why would I ask the women? 
Socrates: Talk with them and discover. Will you come back one year from today – if 
you are still alive, of course – and tell me what you have learned?  
 
SCENE 3: ONE YEAR LATER.   
GLAUCON ARRIVES FOR LUNCH. 
Socrates: How was your son’s birthday party? 
Glaucon:  How did you know there was a party? 
Socrates: Are you not still alive? 
Glaucon:  It was a glorious and treasured day. All the guests were ecstatic.  The 
children were filled with joy. The gods have smiled on my family. I no longer 
fear for safety or security. 
Socrates: And the cause of this surprising change in fortune?  
Glaucon: I did what you suggested. I listened to the women. 
Socrates: What did they tell you? 
Glaucon:  Many things.  But in short they said to make boundaries, create attractors, 
stabilize the patterns we desired, and disrupt the patterns that threatened 
danger and harm. 
Socrates: I do not understand. Is there a story here? 
Glaucon:  We held the party at Panathinaikon Stadium. We set up places to eat, a site 
for crafts, a tent for shelter and rest, a station for music, and a space for art. 
Singers wandered and told stories.  There was a field for wrestling and 
running and flying kites. We encouraged the children to try what they 
pleased. We helped if they asked, then we stepped back and watched. When 
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there was hitting or crying or harsh words – and there was – we 
immediately spoke sternly or separated the offenders. Then we redirected 
them toward an established activity. 
In sum, our strategy was to control only that which could be ordered. For 
those activities in the realm of that which is, and must be, unordered, we 
watched and we shaped – gently, but with insistence. Because I have 
learned to know the difference between the states of order and unorder, I am 
now seen by all Athens as the wisest of men. Second to you of course. 
Socrates:  Truly your ideas appear to be sensible and well conceived. I cannot imagine 
anything ever could go wrong with that approach. 
Glaucon:    Yes, truly, the gods be praised. I cannot wait to use this strategy at the 
Agora. 
 
ACT TWO: “THE FUTURE IS HERE.  IT’S JUST NOT WIDELY 
DISTRIBUTED YET.”7 
A central justification for speculating about homeland security futures is to 
“make strategic decisions [today] that will be sound for all plausible futures.”8  
Based on the nation’s experiences over the past five years, it appears the rapidly 
formed homeland security community remains too disordered to make coherent 
strategic decisions that have much intentional impact on even the short-term 
future.9  Instead, we have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to 
multiple homeland security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended 
and unintended consequences.10   
Most of the significant issues in the homeland security policy space are too 
undefined, too broad, too complex – in a phrase, too wicked – to allow an 
ordered and intentional journey into the future.11  If this assessment is correct, 
how can strategic planning for the future of homeland security be anything other 
than what George Bernard Shaw said about chess:  a foolish expedient for making 
idle people believe they are doing something very clever? 
 
A Strategic Sense-making Framework for Homeland Security 
Futures12 
Strategic homeland security issues can be located in five kinds of 
phenomenological space (Figure 1). 13  “Known” and “knowable” issues are in the 
realm of the ordered (highlighted in Figure 1 in yellow), a world populated by 
scientific knowledge, research, technology, and standards-based human 
interactions.  It is a world where efficiency is king.14  “Complex” and “chaotic” 
issues (highlighted in red) are in the province of the “unordered.”15 It is the 
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sphere of social systems, self-organization, emergence, and retrospective sense-









Homeland security policy dynamics – now and in the future – are significantly 
influenced by how stakeholders perceive a specific issue.  In the framework used 
here – known as the Cynefin framework – there are five ways to perceive an 
issue: 
(1) The known: a space where cause and effect are understood and 
predictable, hence “everyone”17 knows what to do about the issue.  One 
example is a special event venue-design strategy that incorporates 
empirically based standoff distances for potential explosives.18 A second 
example is a decision that public safety personnel will use plain-language 
communications during an incident, rather than 10-Codes or other 
specialized idiom.19 
(2) The knowable: a space where cause and effect relationships may be 
difficult to derive or understand, but researchers and experts – given 
sufficient time and resources – can determine.  An example is identifying 
and protecting critical nodes in a region’s electrical power or water 
distribution network.20 
Figure 1: Sense-Making Domains in Homeland Security 
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(3) The complex: a space where one knows cause and effect only 
retrospectively.  What appears logical after the fact – i.e., when the dots 
have been connected – is but one of many other logical outcomes that 
could have occurred.  There is no guarantee the cause-effect relationships 
will persist or repeat. This is the domain of complexity theory and complex 
adaptive systems.  The pre-9/11 intelligence is one of many examples that 
fit this phenomenological space.21 
(4) The chaotic: a space so turbulent that cause and effect are unknown; 
strategically, it is not clear what to do with any measure of certainty.  The 
example here is the first hours and days after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast.  
(5) The disordered: When there is insufficient stakeholder agreement about 
how to make sense out of a particular homeland security issue – the 
central space in Figure 1 – the issue can be said to be disordered.  Cynthia 
Kurtz and David Snowden, who developed the Cynefin sense-making 
framework, assert the central space is key to understanding the conflicts 
among stakeholders about how to perceive and act on an issue: 
…Individuals compete to interpret the central space [disorder] on the 
basis of their preference for action.  Those most comfortable with stable 
order [the known] seek to create or enforce rules; experts seek to conduct 
research and accumulate data [in the knowable domain]; politicians seek 
to increase the number and range of their [network] contacts; and, finally, 
the dictators, eager to take advantage of a chaotic situation, seek absolute 
control.22  
On the surface, this framework is a potentially useful way to group homeland 
security issues.  However, does the model contribute anything to understanding 
how to create a desirable homeland security future? 
 
The Known in Homeland Security  
There is very little of strategic utility in homeland security known with the 
precision of a scientific theory.23 We can forecast with near certainty some 
aspects of the future, but their impact on homeland security is unknown.  Here is 
a personal list.  We will have one, maybe two new presidents in the next ten 
years.  We will have five congresses.  Terrorists will probably attack us again.  
There will likely be suicide bombers and car bombs in this country.  Our 
transportation system and chemical plants will probably be hit.   
If we are not attacked again within the next decade, it will be difficult to 
maintain the nation’s homeland security apparatus.  The national government’s 
budget, let alone most states’ and cities’ budgets, will not sustain it.  Homeland 
security as a national program will atrophy. 
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Anyone familiar with homeland security can build a list of probable futures.  
Nevertheless, the question remains: what strategic decisions should be made now 
to prepare for the disruptions the known future will bring (a new president, a new 






The Knowable In Homeland Security24 
Some dimensions of homeland security’s strategic future are complicated, but 
knowable. Experts can construct functional outputs that will support strategic 
intentions. These tend to be the realms where technology plays more of a role than 
people: data and voice transmission systems, radiation and bio detectors, reducing 
vulnerabilities in networked infrastructure, using video surveillance data and so 
on. This space also includes standards-based behaviors, like the emergency 
management resource typing envisioned by the National Incident Management 
System and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.
25
   
In principle, the strategic decisions required to address issues in this domain are 
knowable because the space can be organized around the predictive utility of cause 
and effect relationships. It will take time and money to figure out what to do and 
sufficient power to mandate behaviors. However, there are strategic issues that can 
be ordered, constructed, and brought into the future.  Figure 2 lists a few of the 





BELLAVITA, SHAPE PATTERNS, NOT PROGRAMS 
 
 HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
    
8
Figure 2: Some Knowable Homeland Security Issues 
! Securing systems against 
cyber terrorism 




! Fusing intelligence 
information 
! Assessing vulnerabilities 
! Expanding hospital surge 
capacity 
! Protecting chemical 
infrastructure 
! Using the internet as a 
weapons delivery system 
! Developing vaccines against 
pandemic disease 
! Mass distribution of antibiotics 
and vaccines 
 
! Protecting food supplies 
! Quantum cryptology in 
information security 
! Educating citizens about 
preparedness 
! Increasing private sector 
involvement in homeland 
security 
! Expanding terrorism risk 
insurance 
! Achieving energy 
independence 
! Creating collaborative 
networks 
! Improving public 
transportation security 
! Applying neurocognitive 
research to security systems 
 
The Complex in Homeland Security  
A hypothesis suggested by the Cynefin framework is that the most significant 
strategic issues the homeland security community will face in the next ten years 
are in the unordered domain of complex adaptive systems. Issues within this 
space will continually evolve in unpredictably interactive and uncontrollable 
ways. It is not obvious what decisions one can make today to affect outcomes in 
the complexity space. The assumption here is one can make only an educated 
guess about what the future will bring, and how it will bring it. Science and 
research offer little prospective assistance. Why issues unfolded as they did can 
only be known after the fact. Any apparent order in this space emerges through 
“retrospective coherence.”27   
The issues in this domain are “open problems.”  They are open because they 
will never go away or be resolved fully. They are problems in both a functional 
sense (they are a source of grief and opportunity) and in a philosophical sense 
(they are issues from which the future of homeland security will emerge). The 
planning methodologies and strategic tools that work well in the ordered domain 
of known and knowable issues are ineffective in the domain of the unordered.28  
New modes of inquiry and action are needed if policymakers are to do more than 
watch the future of homeland security happen.  
Figure 3 identifies some complex issues whose unfolding will influence the 
strategic future of homeland security. 
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Figure 3: Twenty Five Complex Homeland Security Issues
! International terrorists – Keeping 
international terrorists out of the 
country. 
! Radicalization – Preventing the 
development of homegrown terrorists. 
! Pandemics – Social impacts of 
pandemics. 
! Al Qaeda – Al Qaeda’s evolving 
strategic logic. 
! Iraq and Afghanistan – The impact of 
the terrorism wars on homeland 
security. 
! Non-State Threats – The evolution of 
non-state threats. 
! Next Generation Terrorists – 
Preventing the next generation of 
domestic and international terrorists. 
! Agendas – Determining which issues 
get on the homeland security policy 
agenda, and what happens to issues 
once they get on an agenda. 
! Leadership – Appropriate models of 
effective leadership for the variety of 
environments in homeland security. 
! Governance – Organizing homeland 
security at all levels to prevent and 
respond to terrorism.  
! Prevention – The elements of an 
effective prevention strategy. 
! Technology – What homeland security-
related technologies work, what do not, 
and under what situations. What 
problems technology solves. What 
problems technology creates, especially 
when it fails29 
! Resources – What resources are 
needed to prevent terrorism, and where 
they are going to come from. What 
resources states and cities will 
contribute to keep their jurisdictions 
secure. 
! Allocation – The basis for allocating 
homeland security resources. 
! Culture – How the multiplicity of public, 
private, local, state, and national 
government cultures affect the success 
of homeland security projects. 
! Resilience – How citizens and 
communities can become resilient to 
catastrophic events. 
! Social Capital – How social capital is 
built, maintained, and used in a 
complex, multi-agency homeland 
security environment. 
! Authorities – Whether agencies have 
the authority they need to accomplish 
security missions. What impact current 
and future authorities have on the 
Constitution, on civil liberties, and on 
the kind of nation we will be. 
! Communication – How we share 
usable information more effectively, 
from both a technological and a 
sociological perspective. 
! Language – The vocabulary of 
homeland security, and how we develop 
shared meanings across all sectors. 
! Contractors –The roles contractors 
play in shaping the future of homeland 
security.   
! Knowledge transfer – How we know 
when we have learned something 
significant about homeland security. 
How that knowledge is transferred to 
and adopted by others. 
! Standards – How effective 
preparedness standards will be 
developed, adopted, maintained, and 
used. 
! Networks – How self-organizing 
homeland security systems will be 
directed toward specific goals.   
! Imagination – How the homeland 
security community can foster and 
maintain a creative imagination.
 
Chaos In Homeland Security 
The chaotic state has no discernable order. There are no patterns. When lives are 
at stake, there is no time to wait for systems to organize themselves. The chaotic 
state is turbulent and requires stabilization or using the chaos as an opportunity 
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for innovation. Stability may have to be imposed – through knowledge, by 
authoritarian response, or by charismatic leadership.30 
How will the American people and their government respond to the first 
domestic dirty bomb, suicide bomber, biological attack, or pandemic? One can 
speculate, but until an incident happens, no one can know the answer with 
anything approaching certainty. The answer will emerge from the domain of 
chaos.   
New Orleans after Katrina is an example of the chaotic homeland security 
space involving life safety issues. Initially, there were lots of victims, responders, 
policies, procedures, and systems interacting in uncontrolled and unpredictable 
ways. Eventually, Russell Honoré morphed from a Lieutenant General into a 
John Wayne dude and – according to the public narrative – saved the day.31 It is 
not clear he had the authority to do everything he did.32  He or some of his troops 
may have violated Posse Comitatus rules.33 At the time – and even now – few 
people cared.  The drama was real. The situation required a fix.  Honoré’s actions 
helped to initiate the appearance of stability. That gave Admiral Thad Allen and 
many others the opportunity to begin coordinating the federal government’s 
more patterned response to the complex adaptive system that is now New 
Orleans.  
  
MEETING THE FUTURE 
Mensh tracht; Gott lacht (Man plans; God laughs.)  
– Yiddish proverb 
–  
“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensable.”  
  – Dwight Eisenhower (attributed) 
 
These two sayings illustrate strategic folk wisdom about unorder. There are 
realms of existence that cannot be controlled – a child’s birthday party, for 
example, or a national strategy for homeland security. From a strategic 
perspective, homeland security is a complex adaptive social system created, 
maintained, and altered by more dependent variables than can be incorporated 
into any formula, heuristic, or plan.   
The core assertion in this point of view is that since control is not a property of 
a complex social system, we cannot make strategic decisions today that will be 
sound for all plausible futures. Shaw, with modifications, may be correct: 
Strategic planning in homeland security for issues in the unordered domain is a 
foolish expedient for making dedicated and busy people believe they are doing 
something important. 
The core assertion about control is readily tested.   
1. Make a decision: Define what you want to happen in one 
homeland security issue space that has a significant human 
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component: voice interoperability within a public safety region that 
crosses political boundaries; risk assessment and risk 
management; information and intelligence sharing; collaboration 
among public safety disciplines; organizing across cities, states 
and regions; leading within a homeland security regional 
network; creating a culture of preparedness; developing and 
using metrics for the target capabilities list; determining how to 
allocate homeland security grants; protecting land, sea, and air 
borders; ensuring security of public transportation systems; 
protecting critical infrastructure; developing resilient 
communities; identifying terrorist threats, protecting privacy, 
preserving the core values of the U.S. Constitution, 
understanding judicial decisions that affect homeland security, 
expanding public health and medical capabilities, figuring out 
the role of the military in homeland security, managing complex 
incidents during an emergency, and so on.  
2. Assess the future: Describe what could happen in the issue space 
you select within the next six months, one year, three years, five 
years, and then ten years.34   
3. Expand the future: Describe the interactive effects of the other 
issues on your selected homeland security issue. How, for 
example, will changes in military technology and judicial 
decisions affect the capacity of law enforcement and other public 
safety professions to share information, protect infrastructure, 
and so on?   
4. Incorporate the environment: When that analysis is done, 
overlay environmental factors not directly related to the 
substance of those issues, first to each of the issues and then to 
the cascade of interactive effects: politics, demographics, 
economics, wars, changes in players, cultures, disasters, health 
issues, information flow, decisions, resources, laws, and/or 
unexpected events. 
5. Reassess your decision: Check in every year or so to see how 
your forecasts are doing. 
 
This is a difficult analytical task, probably impossible. We can envision, 
strategize, and plan with all the capacity, talent, and methodologies dedicated 
homeland security agencies and contractors can muster. However we will not 
know the future of homeland security until we get there. Once we arrive, we can 
connect dots, attribute cause and effect, identify lessons learned, and get 
conceptually fat on the other explanatory rituals we engage in. Traditional science 
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and certainty will not lead us to a homeland security future worth creating. 
Adaptability may. 
Still, the rational hope that springs eternal insists that we must not avoid 
making our best decisions today. Our normative ideal is to make decisions within 
a strategic framework. The sense-making structure presented here suggests the 
best we probably can do about the future – at least in the province of unorder  – 
is to make decisions based mostly on what we see today, and loosely on what we 
want to be doing tomorrow. Our stance needs to shift from the desire to design 
and control human systems (a strategy that works in the realm of the known and 
the knowable) to the ability to recognize and influence patterns in those 
systems.35 We need to learn how to become a partner with an uncontrollable 
future. 
Consider how one rears children. They are not little machines waiting to be 
directed by higher headquarters. They are people learning how to be free and 
responsible citizens. Their future emerges; it is not designed. So too with 
homeland security – it is only five years old.  
Intermission: A Number of Presidents on the head of a pin 
Herbert Hoover: Let me understand what you are trying to say here. The 
American people – aided by knowledge, technology, and enough power to 
shame the wildest desires of ancient gods – should just throw up their hands 
and quit? Controlling our environment, creating the future we want is just too 
hard to do, so let us sit around and wait to see what happens? 
Abraham Lincoln: That is not what I am hearing. I think the argument is 
keep trying to master what we can. There is much in the world we can know, 
can predict, and can shape to our intention. But when many people, 
organizations, and interests are involved, our directive power is practically for 
naught. Yes, we have the power to control almost anything if we had the will to 
do that. We have laws, courts, armies, police, and prisons to enforce our will. 
But that is not our Republic. I knew a rich man back home who loved the sound 
of one particular nightingale. He had it captured and brought to him and placed 
in an elegant cage. Of course that bird stopped singing and eating and it 
practically died before the man released it. The bird started singing again, but it 
never got back the song it used to have. I do not want our Republic to lose its 
song. 
Herbert Hoover: An interesting theory, perhaps. Secretary Mellon advocated 
this “leave it alone” approach in 1929. I rejected it then as I reject it now. My 
intent was to encourage voluntary measures by the private sector, state, and 
local government to restart the engine of business and industry. My strategy 
was to rely on the independence and self-reliance of the American people. I 
wanted to allow economic restoration and growth to emerge through the 
market. You saw what happened. My reluctance to lead more forcefully harmed 
our country – almost irreparably. 
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Franklin Roosevelt: As I hear the argument, that is the point. You do try to 
control what you can and must. The idea is to understand when you can control 
and when you cannot. The argument is not, “Try harder and you can control 
more.” It is learn to distinguish between the known, knowable, and the complex. 
It means use different strategies, different tools for different situations. I could 
not control the nation’s economy either. But like any American president, I 
could strongly influence the national direction. My strategy was similar to 
Glaucon’s. I set boundaries around where I was going to act. I established 
programs in the first 100 days – many of them my predecessor’s ideas – 
without a clear idea of what they would do. I was probing to see what would 
happen. I was acting, not analyzing.  My strategy was to shoot first, and then to 
aim. When the programs seemed to work, I stabilized them. When they did not – 
or when the courts said I could go no further – I stopped. My job as the strategic 
leader of the nation was to shape the future. Hitler and Stalin tried to control 
the future of their nations.  Their legacy is fear and death. Our legacy is 
freedom. 
 
ACT THREE: BE HERE NOW36 
It helps to know where you are before deciding where you want to go. So where 
are we? As we enter the middle of our first homeland security decade, what is our 
strategy? And where did it come from? 
If you believe our homeland security strategy can be described by citing the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, then – with respect – you have not 
been paying close attention. In my view, no one knows with certainty what our 
homeland security strategy actually is. There are many opinions about it.  Experts 
may eventually come to a consensus about what some – or maybe all – of it is. 
But if there is a current consensus, it has not been “widely distributed” within the 
homeland security community. 
There is no single place one can go to discover even the “espoused” HLS 
strategy, let along the strategy “in use.”37 As the Government Accountability 
Office and others have pointed out,38 the homeland security strategy is a 
patchwork of multiple strategies, laws, presidential directives, grant guidance, 
and related documents. It includes the strategies and practices of state, local, and 
regional entities. It incorporates whatever the private sector is – or is not – doing.   
But even if we just restricted our knowledge to the official National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, we still come up with as many questions as answers.  
The first objective of the (Grand) National Strategy is to prevent terrorist 
attacks. What strategic guidance informs programs designed to achieve that 
objective? We have an “always activated” national response plan.39  We have a 
national system for managing incidents. We have – or will have soon – a national 
catastrophic response plan. We have lots of response strategies. We have yet to 
develop a national strategy for preventing terrorism.40   
BELLAVITA, SHAPE PATTERNS, NOT PROGRAMS 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
14
Obviously we are doing many things to prevent terrorism. My point is about 
the relationship between what we are doing and what our strategy says we should 
be doing. Someone could make the case that there is a relationship, and explain 
how it led us to where we are today with prevention. Any such description would 
be constructed by looking at what we are doing today – with fusion centers, 
better coordination among disciplines and regions, data mining, wiretapping, 
analyst training, and so on – and creating a plausible explanation about how we 
got here. In other words, we can know our prevention strategy – as we can know 




DHS Executive: Your argument is simply not correct. We have numerous 
strategies. They may not be perfect, but they are thought out and for the most 
part integrated. Each one of them can be articulated. They identify ends, ways, 
and means.  They inform our policies, our programs, and our budget decisions.   
Senate Homeland Security Leader: I have to agree with DHS here. The 
nation’s homeland security strategy is comprehensive and robust. While many 
problems remain unresolved, anyone knowledgeable in this area knows that we 
have made significant progress. 
House Homeland Security Leader: I agree with the Senator and DHS. As a 
nation we have strong strategic direction, supported by many – not yet all – of 
the policies we need to carry out the strategy. We agree there remains a lot of 
work to do.  But there is no question. We are better off now than we were five 
years ago. 
Author (mumbling): I wonder what the result would be if each of you and your 
staffs wrote down what you think our homeland security strategy is. How close, 
how detailed would each of the responses be? What would be included in the 
responses? What would be left out? And then how would that compare with the 
National Strategy – and others – as written, or with a consensus strategy derived 
from all of us talking about what has been created over the past five years? 
Since homeland security is not just what happens in the District of Columbia, 
let’s take the experiment on the road and visit the states and territories and tribes 
and UASI cities and professional associations and Northern Command. Let’s talk 
to citizens who care about homeland security. What would we end up with then? 
No doubt with enough time and talk we could look at the empirical evidence 
and come to some agreement about what the nation’s strategy is. And that is my 
point. The coherence of the strategy comes after it has happened, not before.  
Homeland security is a complex human and technical system. No matter what we 
decide prospectively our strategy should be, we will only know, we can only 
know, after it happens.   
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And when we pause at that moment to congratulate ourselves for the 
perceptiveness of our retrospective coherence, homeland security will change 
some more. 
 
ACT FOUR: TAXICAB PRESCRIPTIONS 
Strategy is a pattern of consistent behavior over time. It is a mix of intended and 
realized behavior. It combines visions of the future with emergent adaptations.  
These are well known ideas that are compatible with the sense-making frame 
described in this paper. 42 
Homeland security strategy in the known and knowable domain – mostly 
involving technology and standards – should be guided by norms of rationality, 
scientific knowledge and research, efficiency, and true “best practices.” 
The other side of the homeland security strategic jungle – the side composed 
of complex social systems – is characterized by an ontological state of unorder.  
Cause and effect are known only after the fact, and through consensus.  
Replicability is illusory at any but the most global level of generalization. Best 
practice is replaced by smart practice, emergent practice, or novel practice.43 
The leadership task is to sift through the elements of strategic disorder (the 
center space in Figure 1) and determine whether an issue can be ordered – and 
thus subject to a rich set of knowledge and methodologies – or whether the 
issue’s organic state is unorder, and we are wasting time and resources trying – 
as Glaucon first did – to control the party. 
Specific homeland security programs are a necessary, but insufficient, way to 
get us into a future worth creating. Homeland security strategy in the unordered 
domain requires a different approach – one compatible with the skills of a poet, 
storyteller, or old-school weather observer.   
As noted throughout this essay, the central prescription for strategic action 
within complexity is to work at the level of patterns.44 Acknowledge that 
retrospective coherence is an organic property of complexity, not an anomaly or 
flaw to be corrected. To influence what happens, establish boundaries.  Use 
attractors to seed beneficial patterns. When a desired pattern forms, stabilize it.  
When undesirable patterns start to form, disrupt them. 
One can cite the development of fusion centers as an example of an emergent, 
pattern-based approach to homeland security strategy.45   
Fusion centers started at the state level, in response to a post-9/11 recognition 
that information needed to be shared more effectively. Fusion centers were not 
mandated by the national government. Initially the centers – serving as 
“attractors” – primarily involved law enforcement agencies. Those boundaries 
expanded as state leaders in Georgia, Arizona, Illinois, and elsewhere recognized 
the need to share information with other disciplines. Based on the experiences of 
the centers, the National Governors Association, Homeland Security Advisory 
Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and others provide stakeholders 
with “stabilizing” guidance in how to establish fusions centers. The innovation 
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continues to spread with states, cities, and regions adapting the concept in 
ways that make sense in their jurisdictions.   
In a recent systemic development, some analysts recognize that “fusion” 
means more than simply putting people from different agencies in the same 
room.  Information also has to be fused.46 This insight represents the early stages 
of another pattern in the continuing evolution of fusion centers.   
There are some efforts being made to mandate standards for centers. That 
potential pattern will dissipate if imposed standards do not add value to 
intelligence activities. 
 
In the District of Columbia, late one rainy January night, a man got into a taxi 
heading back to his hotel. His day had been spent going from building to 
building, attending one homeland security meeting after another  The cold, 
confusion, and complexity of the day, mixed with too much coffee and not 
enough food or sleep, colored his mood. 
“This is some city,” he said to the driver. “I think they should break this place 
up and move pieces of the government all over the country. It shouldn’t be 
centralized like this. It’s too crazy.” 
“No, you don’t want to do that,” the driver said, keeping his attention on the 
road. “You really want them all here, in one place, so you can keep an eye on 
them.” 
 
The complex adaptive-system framework suggests an alternative to either the 
decentralizing or centralizing options offered by the passenger and driver: use 
complexity; take advantage of its properties as a way to strengthen the process 
and substance of homeland security strategy. 
Homeland security will travel toward the future in the company of rationalists 
who see order and intentionality, and realists who see the coherence of strategy 
retrospectively. Homeland security – as a distinct policy domain – can formalize 
the interaction and learning between the two worldviews. It can support regular 
inquiry – a forum or idea market47 – in the dance between homeland security 
strategy espoused and homeland security strategy in use.  
The purpose of formal and recurring strategic inquiry would be to monitor and 
identify trends in strategic intentions, discontinuities, and coherence. The 
findings from the periodic inquiry would be distributed into the complex adaptive 
mix of information that swirls within homeland security.   
What happens after that can only be known retrospectively. 
 
CODA: DOGMAS OF THE PAST 
Abraham Lincoln’s message to congress on December 1, 1862 included words 
cited before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks.48  They are words worth 
recalling: 
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We can succeed only by concert.  It is not "can any of us imagine better,” 
but "can we all do better?"  The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate 
to the stormy present.  The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we 
must rise – with the occasion.  As our case is new, so we must think anew, 
and act anew.  
Recognizing the strategic difference between order, disorder, and unorder – and 
responding accordingly – can be at the heart of thinking and acting anew.  
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 “Learning” Homeland Security – How One Executive 





Homeland security is in a pre-paradigm phase. We understand this to mean that unlike 
medicine, law, engineering, and other professional disciplines, there is no general conceptual 
agreement about the range of topics that constitute homeland security as a field of study. 
Consequently there is not a dominant approach to teaching homeland security. We happen to 
think this is a good thing.1 
 
Whether one defines “homeland security” as a discipline, activity, programmatic 
approach, or a national security objective, “learning” homeland security is a new 
endeavor.2 The scope of the task is particularly daunting when added to the 
“normal” responsibilities borne by senior state and local officials. Not only must 
they address the tactical and operational components of what we are calling 
homeland security, but they must master the more complex policy, strategy, and 
organizational design issues as well. Further, the relative infancy of homeland 
security as a public policy issue, and its constant and rapid evolution in concept 
and implementation, is a significant complicating factor. 
How can senior state and local leaders learn the basics of an evolving doctrine 
and strategy, and how can they apply it in their own jurisdictions? The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security clearly states that homeland security is a 
“shared responsibility” between states, localities, and the private sector.3 It 
further sets the stage by posing four critical questions: (1) What is “homeland 
security” and what missions does it entail? (2) What do we seek to accomplish, 
and what are the most important goals of homeland security? (3) What is the 
federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals and what should it 
do in the future? (4) What should non-federal governments, the private sector, 
and citizens do to help secure the homeland?4  
These are the questions governors, mayors, councilmen, legislators, 
commissioners, fire chiefs, police chiefs, and others should be asking the national 
leadership, themselves, and their organizations. More critically, nearly five years 
after the attacks of 9/11 and four years after the National Strategy’s publication, 
state and local governments should be well on the way to having clear answers to 
these questions, as well as having organized to implement the solutions. Some 
have, some have not, and many are still struggling with the questions, let alone 
the answers.  
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The intent of this article is to discuss one means of moving from the questions 
posed above to specific actions that will ultimately achieve better safety and 
security in the face of twenty-first-century terrorist threats. Does this approach 
help move senior leaders from the exploratory analysis of “what is homeland 
security” to a state where politically, organizationally, and socially acceptable 
programs and processes better protect and secure their constituencies? The 
purpose of this essay is not to study, graph and compare what the nation’s states 
and cities have achieved in “homeland security.” Nor is it to analyze potential 
methodologies for providing executive level education. This article describes and 
discusses the Executive Education Program developed by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security (NPS/CHDS.) It will discuss the need for an 
executive education program for senior state and local officials; the methodology 
used by DHS and NPS/CHDS to present concepts and subjects for discussion to 
this audience; and an anecdotal assessment of what has been learned since the 
program’s inception in January 2003. But before this discussion begins, it is 
important to provide a very brief overview of the program. 
 
TYPES OF EXECUTIVE EDUCATION SESSIONS 
The NPS/CHDS program provides three types of sessions, differing mostly by 
topic or by audience. The program was first tasked by the Department of 
Homeland Security to deliver policy and strategic level seminars to governors and 
their cabinets or homeland security “teams.” The original purpose was to prepare 
state officials to take on the new policy, strategy, and organizational design issues 
that homeland security presented. These sessions are commonly referred to as 
“state” METs. (MET is an acronym for Mobile Education Team.) While the 
content of these METs has evolved over time, their overriding focus continues to 
be the prevention of terrorist attacks, the policies of homeland security (both 
federal and state), and the issues that would arise with the response and recovery 
to catastrophic events.  
The second type of session is provided to leaders in major urban areas; thus 
while similar in content to the sessions held for states, their audience 
composition and themes for discussion differ. The audience composition in major 
urban areas varies from city to city; some include many elected officials and 
minimal staff, while others may have one or two elected officials and more 
department heads. An urban area seminar may also take either a “wide” or a 
“deep” approach. The wide approach is one where the multiple jurisdictions that 
make up the greater urban area are represented; the deeper approach is more 
focused on the agencies and disciplines within the core city or county. Those 
jurisdictions choosing width in their focus have a greater intergovernmental 
discussion while those selecting depth generally focus more heavily on the details 
of interagency challenges and opportunities. 
The third type of executive education session, the topical MET, is focused on a 
single issue or is delivered to a non-jurisdictional entity such as a national 
association. These events are designed to explore the policy, strategic, and 
organizational infrastructures as they might apply to a specific hazard (e.g. 
pandemic flu), an existing or evolving national policy or strategy (e.g. fusion 
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centers), or a single topic for further exploration and/or resolution (e.g. public 
and private sector interfaces). These events tend to vary greatly, both in audience 





We are “…building an airplane [while] in flight.”5 
 
Creating a new government program is not a simple task; such programs are 
often fraught with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Add a fear 
of death and destruction on a national scale should the program falter or fail, and 
we have the basic environment that leaders face in achieving homeland security. 
Repetition of the mantra, “it’s not a matter of if, but when terrorists will strike 
again,” is not conducive to an atmosphere in which officials must deliberatively 
and thoughtfully create an effective and efficient government program. But the 
difficulties of the organizational development environment do not negate the 
necessity of what remains to be done. 
The federal government’s homeland security challenge consists of much more 
than simply drawing boxes and lines in a new organizational chart. For current 
homeland security leaders, under fire for trying to “build the tail section while 
soaring at 30,000 feet,” this is not breaking news. And state and local leaders do 
not get a “pass” while federal agencies struggle to create a pristine organization 
that all agree is both effective and efficient. Elected and appointed leaders in the 
nation’s urban, suburban, and rural areas are also expected to achieve a safer and 
more secure world. With respect to homeland security, they are in unique 
positions of responsibility, accountability, and ownership of resources where they 
can do more to secure the homeland than all of the federal agencies combined.  
Consider the following statements: “All disasters are local;” “The next attack 
will be stopped by a cop on the street;” “Governors have a unique constitutional 
responsibility;” and, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”6 These familiar refrains apply to homeland 
security. States and localities play a significant role, but that role is still being 
defined and is far from fully-developed. State and local officials have been asked 
to partner in this national endeavor, but without a clearly defined road map or 
any precedent processes in place, especially for the prevention of terrorist acts.  
The purpose of the MET seminars is to clarify the most important and 
essential questions and truths confronting elected leaders responsible for 
homeland security and then figure out how to answer those questions, in 
accordance with the truths. How are decisions made when the disaster far 
outstrips the resources to address it? Is intelligence fusion possible? Federal 
priorities are inherently different from state and local priorities: Who’s in charge? 
How can state and local leaders be provided with assistance for their part in the 
construction of homeland security? One way is to simply tell them what to do and 
then fund them to do it. This assumes someone knows how to “do it,” and that 
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the activities can be accomplished in an ever-changing, often-decreasing funding 
environment. But adequate financial resources are only a part of the solution; the 
rest involves policy development, organizational designs, strategic planning, 
commitment, and – most importantly – leadership. Educational assistance at the 
senior state and local levels is required. This is not to suggest that state and local 
officials do not know how to accomplish these types of tasks.  It is rather that, in 
the area of homeland security, policy, organizational structure, and strategic 
thinking are either little known or under-developed.  Additionally, the concept of 
“training” or “how to do it” assumes that there is a right way and a wrong way; 
“education” teaches people how to think critically, analyze problems and develop 
their own solutions and options. These seminars are not intended to be 
“training.” 
Take prevention as an example of the inherent educational challenge. Systems 
of prevention are far more difficult to implement than systems of response; the 
prevention of a terrorist act is not a normal or “routine” function of state and 
local governments. When they are asked to “share responsibility” to stop the next 
attack, there is an implication that an infrastructure and methodology is already 
in place. But in the vast majority of jurisdictions, plans to prevent terrorist 
attacks are non-existent, incomplete, untested, or immature. It is impossible to 
“train” to a standard, practice, or precedent that does not exist. But “education” 
can be provided to assist in a critical analysis of a problem, the options for solving 
it, and an increased awareness of its importance relative to other priorities. 
Prevention is not the only area that requires deliberative discussions, policy-
making, and resource commitments. When the subject is terrorism, public 
communications, protection of critical infrastructures, continuity of essential 
services, catastrophic response actions, and interagency and multi-jurisdictional 
coordination all present issues and problems not solved by “normal” disaster 
preparedness. These are the challenges explored during an Executive Education 
Program seminar. This is why the need for these seminars exists. 
  
THE APPROACH 
The basic objective of the MET seminar is to identify the critical homeland 
security issues that challenge state and local leaders.  The seminar team and 
elected/appointed leaders collectively define and prioritize these challenges and 
analyze their specific experiences, limitations, and capabilities. They also discuss 
the challenges common to jurisdictions throughout the nation, with a view to 
beginning or advancing strategic initiatives focused upon prevention of, 
preparedness for, response to, and recovery from a terrorist act.  It would be 
inaccurate to describe a MET as a presentation, evaluation, assessment, tactical 
training event, table-top exercise, or policy direction handed down from the 
federal government.  Nor does a seminar in and of itself solve the complex issues 
attendant upon instituting homeland security. Instead, these sessions are 
designed to be provocative, non-attributive, candid discussions and debates 
about the homeland security issues facing state and local jurisdictional leaders. 
The program’s objectives, the composition of the audiences, and the curriculum 
content are all key elements in the overall success of the program. 
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The purpose and objectives of the Executive Education Program are to: 
• Assist the jurisdictions’ executive leadership to build on their existing 
successes in Homeland Security preparedness and strengthen capacity 
to prevent and defeat terrorism. 
• Identify and examine homeland security concepts, challenges, and 
opportunities at the policy, strategy, and organizational design level. 
• Discuss opportunities, expectations, and challenges of elected officials 
and other senior leaders in implementing homeland security 
objectives. 
Within these explicit goals are also implicit and more explanatory intentions. The 
program, through an open, candid, and sometimes provocative discourse, also 
attempts to achieve these unstated objectives: 
• Make senior officials aware of their responsibilities as well as 
opportunities to participate in the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
• Clarify why they should care about homeland security, the local, state 
and federal homeland security systems, and the expectations of 
partners when something happens – i.e. who is in charge? 
• Enable jurisdictions’ senior leaders to talk collaboratively about their 
roles, responsibilities, and expectations in their pursuit of homeland 
security success. 
• Discover the more controversial, and often neglected, issues inherent 
in the response and recovery to catastrophic disasters, and share either 
“smart practices”7 observed elsewhere or more information on why 
these issues are so difficult. 
• Help the jurisdiction, and thereby the nation, “move the ball 
downfield” in their homeland security efforts by identifying the priority 
issues they need to tackle next in their efforts to protect and serve their 
citizens. 
The session results vary and are often unpredictable. In some sessions, the key 
finding for participants is a better awareness (though the lack of awareness may 
be unacknowledged by all participants beforehand) of what they already have in 
place. In other sessions, the outcome is a clear statement of priorities that the 
jurisdiction must address in near, short, and/or long term efforts. Typically, 
results include a bit of each of the above, plus the important designation of who 
in the room has the responsibility for accomplishing the most significant tasks.  
In some cases, just the fact that the program brought the particular 
participants together to discuss these issues at length for the first time marks an 
“advance of the ball.” Occasionally, there is the “aha!” or “Kodak© moment”8 
when not only is a challenging issue identified but the participants also outline 
and commit to the issues’ resolution. Successful moments have included the 
realization and commitment to form state intelligence fusion centers, the 
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agreement to pursue elected official councils on homeland security, and the idea 




Who is “doing” homeland security? While the question depends heavily on how 
“homeland security” is defined, some believe the people conducting the day-to-
day management and administration of homeland security should be those most 
involved in the executive seminars. However, underlying the program is the 
concept that “management attends to the realism of what is.  Leadership looks 
toward what could be, what “should” be.9 Consequently, the program requires 
that the jurisdiction’s executive leadership participate in the MET seminars, 
whether or not they are intimately familiar with or involved in the execution of 
homeland security activities. For example, the governor and key members of his 
or her cabinet are expected to attend state level sessions. In order to fulfill and 
promote homeland security objectives, the presence and involvement of 
leadership is essential. While management can keep the initiatives and programs 
running, only leaders can provide executive commitment, vision, strategic 
priorities, and resources. The “bosses” must be in the room and party to the 
discussion, especially the discussion of who is in charge and the potential 
assignment of responsibility for various aspects of the homeland security 
endeavor. 
The program also attempts to underscore the importance of involving non-
traditional partners in achieving homeland security objectives. Homeland 
security is about much more than just law enforcement, firefighting, and 
emergency management. It is also about public health, agriculture, public affairs, 
economics, tourism, business, tribes, legislators, judges, general services, and 
much more. The program typically strives for a balanced mix of these areas and 
an attendance limit of approximately thirty-five participants. The program 
generally works with a multi-disciplinary group, limited in number to promote an 
open discourse. 
The program utilizes a team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to achieve its 
explicit and implicit objectives. The SMEs use a variety of engagement methods. 
They provide expertise, both from their personal areas of experience as well as 
from their exposure to lessons from other jurisdictions in previous sessions. They 
are provocateurs, challenging current strategies and concepts at both the national 
and jurisdictional levels. They coach and constructively criticize, offering insights 
and advice on how the jurisdiction might solve or think differently about a 
current challenge. For the most part, but not exclusively, the SMEs are selected 
from the ranks of former senior officials in order to provide an environment of 
candid and open dialogue without fear on their part of deviating from or 
contradicting any institution’s current policy positions. 
Again, the goal is to have an open exchange of views about homeland security. 
The size and composition of the audience is intentionally designed to promote 
discussion. Speeches, prepared presentations, and recitations of tactical plans are 
discouraged. Debate and questioning are encouraged, not avoided or stifled. The 
underlying premise is that we have not yet figured out homeland security, but 
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through honest and frank conversation among professionals and responsible 
officials, we can improve the policies and practices. 
 
Curriculum 
The curriculum is designed to provide a guideline for discussion that will identify 
a range of potential inquiries during the executive education seminars. These 
“interrogatories” are intended to stimulate discussions that will identify and 
clarify the policy and strategic issues and challenges faced by each client group. 
While the questions posed seemingly invite “yes” or “no” responses or 
explanations, the primary goal is to use them to promote a lively policy and issue-
identification dialogue. Sometimes the facilitator will shift the focus of a 
particular topic by asking “What is your expectation of…,” rather than “how do 
you…,” in order to elicit desired results rather than statements of current status. 
The desired interrogatories are inserted into an outline based upon the overall 
themes and direction that any particular client requires or requests. Simulated 
video news stories, “Crossfire”-type commentaries, and expert views in video 
clips are used to help highlight the issues as well as provide a dynamic context to 
the sessions.  
The topic areas are intended to focus on the policy and organizational issues 
surrounding the multi-governmental, multi-agency, and multi-disciplinary 
environment in which jurisdictions are operating in order to accomplish 
homeland security objectives. Below are examples of the topic areas and 
questions utilized by the program to stimulate discussion. Not all of these 
questions are used in every session and many other topics arise that are not listed 
here. The intent is to cultivate an agile discussion tailored to the issues relevant to 
the particular jurisdiction. 
 
 
SAMPLE OUTLINE TEMPLATE 
Inter-governmental Management and Policy Development 
• How are policies and strategies for homeland security developed, 
vetted, and approved? At what point are chief elected officials involved 
and what is expected of them? 
• What hampers or hinders cross-government agreement on goals, 
objectives, and directions for homeland security? What has been done 
to overcome these barriers? 
• How are the multiple chief elected officials, elected councils, appointed 
district executives and inter-jurisdictional disciplines engaged in policy 
setting? 
• How are essential and traditional government objectives balanced with 
those of this new demand for homeland security? How are they 
discussed and debated across jurisdictional boundaries? 
• How are trade-offs between prevention and response investments 
discussed and decided? How are homeland security efforts, particularly 
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• Who is responsible for threat identification – federal, state, or local 
governments?  The private sector? Who is involved and who is 
excluded and why? 
• Are all existing data bases and systems being utilized for surveillance 
and monitoring – e.g. police reports, driver licenses, fire inspections, 
welfare roles, health surveillance, etc? What are the barriers and is it 
worth it to overcome them? Are there any legal challenges or policy 
positions associated with Threat Identification?  If so, how are they 
being addressed? 
• What is the mechanism for integrating threat identification efforts 
across jurisdictional boundaries and among local, state, private, and 
multiple federal efforts? 
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
• Who identifies what is critical infrastructure? How is this process 
working?  What are the key vital infrastructures and how are their 
proponents and/or owners included in the assessment process? 
• How is protection prioritization accomplished? Where resource 
decisions are made for additional protection measures? How are the 
“trade-offs” analyzed and delivered to decision makers? How is this 
handled in a multi-jurisdictional environment? 
INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND FUSION 
• What is the vision for a process to collect, fuse, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence and information products? What is the status 
of intelligence and information fusion efforts? 
• Are all disciplines involved? How are public health, agriculture, ports, 
transportation, and other entities incorporated into the area’s 
intelligence collection, analysis/fusion, dissemination, and feedback 
process? Who drives or determines the end products of the fusion 
process? 
• What role does the private sector play in intelligence strategies? 
• What are the issues regarding legal authority/statutory limitations on 
gathering and sharing intelligence – e.g. open meeting/disclosure 
laws, etc.? Is there any legislation and/or ordinance pending? What 
are the pros and cons? Are legislative remedies needed? 
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR PREVENTION 
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• How is the public engaged to help with prevention and to manage 
uneasiness/fear? How is prevention information communicated to the 
public? 
• How do you deal with special populations in the prevention phase 
(cultural/language/ethnic, schools, elderly and homebound citizens)? 
• How do you talk about your prevention efforts? 
Preparedness 
• How do your priorities match up with the National Preparedness 
Priorities? Do you have other priorities? To address prevention as a 
priority, how would the area’s allocation of resources and staffing need 
to be adjusted or is it appropriate? 
• How much risk is the jurisdiction willing to accept in 
preventing/preparing for terrorist attacks?  What type of risk 
calculation is incorporated into the resource allocation decision-
making? 
• What is your strategy for enlisting the public’s support in both 
preparing for and preventing a terrorist attack? 
Catastrophic Response/Recovery 
• How would a major and catastrophic incident be managed and 
coordinated? What role will the various elected officials have in this 
management? 
• Does the city, county, or state have the authority or the need for 
authority to compel vaccination or treatment? Can the state or local 
authorities direct health care providers to exam, monitor, or treat? 
• Who has the authority to seize/use facilities or property? Who has the 
authority to quarantine a high rise building? Who has enforcement 
responsibility and authority? Who has the authority to force closure of 
facilities? Malls, schools, transportation centers? 
• How will state and federal military resources be requested and engaged 
in a catastrophic, terrorist incident? Is there a policy on the “use of 
force?” 
Continuity of Services 
• What are the jurisdictional legal obligations and responsibilities for 
COOP (Continuity of Operations) and COG (Continuity of 
Government) planning? How have the essential functions of the 
governments in the urban area been identified? 
• What would the public identify as the essential responsibilities and 
functions of government in the event of a disaster? Given that many 
essential services and functions for citizens are handled by diverse 
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local, state, federal, and private levels, how is the continuance of these 
services planned and coordinated? 
• How many of your agencies have identified their essential functions? 
Has this information been consolidated into a comprehensive plan and 
strategy? 
• What are some of the unique policy issues that will either help or 
hinder effective COOP and COG in the area? 
Risk Communications 
• What information would be released to the public? Who decides? What 
type of discussion occurs when deciding what to say and who will say 
it? 
• How will the media react? What should governors, mayors, 
commissioners, etc. expect? What media strategies should officials 
employ? How should officials communicate with the public to manage 
fear during an event? 
• At what point would federal, state, and local governments confirm to 
the public that an event is terrorist in nature? How will this message be 
coordinated?  
• What would be the public’s expectations for information and guidance? 
Before, during, and after? 
Strategic Planning and Budgeting 
• What is the long term (multi-year) strategy for guiding and directing 
homeland security goals and objectives? Is this an individual 
jurisdictional strategy or regional? 
• How will resource efforts be sustained if federal funding decreases or 
ends? Where do homeland security efforts and costs rank in the overall 
budget priority process? 
• How should the jurisdiction tie its strategy to other regional, state, and 
federal plans? Or should it? 
• How will the success of the strategic plan and consequent budget 
allocations be measured? 
While this is just a sample of the questions that might appear in a seminar 
outline, they show the level and flavor of the discussion prompts. The goal is to 
solicit discussion at the policy and strategy level and to avoid the operational or 
tactical details. The initial response(s) to any of these prompts helps lead the 
discussion towards a better clarification of the issues and sometimes towards 
potential paths for resolution.  
 
THE LESSONS (so far)10 
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The Executive Education Program has conducted sixty-nine sessions at the time 
of this writing, beginning with a state MET in New Hampshire on January 29, 
2003 and most recently, a topical MET for the Council of State Government’s 
Henry Toll Fellowship Program on July 12, 2006. There have been thirty-seven 
state METs, eleven for major urban areas, and twenty-one topical METs (the 
appendix contains a complete list of completed sessions as of July 17, 2006). The 
program has covered the United States geographically from Guam to Puerto Rico, 
Seattle to Miami and from New Hampshire to Los Angeles and Long Beach.  
So what? Has anything been learned? Are we “evolving” homeland security or 
are we constantly revisiting the same ground time and time again? Is the ball 
being moved forward? An analysis of seminar summary reports conducted in 
December 200511 found that the top five topics discussed were: (1) 
Intelligence/Fusion Centers, (2) Public Information/Outreach, (3) Private Sector, 
(4) Federal Partnership, and (5) Media and Public Health/Medical Surge (tie.)12 
The following comments represent the prevalent themes and trends observed 
over the last three and a half years’ delivery of the executive education series. 
Because they are generalizations, many of these comments do not apply equally 
to every place the program has been presented. This article looks at five areas 
critical to the execution of homeland security objectives: organization, 
prevention, preparedness, risk communications, and catastrophic response and 
recovery.  
 
Organizing for Homeland Security 
States have approached their organizational designs for homeland security 
activities in a variety of ways. There is no predominant organizational chart 
indicating a consistent approach from state to state. Some have established 
agencies, or groups of agencies called “homeland security,” while others have 
appointed individual executives to oversee efforts. Leadership or primary points 
of contact vary by discipline and agency. This lack of consistency should not 
necessarily be seen as a negative, however. First, many (if not most) other state 
agencies vary in composition, roles, and responsibilities from state to state; 
therefore, it is not surprising that homeland security structural evolutions do so 
as well. Second, states are still experimenting with their structures. Many states 
visited by the team are employing a second or third organizational construct as 
they attempt to satisfy both efficiency and political requirements. 
Finally, it does not appear that any particular organizational template leads to 
successful homeland security efforts. What appear to be the more important 
criteria for an effective state effort are the strength of the personal relationships 
among the players; the establishment of openly agreed-upon goals, objectives, 
roles, and responsibilities; and the commitment and involvement of the state’s 
governor. The presence of these three elements, regardless of the organizational 
structure, appears to be paramount in achieving homeland security goals. 
Urban areas, also varying in organizational structure, generally rely upon their 
law enforcement agencies to lead homeland security efforts. The differences 
among the urban areas we work with are mostly in the degree to which other 
jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines are included in the overall effort. While at 
one end of the spectrum there is an almost exclusive law enforcement endeavor, 
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there are other instances where multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary 
approaches are the rule. There are pros and cons to both approaches. The former 
ensures centralized decision-making and expediency in moving to action, at least 
within the areas controlled by law enforcement. But this approach excludes other 
important players, which in turn limits valuable input from and collaboration 
with other disciplines and other partner jurisdictions. The latter approach 
provides much broader collaboration and diversity, but presents challenges of 
consensus building, conflicting political demands, and a time-consuming 
decision-making process. 
So is organizational design important or irrelevant? It is important to 
organize; less important are the specific constructs upon which that organization 
is built. Organizational backbones are critical for the institutionalization of 
efforts. One constant of senior government leadership is that individuals will 
retire, be promoted, transition in an election, transfer, or be voted out of office. 
Also important, in the particular activity of homeland security, is that senior 
officials might be killed, wounded, or otherwise absent from the community of 
leadership. Deputies and subordinates can more easily step up to fill a designated 
organizational slot than they can to fill a position based solely on an established 
personal relationship. 
However, it is difficult to point to any single successful organizational design 
that does not have an unsuccessful twin somewhere else. For example, in one 
state, the placement of the emergency management organization under the 
adjutant general, who also serves as the homeland security advisor, appears 
effective and efficient.  Yet, across the state line an identical construct is 
ineffective. In other examples, the emergency manager and homeland security 
official is the same person, yet effectiveness can vary significantly. How 
individuals lead and how they relate to one another are very important – more 
important than hierarchical, static diagrams of responsibility. While states and 
local governments may reach the point in homeland security evolution where a 
smart organizational practice becomes a best practice, we are not there yet. How 
can form consistently follow function when the latter is constantly in flux?  
Why do states and cities organize differently? There are at least three 
significant reasons organizational constructs and assignments of homeland 
security leadership may differ between states and localities: resource 
opportunities, proximity to the front lines, and perceived defaults of 
responsibility.  
Resource Opportunities. In general, states have more government agencies and 
larger staffs than do cities and local governments. Responsibility for the range of 
state-level homeland security activities could arguably fit in any number of boxes. 
In practice, the options include assignment of homeland security to the adjutant 
general, the emergency management director, the lieutenant governor, the public 
safety director, the attorney general, the state police leader, or the creation of a 
new agency or position. There are advantages to any of these choices. Cities and 
other local governments simply do not have these options or staff resources; 
generally, though not exclusively, local law enforcement is the more robust 
agency for homeland security leadership, from a resource point of view. 
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Proximity to the Front Lines. For the most part, state agencies are not 
predominantly comprised of first responders or first preventers. States have an 
enormous role to play in homeland security, but the roles of “boots on the 
ground” prevention and response activities rest largely with the localities.  
Therefore, the decision regarding the assignment of homeland security 
leadership at the state level can be more discretionary, as opposed to a 
municipality where intelligence, protection, surveillance, first response, and 
other counter-criminal activities reside mostly in one discipline. 
Perceived Defaults of Responsibility. Who owns homeland security? One could 
argue that a state’s responsibility for homeland security is predominantly 
counter-criminal, emergency response, military, general public safety, or an issue 
of executive policy: The default is not clear at the state level. But in a local setting, 
where homeland security is perceived in terms of “stop the terrorist and if not, 
get the lights and sirens moving,” the perceived default of responsibility most 
often falls on either the law enforcement or emergency management community.  
 
To conclude and summarize the lessons we have learned with regard to 
organizing homeland security: (1) There is not yet a convincing argument for any 
one organizational design for homeland security; (2) Good personal 
relationships, agreed upon roles and responsibilities amongst the leaders and 
players in homeland security, and executive commitment contribute significantly 
to effectiveness; and (3) States and local governments are going to organize their 
homeland security function differently, for a variety of reasons. 
 
Prevention 
As stated earlier, the MET sessions purposely focus on the prevention elements of 
homeland security. These discussions walk participants through risk analysis 
factors (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), intelligence processes, 
preparedness for prevention, and protection/threat response. At times this 
portion of the seminar can be tedious and non-participatory. Why? As mentioned 
in the introduction, suddenly to become responsible and accountable for the 
prevention of terrorist attacks is a novelty for state and local governments. 
Getting senior executives to talk about something outside their comfort and 
experience zone is not always easy. But in this case, it is the issue. One governor, 
in one of our first seminars, stated in effect that he never wanted to have to deal 
with the catastrophic destruction resulting from a terrorist attack; his priority 
was to stop an attack from happening in the first place. State and local 
governments are all trying to discover how to “do” prevention without precedent 
or experience. 
Prevention as a doctrine, strategy, and infrastructural effort is just beginning 
to grow what might be called institutional “roots.” The establishment of 
information and intelligence fusion centers has been increasing over the past few 
years, but these centers are still not prevalent or consciously designed as 
comprehensive networks. Allowing the fusion-process effort to evolve naturally 
(or without institutional guidance) is not necessarily a bad outcome for the long 
term; it will simply take time. Most states and many urban centers have 
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acknowledged the importance of some type of multi-disciplinary, multi-
jurisdictional process to “put the pieces of the puzzle together.” The primary 
challenges faced by state and local governments in this area appear to be in 
providing resources for these infrastructures, responding to civil liberty issues, 
and justifying the investment of resources in the absence of attacks. Other 
challenges faced by state and local governments include the lack of full 
participation on the part of many non-traditional players in intelligence and 
prevention efforts. This includes a lack of representation from the health, 
agricultural, emergency management, business (both infrastructure and 
economic aspects), tourism, and even environmental disciplines. Efforts to 
include these groups have been successful in too few cases. 
While much criticism is directed at the federal government for little (or one-
way) information and intelligence flow, no level of government has solved this 
problem. Local governments often have similar complaints about state efforts, 
first responders accuse parent agencies of a lack of communication, and non-law 
enforcement disciplines feel out of the loop at all levels. There are a few shining 
examples that address pieces of this overall challenge, but a complete and 
comprehensive “enterprise approach” to information sharing has not yet been 
observed. On a positive note, state and urban area fusion centers are continuing 
to multiply and evolve and in some cases beginning to interconnect with each 
other. The future of fusion centers is unclear in the absence of a terrorist attack; 
justifying the staff and expense of an endeavor where success is judged by the 
absence of disaster is politically difficult. It is especially difficult when this 
particular prevention endeavor is perceived as impinging on civil liberties. 
Success in the further proliferation and capability of fusion centers may rest 
largely on the ability to show “two-fer” (two for the cost of one) benefits – e.g. 
that fusion centers can be a benefit in the battle against all crimes, or even all 
hazards, not just terrorism. 
Finally, looking at the entire system or model for prevention, from risk 
analysis to threat response and all of the sub-elements, one would be hard- 
pressed to find a state or local effort that has tied it all together in some type of 
enterprise approach (i.e. established a joint and unified effort across multiple 
agencies, levels of government, and the private sector, all contributing resources 
and taking responsibility for connected pieces of the overall methodology). While 
this may be an unrealistic expectation, the vision is there to be pursued. Good 
public arguments for prevention investments at the state and local government 
levels must be found and delivered. As in the case of fusion centers, overall 
prevention efforts may suffer from budget and political disinterest in the face of 
unprovable success.  
 
Preparedness 
While the seven national preparedness priorities were published only in the last 
year or so, observations from the MET sessions suggest two conclusions. First, 
the priorities are, and have been, consistent with the priorities of state and local 
efforts. Second, each jurisdiction may place greater weight or effort on one 
priority or another. To a large extent, the seven priorities for homeland security 
have been validated by the state and urban-area participants. From the 
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perspectives of individual agencies and disciplines, however, traditional priorities 
remain the same (e.g. fire fighters fight fires, police officers patrol and arrest, 
etc.). Balancing traditional governmental priorities with the new priorities of 
homeland security appears to be the great challenge. This is not to say there is an 
aversion to the new priorities (some would say they are not even new); it is more 
a question of how to effectively accomplish both the new and traditional at the 
same time, even with additional federal funding. 
Another observation revolves around the need to practice and prepare to 
prevent. How do you exercise prevention? What does a fusion center tabletop 




The focus of risk communications discussions appears to be on incident public 
information or “how we talk to the media and the public” during an emergency. 
The MET seminars also reveal a need for methods and guidelines for pre-event 
risk communications. Effectively informing the public of prevention and 
preparedness efforts, their role, and the engagement of the media in 
preparedness phases are important efforts that require training, tools, and 
further education. The consensus is that the management of both public fear and 
the media is most effectively done well before an event occurs. An element of 
political risk is recognized here, along with an awareness that such a program 
must be carefully implemented. Publicly talking about the bad things that could 
happen, even accompanied with information on how these things can be avoided 
or resolved, is not a welcome activity to elected officials and their subordinates. 
Jurisdictions also appear to acknowledge that in cases of pandemic flu, bio-
terrorism, and other events of mass disruption, much of the response effort is 
dedicated to managing the reactions of those unaffected by the emergency, not 
just those who are infected, injured, or killed.  
Participants see a possible advantage in utilizing unofficial spokespeople and 
preparedness advocates whose words will resonate more strongly with the public 
than those of elected and senior government officials. Communications from 
church and community leaders, celebrities, and educators may have a greater 
public impact, with respect to both preparedness messages and emergency action 
recommendations, than those delivered by public sector officials. The 
combination and coordination of official and unofficial methods of delivery could 
be the most effective course of action. However, this potential improvement will 
challenge those in charge of the ongoing effort towards unified message 
development and delivery. Most jurisdictions attending the METs seminars have 
accepted, possess, or are implementing Joint Information Systems and Centers 
(JIS/JIC.) But these efforts and structures primarily address single or 
geographically-limited incidents and primarily only in the emergency response 
phase. Consistent messaging to the public is important in the preparedness and 
imminent-threat phase as well, and to a wider geographical audience. But current 
employments of JIS/JICs cannot solve this issue; they are designed and used for 
tactical and operational responses rather than strategic messaging. 
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Response and Recovery 
The post-Katrina and pre-Pandemic Flu environment has significantly increased 
the desire to discuss the more difficult policy and strategic issues that arise 
during the occurrence of catastrophic events. The seminars and sessions 
purposely steer away from those issues that are traditional and, for the most part, 
already solved. (Senior executives do not need the MET team to have a discussion 
of the jurisdiction’s standard procedures for their emergency response system.) 
The executive education program presents and solicits discussion on some of the 
harder, if not impossible, issues that emerge during a catastrophic scenario. 
Examples of the topics discussed by the participants include: rules of engagement 
for the enforcement of quarantine, seizure of private property, lines of succession, 
and use of force in an evacuation. 
The most challenging – and most often unresolved – of these is the use of force 
and rules of engagement for public health or general peace and order events. 
Most jurisdictions acknowledge that, in cases of isolation or quarantine, 
discussions have occurred between health and law enforcement agencies 
pertaining to the importance of coordination. But when the first layer of the 
onion is peeled away, there has been little policy development regarding how 
isolation or quarantine will be enforced. How much force is appropriate and who 
makes this policy? If state police or National Guard forces become engaged, do 
they know, acknowledge, and adhere to a local jurisdiction’s policies? Should 
they? What about federal forces sent in to supplement state and local efforts? 
What about actions on international borders? This particular policy issue 
desperately needs further national discussion. Most, if not all, catastrophic-level 
scenarios will present this decision requirement, yet the issue’s pre-disaster 
analysis, debate, and option development appears to be minimal at all levels of 
government. 
Most jurisdictional senior executives attending the METs seminars appear to  
be well prepared for the vast majority of disasters (and the inherent policy issues) 
they can reasonably expect to face. It is the catastrophic event, the rare but 
possible calamity that presents policy issues that have never been discussed or  
involve inadequate or non-existent analyses and options. For example, attacks 
with weapons of mass destruction combine unknown technical variables with 
unprecedented public fear to create decision-making environments that are 
rarely experienced or exercised by senior executives. Preparedness for the social, 
as opposed to the medical, impact of a public health disaster are just now being 
debated, discussed, and planned for. A recommendation made by several 
jurisdictions is to provide exercises for officials that focus more on the 
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The comments and observations related here merely skim the surface of the 
discussions and recommendations that have emerged from the sixty-nine MET 
seminars held to date. The results of 266 hours of discussion, with over 2,000 
officials over three years, resulted in a much longer list of recommendations and 
concerns than described above. Another observer of these sessions may, and 
should, stress other findings, trends, and perspectives. Frankly, an article could 
be written on each of these areas.  
Nevertheless, two critical points can be made: (1) learning is needed; and (2) 
learning is occurring. Education is the key to success for senior officials at this 
stage of our homeland security evolution. Every administration leaves its mark by 
advancing the evolution of policies and strategies a bit more. Education helps 
those involved to define the policies and strategic issues to focus upon and 
presents options and approaches for further analysis. The Executive Education 
Program’s sessions have demonstrated that the method utilized by the 
Department of Homeland Security and Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security is one promising approach to satisfying the need 
to educate senior officials in this new endeavor we call homeland security.     
The ball is being moved downfield. States, local governments, federal agencies, 
and the private sector have all been engaged in this effort. The greatest challenge 
appears to be that the road to homeland security “success” must be built while 
these public officials are sprinting down the pavement. This is the primary value 
of the Executive Education Program’s sessions: it provides a break point in this 
journey, allowing these officials to evaluate where they have been and to 
hopefully plot out their next steps. It also helps to “institutionalize” homeland 
security efforts and provides a resource for new leaders and administrations. 
 
 
Glen Woodbury is a faculty member and associate director of Executive Education 
Programs for the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security. His responsibilities include the development of executive education 
workshops, seminars and training for senior state and local officials. Mr. Woodbury 
also teaches at the school’s master’s degree program, serves as a subject matter expert 
on emergency management and homeland security issues, and conducts research and 
analysis of policy issues in the public safety and security arena.  
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Executive Education Program 
State METs 
Urban Area METs 
Executive Education Topical Seminars 
As of July 17, 2006 
 
(Author’s Note:  While exact attendance figures were not kept for all events, an estimate of 





State MET Conducted 
1. New Hampshire January 29, 2003 
2. South Carolina May 8, 2003 
3. Alabama July 1, 2003 
4. Georgia August 1, 2003 
5. Iowa August 26, 2003 
6. Wisconsin September 12, 2003 
7. Tennessee October 15, 2003 
8. North Dakota November 4, 2003 
9. Indiana December 10, 2003 
10. Illinois April 16,  2004 
11. Maine May 18, 2004 
12. Connecticut June 8,  2004 
13. NGA/Seattle July 19, 2004 
14. New Jersey August 17, 2004 
15. Pennsylvania August 23, 2004 
16. Colorado September 20, 2004 
17.  Pacific Basin, Honolulu, HI (Governors and 
officials from Hawaii, Guam, America 
Samoa, and Northern Marianas) 
September 27, 2004 
18.  Ohio October 8, 2004 
19.  Wyoming October 20, 2004 
20. Arkansas December 14, 2004 
21. Iowa 2 December 16, 2004 
22. Oklahoma March 4, 2005 
23. Connecticut 2 March 16, 2005 
24. Arizona April 16, 2005 
25. Washington State May 9, 2005 
26. Utah June 20, 2005 
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27. Pacific Basin HS - Kona, HI (Governors and 
officials from HI, Guam, America Samoa, and 
Northern Marianas) 
August 11-12, 2005 
 
28. Washington State – Operationalizing Policy 
at the Agency Level 
August 24, 2005 
29. California September 9, 2005 
30. Puerto Rico September 15, 2005 
31. Georgia – Private and Public Sector Focus October 6, 2005 
32.  North Carolina March 15, 2006 
33. California 2 April 20, 2006 
34.  Louisiana (Hurricane) May 16, 2006 
35. Ohio (Bio - Pan Flu) June 13, 2006 
36.  Arizona Governor’s Public-Private Sector June 24, 2006 
37. Guam July 6, 2006 
 
URBAN AREA METS 
 
State MET Conducted  
1.  Seattle, WA April 25, 2005 
2. National Capital Region, Washington, DC June 1, 2005 
3. Phoenix, AZ June 16, 2005 
4. Atlanta, GA November 14, 2005 
5. Salt Lake City, UT December 7, 2005 
6. Jacksonville, FL February 9, 2006 
7. Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA February 22, 2006 
8.  Cincinnati, OH March 9, 2006 
9.  New Haven, CT March 21, 2006 
10. San Francisco, CA April 19, 2006 





Topic Location MET Conducted  
1.  Continuity of 




Des Moines, Iowa January 8, 2004 
2. HS in Rural America Somerset, KY March 8, 2004 
3. Intelligence and 
Information Sharing 
Hartford, CT (HS directors 
and officials from the 
Northeast) 
November 10, 2004 
4. “Pacific Cloud” 
Hollywood 
Hollywood, CA (Sec. Ridge 
and Federal and Los Angeles 
December 15, 2004 
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Officials and Hollywood 
Executives – Academy Awards 
Exercise) 
5. Nat’l Assoc for 
Attorney Generals – 
Public Health Legal 
Authorities  
Lansing, MI April 20, 2005 
6. Nat’l HS Consortium 
(State HS directors and 
officials from national 
public safety and 
governmental 
associations) 
Monterey, CA May 24, 2005 
7. Council of State 
Governments - 
Executive Council and 
Public Safety 
Committee leaders 
Lake Tahoe, CA June 6, 2005 
8. National Sheriffs 
Association 
Louisville, KY June 29, 2005 
9. CA Dept. of Food & 
Agriculture – Agro-T 
Sacramento, CA September 8, 2005 
10.National Sheriffs 
Association 
Miami, FL November 6, 2005 
11. CHDS Katrina 
Review 
Washington, DC November 8, 2005 
12. Multi-State Agro-
Terrorism Seminar 
with Univ. of Minnesota 
Chicago, IL (10 states 
participated) 
November 15, 2005 
 
13. Pandemic Flu 
Preparedness Forum 
with Univ. of Texas 
Houston, TX November 28, 2005 
14. Homeland Security 
Consortium (State HS 
directors and officials 





Phoenix, AZ December 2, 2005 




Washington, DC January 24-25, 2006 
16. Nat’l Lt. Governors 
Association 
Washington DC February 6, 2006 
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17.  NEMA Public 
Affairs Roundtable 
Session 
Washington, DC February 13, 2006 
18.  MT Governor’s 
Conference - Elected 
Officials MET 
Billings, MT May 23, 2006 




Lanai, Hawaii June 20, 2006 
20.  Guam Risk 
Communications and 
Health Emergencies 
Hagatna, Guam July 5, 2006 
21. CSG Henry Toll 
Fellowship 




                                                
1 Christopher Bellavita and Ellen M. Gordon, “Changing Homeland Security: Teaching the Core,” Homeland 
Security Affairs II, no. 1 (April 2006). http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.1.1 
2
 Fiol and Lyles define learning as “the development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past 
actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.” See C. Marlene Fiol and Marjorie A. Lyles, 
“Organizational Learning,” Academy of Management Review 10 (1985): 803-813. According to Amy K. 
Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, learning is multi-dimensional: it has cognitive, behavioral, and emotional 
components, each of which is susceptible to particular instructional or educational approaches. See “Lessons 
We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume II, Issue 2 (July 2006). 




 Charlie Savage, “Ridge to leave post as first U.S. director of homeland security,” Boston Globe, December 1, 
2004. In the article, this phrase is attributed to Frank Cillufo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy 
Institute at George Washington University but this author has heard the term repeated by Department of 
Homeland Security staff as well when describing the challenge of creating “homeland security.” 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/12/01/ridge_to_leave_post_as_first_us_director_of_
homeland_security/.   
6 The Bill of Rights; Amendments I – X of the United States Constitution, Amendment X. From 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/billeng.htm. Last accessed on 7/18/06. 
7 I advocate the term “smart practices” versus “best practices,” the latter implying some type of evaluative 
and comparative analysis. Homeland security is not yet at a point at which what works in some places can be 
objectively ranked and ordered into what is “best” for everyone. 
8 Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer, Seattle Police Department, in comment to author. While he did not originate 
the phrase, Chief Kimerer deserves credit for applying it effectively to this program. 
9 Christopher Bellavita, in initial draft of article, “What Should Homeland Security Leaders be Talking 
About?” Reviewed on July 10, 2006. 
WOODBURY, “LEARNING” HOMELAND SECURITY 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
22 
                                                                                                                                            
10 The following section on what the program has discovered so far is not the result of a formal analysis or 
necessarily held in consensus by the program’s leadership. It is the author’s attempt to capture the trends he 
has collected by attending a majority of the seminars, as well as from a review of the session summaries 
completed to date. Credit goes to Wendy Walsh, homeland defense and security coordinator, Naval 
Postgraduate School, who conducted an analysis of the executive education seminar summary reports 
completed from 2003-2005. Sample size for her analysis was 24 reports (11 states, 4 urban areas, and 9 
topical METs.) 
11 Wendy Walsh, “MET Analysis – December 2005,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
12 But it is important to acknowledge that these are the top issues discussed primarily because that is how the 
curriculum is designed, not necessarily because they are the top overall issues of the participants outside the 
context of the seminars. 
Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland 






Required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, the National 
Preparedness Goal is a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal intended 
to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets. All states and urban 
areas are to align existing preparedness strategies within the National 
Preparedness Goal’s eight national priorities.1 A national priority under the Goal 
is the use of geographic regions across the nation to share risk, engage in joint 
planning, and share resources to develop and sustain risk-based capability levels. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) required states and urban areas 
to assess their preparedness needs by reviewing their existing programs and 
capabilities. These findings were then to be used in developing a plan and formal 
investment justification outlining major statewide, sub-state, or interstate 
initiatives for which they will seek federal funding under the Homeland Security 
Grant Program. According to DHS, the funding initiatives are to focus efforts on 
how to build and sustain programs and capabilities within and across state 
boundaries while aligning with the Goal and national priorities. In fiscal year 
2006 DHS funding guidance, regional collaboration included specific 
implementation benchmarks. These benchmarks included (1) formalizing mutual 
aid agreements with surrounding communities and states to share equipment, 
personnel, and facilities during emergencies; (2) conducting exercises of the 
execution of mutual aid agreements to identify the challenges and familiarize 
officials with resources that are available in the region; and (3) coordinating 
homeland security preparedness assistance expenditures and planning efforts on 
a regional basis to avoid duplicative or inconsistent investments. 
There are tremendous challenges in developing and implementing regional 
collaboration strategies. This article examines these practices, based on an 
analysis of several published sources elaborating on critical success elements or 
factors for successful collaborations, partnerships, or strategic alliances and 
performance management and strategic planning, including those for homeland 
security. 
 
IMPORTANCE AND CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL APPROACHES 
Others besides DHS have emphasized the importance of multi-organizational 
relationships, coordination, and collaboration such as regional approaches to 
homeland security preparedness, response, and recovery. For example, Donald F. 
Kettl characterized homeland security as being fundamentally about coordination 
involving multiple federal agencies, complex partnerships with state and local 
governments, and intricate ties between the public and nongovernmental 
sectors.2 Kiki Caruson, Susan A. MacManus, Matthew Kohen, and Thomas A. 
Watson also have written that regionalism offers a powerful tool for encouraging 
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greater intergovernmental cooperation and improved homeland security 
preparedness. Assessing Florida’s regional approach, these authors highlighted 
the importance of regionalism in fostering strong vertical and horizontal 
networks, intergovernmental cooperation, and security preparedness. They found 
that regional organizational structures are most effective in promoting 
intergovernmental cooperation and homeland security preparedness where there 
are (1) a large number of counties, cities, special districts, and multi-county 
special districts operating in each region and (2) a number of vulnerabilities, 
including high-risk physical targets, at-risk populations, water geography, and 
population size and density. Under these conditions, they found local officials 
tend to report higher levels of intergovernmental cooperation, better-quality 
networks, and a high level of preparedness.  Regions where these conditions were 
not present tended to report less cooperation among government entities and 
lower preparedness ratings.3 The Homeland Security Policy Institute Task Force 
also emphasized that regional preparedness is critical to building a national 
response system. The Task Force noted that regional coordination and 
cooperation maximize the effectiveness of scarce preparedness funds, eliminate 
duplication of effort, and build effective preparedness and response networks by 
integrating federal, state, and local assets.4 
The Task Force mentioned mutual-aid agreements, regional coordination 
plans and interstate compacts such as the Emergency Management Acceptance 
Compact as means to facilitate regional coordination. However, agreements, 
plans, and compacts, while important, are not nearly sufficient for serious 
regional collaborative efforts and the outputs of a much more complex process. 
For example, goals and objectives must be mutually agreed upon by various 
stakeholders in a region as a foundation for using resources in a complementary 
way.5 Thus a regional planning effort should reflect national, state, and urban 
area homeland security strategies, not just the National Preparedness Goal and 
its related national target capabilities. The national requirements are but one part 
of developing regional preparedness, response, and recovery assessments and 
funding priorities specific to a region. Organizations involved in a regional 
approach will need to formulate specific homeland security objectives and related 
strategies, determine the capabilities and resources needed to carry out and 
sustain the strategies, set up governance structures for the regional effort, and 
evaluate that effort on an ongoing basis. 
In sum, although regional approaches to confront difficult, large-scale public 
problems such as homeland security are not new, developing and implementing 
regional approaches will sorely test the management skills of all those 
responsible for regional initiatives. Success in implementation is not assured and 
certainly is not easy. With one exception, states and local jurisdictions generally 
will need to take steps to self-organize themselves into a region for joint planning 
and resource allocation. Only one area in the nation – the National Capital 
Region (NRC) comprised of the District of Columbia and surrounding counties 
and cities in the states of Maryland and Virginia – has a statutorily designated 
regional coordinator, the Office of the National Capital Region Coordination 
(ONCRC) within DHS.6 The ONCRC is responsible for overseeing and 
coordinating federal programs for and relationships with state, local, and 
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regional authorities in the NCR and for assessing, and advocating for, the 
resources needed by state, local and regional authorities in the NCR to implement 
efforts to secure the homeland. Representatives of the NCR’s Homeland Security 
Senior Policy Group testified before Congress in March 2006 on the NCR’s 
readiness and discussed the challenge of regional collaboration and decision-
making involving multiple sovereign jurisdictions. They observed that there was 
no single person, office, level or branch of government that had the authority to 
direct all preparedness activities across all others in the region.7 However, they 
observed that NCR must operate as a collaborative enterprise to accomplish the 
readiness levels corresponding to the priorities of all of the region’s stakeholders. 
Others have identified similar challenges. Kettl wrote that simulations 
conducted by the federal government illustrated how hard it is to build effective 
networks for coordination.8 In addition, discussing what he learned from 
watershed performance-management systems involving multiple actors, Mark T. 
Imperial noted implementation challenges.  For example, performance 
management raises questions of competing interests and values among the 
individual organizations responsible for managing a watershed. There are 
different enabling statutes, competing public interests, and demands from their 
respective constituency groups. In addition, there are problems associated with 
the complexity of natural processes; difficulty in establishing cause and effect 
relationships, including the impact of human-induced changes or natural 
variations; and long time lags between action and observable environmental 
changes.9 
Given the challenges, managers might consider what practices underlay a 
successful regional effort, as part of a high-performance regional partnership.  A 
review of several key literature sources provided the basic set of practices for 
successful partnerships. The National Academy of Public Administration 
produced a monograph on high-performance partnerships.10 Robert Klitgaard 
and Gregory F. Treverton also described key factors,11 as did the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) in discussing practices facilitating greater 
collaboration among federal agencies,12 factors characterizing regional 
coordination,13 and practices in developing pertinent information-sharing 
relationships and procedures.14 Russell Linden,15 Imperial,16 and Yves Doz and 
Gary Hamel17 discussed the challenges of collaboration and strategic alliances, 
and A. Bone et al.18 discussed cross-sectoral partnerships. In addition, GAO work 
in which I participated on performance management and strategic planning 
practices provided other possible regional practices for homeland security 
performance.19 Additional sources were also used, noted individually in the 
sections that follow. 
These practices are categorized into strategic practices and enabling practices. 
The strategic practices value and justify the partnership while the enabling 
practices support developing, implementing, and sustaining the partnership. 
 
STRATEGIC PRACTICES: PARTNERING TO OUTCOMES 
The first set of practices for successful regional partnerships is those I consider 
strategic. These elements are (1) implementing a formal regional partnership; (2) 
assessing the value and content of a regional partnership on an ongoing basis; 
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and (3) defining and articulating a common mission and specific regional 
partnership strategic outcomes. 
 
Formal Regional Partnerships 
The first strategic practice is implementing formal regional partnerships, not 
collaborative networks. While regional collaboration is certainly needed, using 
the term “collaboration” implies to me a temporary, coordinative effort with 
fluidity of members, commitment, and resources targeted for collaboration.  If we 
are to leverage regional collaboration for the four mission areas of homeland 
security—prevention, protection, response, and recovery—we should consider the 
stronger descriptors and leveraged relationships of “partnerships” or “strategic 
alliances.” 
The National Academy of Public Administration defines a partnership as a 
mutually-beneficial and reciprocal relationship where entities share 
responsibilities, authority, and accountability for results.20 To qualify as a 
partnership, the individual organizations must form a structure for the involved 
organizations to share authority, responsibility, resources, and accountability for 
achieving mutual goals. Normally, partnerships will emerge from collaborative 
initiatives as those involved in the collaboration identify joint interests and goals. 
As the relationships evolve from limited collaboration to partnerships, trust is 
built and policy and process boundaries between the joint actors begin to merge 
and tightly integrate in strategic initiatives important to the individual partners. 
 
Value and Content of a Regional Partnership 
A second strategic practice is assessing the value and content of a regional 
partnership initially and on an ongoing basis – deciding to partner at all and then 
deciding if the partnership should be sustained. Considering a partnership 
involves a complex set of factors, including evaluating in what environment the 
partnership must perform; what should be the right mix of capable partners; who 
are potential partner candidates, including those organizations that should not be 
included in the partnership; and what value each partner might bring to the 
partnership. Those deciding on a partnership should include representation from 
many different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders as part of discussing public 
policy problems and agreeing on possible solutions. Decisions made 
collaboratively within the partnership are likely to have broader support than 
those that are unilateral. 
As several authors pointed out, the central issue in deciding to partner is the 
creation of value – for who and where, for what benefits and in return for what 
efforts, and in what time frame. In simple terms, a partnership should only be 
used when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved by 
working alone. The National Academy of Public Administration further defines 
more robust, “high performance partnerships.” Similar to a normal partnership, a 
high-performance partnership leverages each partner’s individual strengths. 
However, high performance partnerships are those that produce significant 
outcomes that could not be reached by an individual partner alone. 
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In contrast to collaborations, a high performance partnership stems from a 
critical and thorough assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organizations who could partner. A joint assessment will include organizational 
capabilities and capacities such as financial resources or sources of funding, 
political skills and contacts, knowledge and experience, organizational structure 
and governance, information sources, and experiences. In a formal partnership, it 
is understood that each partner must carry out its commitments or risk 
undermining the benefits for all. Moreover, none of those involved in partnership 
should use the partnership to shirk or transfer its responsibility or attempt to cut 
or shift costs to the other partners. 
The assessment will determine what capabilities and capacities individual 
partners can leverage or directly commit to shared goals and what actual 
partnership synergy could be achieved and sustained for mutual benefits. As part 
of the individual calculations of joining or not joining with others, potential 
partners will weigh what might be achieved together and what might be achieved 
individually and if the partnership will have staying power to create the expected 
value for all parties. It is a fact of partnering life that individual partners, even 
though they come together to produce joint benefits, also keep an eye on what 
“extra” benefits might come their way within the partnership – part of “winning” 
within the partnership. 
Interdependence, based on the leveraging of capacities and capabilities, is the 
bedrock of a successful partnership and, for homeland security regions, certainly 
true. Once the partners commit to a formal partnership, the joint and individual 
assessment of partnership value and the balance of power within the partnership 
never ends. Managers of an enduring partnership will develop a process for 
evaluating benefits and periodically renegotiate the compact between partners. 
The environment of the partnership may change, as partners become rivals in 
securing funding, missions change, or the mix of products or services undergoes 
major changes. Over time, the capabilities and capacities of individual 
partnership may change, as well as the interest in sustaining a partnership for 
mutual gain. In addition, the balance of power of individual partners within the 
partnership can shift widely over time, particularly as the relative importance and 
specialization of the capacities and capabilities contributed by each partner 
varies. For example, one partner may defer to other partners for key 
competencies and become too narrowly specialized. As a result, it becomes too 
dependent on the partnership and actually can be in danger of termination from 
the partnership as the other partners find better partners. That partner also can 
be at organizational risk if the partnership dissolves and it no longer can rely on 
the vital capacities and capabilities provided through the partnership. 
That said, the partnership has to be prepared to terminate a partner if that 
partner no longer provides the synergy for added value. Those involved as 
partners in a homeland security region will find this a particularly tricky issue – 
as well as the reverse concern when a well-resourced partner decides it no longer 
wishes to support a regional homeland security partnership. In addition, 
reassessing the partnership may also involve the network of partnerships each 
partner may have. Partners rarely are aligned with just one partner.  Instead, 
each partner has its own partnerships and what occurs in the others has 
CAUDLE, REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 




implications for the partnership. Part of a partnership value analysis should 
include surveillance on developments in other partnerships and what their 
impact might be on the partnership. For homeland security, this likely would 
involve alliances with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, as 
well as mutual aid agreements with jurisdictions outside of the region. 
 
Common Regional Mission and Specific Strategic Outcomes 
A third strategic practice is defining and articulating a common mission and 
deciding on specific, high-level regional partnership strategic outcomes or 
priorities. A common mission is the shared, clear, and compelling purpose for the 
partners to work together. For example, an initial NCR homeland security 
mission statement was to “build and sustain an integrated effort to prepare for, 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from ‘all-hazards’ threats or 
events.”21  Washington State’s Region 6 (geographic King County) 2005 mission 
statement was “to protect the citizens, property, environment, culture and 
economy of Region 6 (geographic King County) from acts of terrorism and 
natural disasters and to minimize the effects of these emergencies.”22 
These mission statements should be focused and encompass all of the 
homeland security programs involving the partners. A clear, concise mission 
statement will form the foundation for a coordinated, balanced set of more 
specific strategic goals, objectives, performance measures, and detailed strategies 
to implement the goals. Without such a mission statement, it will be difficult to 
develop an appropriate hierarchy of regional goals, measures, and strategies 
across the partners and to clearly relate the associated outputs and outcomes to 
the regional homeland security mission. 
Further, the partnership mission statement should be a call to action, clearly 
interrelated with the missions of the individual partners and their respective 
goals. A strong common mission statement is a necessary vehicle to help 
overcome significant differences in individual partner organizational missions, 
cultures, and established ways of doing business while still satisfying respective 
operating needs. 
Once a mission statement is ready, the partnership would define high-level 
results – strategic outcomes or priorities – the partnership should accomplish.  
In defining regional outcomes, the partnerships should conduct comprehensive 
internal and external assessments to identify regional homeland security 
customers and stakeholders and articulate expected outcomes for any regional 
homeland security programs. Partners, working with customers and 
stakeholders, would develop a specific and precise definition of outcomes based 
on the partnership mission statement. For example, Washington State’s Region 6 
has seven priorities: (1) coordinate and strengthen regional emergency 
preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery; (2) assess and 
address regional assets, needs, threats, and vulnerabilities; (3) make decisions 
that will generate long-term regional benefits and sustainability; (4) promote 
critical infrastructure protection, continuity of operations, and continuity of 
government plans for public, private, and non-profit organizations, and tribal 
nations; (5) develop region-wide interagency and interoperable communications 
capabilities and strategies; (6) develop region-wide public information, public 
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education, and outreach strategies; and (7) enhance the coordination, 
capabilities, and surge capacity of the region’s public health and healthcare 
system.23 
The outcomes or priorities must be those that will convince all involved that 
their return on investment warrants the time and resources devoted to the 
regional partnership and the costs of sustaining a partnership. The costs include 
money, management or staff time, sharing data and reports, and designing and 
implementing joint incentive and evaluation systems. The outcomes should also 
consider the costs of not forming a partnership, such as misunderstandings, the 
failures to coordinate, and duplications. 
 
ENABLING PRACTICES: LEADERSHIP TO PERFORMANCE 
SYSTEMS 
The second set of practices defines the enablers for implementing a high-
performance regional partnership. Enabling practices include (1) having 
leadership to champion commitment to a regional partnership and high-
performance; (2) crafting the regional partnership’s organizational infrastructure 
and norms to perform effectively; (3) setting joint regional strategic goals, 
objectives, measures, and strategies across regional jurisdictions to accomplish 
the strategic outcomes; (4) providing resources from both joint and individual 
regional partner sources to initiate and sustain the regional goals, objectives, and 
related strategies; and (5) setting a regional partnership performance 
management system for outcomes and individual performance management 
systems to reinforce partnerships. 
 
Regional Partnership Leadership 
The first enabling practice is having leadership to champion commitment to a 
regional partnership and high-performance. Experts point out that partnerships 
appear to thrive when individual champions, representing senior leadership in 
their own organizations, make a commitment to the partnership and tackle the 
challenges in working across organizational boundaries. These champions invest 
their personal reputation, resources, and time until the understandings providing 
the partnership’s foundations are reached and a process put in place to define 
goals and how they will be achieved. 
While champions provide initial direction and support for a partnership, 
sustainable partnerships require sharing authority, ownership, and joint 
accountability for results. The initiating champion must be supported by and 
then supplanted by managers of the joining partners. The champion and these 
managers should see the partnerships as the means to extend their own 
organizations’ resources, not as remedies for past failures. Top management of all 
the partners should be committed to successful implementation of homeland 
security performance-based management and the achievement of agreed-upon 
outcomes. These outcomes should be made high priorities of the partnership and 
individual partners. Top management buy-in and commitment, a high level of 
involvement, and consistency in leadership should characterize the partnership. 
Top managers from the involved jurisdictions should be involved in all aspects of 
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regional performance-based management, from developing a performance 
monitoring and evaluation system to identifying and assessing key measures. 
 
Partnership Organizational Infrastructure and Norms 
A second practice is crafting the regional partnership’s organizational 
infrastructure and norms to perform effectively. Organizational infrastructure 
and norms include a governing and decision-making structure, policies, 
procedures, processes, communication, and data systems, central to operating 
across agency boundaries. 
Partners should follow the principal that “form follows function,” or in this 
case, form follows the intended results described in the regional homeland 
security mission statement and strategic goals. The governance and decision-
making structure for the regional partnership – developed by and accepted by all 
individual partners – provides the leadership, processes, and resources for 
partnership decisions, the allocation of resources to implement the decisions, and 
the means to resolve the unavoidable conflicting priorities and concerns within 
the partnership. The NCR Senior Policy Group, for example, plays a central role 
in interaction across the NCR jurisdictions. The Group provides continuing policy 
and executive level focus on the region’s homeland security concerns.  It has the 
mandate to determine priority actions for increasing regional preparedness and 
response capabilities and reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. It is the final 
adjudicator for decisions, relying on extensive input and advice from local 
government’s Chief Administrative Officers committee.24 
All partners and their stakeholders should know how to access the partnership 
decision-making structure and what to expect from it. The organizational 
infrastructure and norms should vary depending on the political traditions and 
authority of state, regional, and local entities that are involved in the partnership. 
However, political traditions and authorities may not promote partnerships that 
cross organizational or jurisdictional boundaries. For example, David Robertson 
observes that the power given to cities and counties is determined by the states.25 
This complicates emergency planning and decision making when jurisdictions 
are not located in the same state and there are conflicting laws. Where there are 
conflicts or complications, those forming the partnership might consider more 
prescriptive, minimum requirements for membership, decision-making 
processes, and planning. 
To facilitate boundary-spanning partnerships, partnering organizations should 
address the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, processes, and data 
systems that will be used in the partnership. Partnership norms such as a 
common set of values, language, and glossary of terms also can guide joint 
activities and build mutual trust. To assist in crosscutting efforts, partner 
organizations could increase the usefulness of their common data sharing by 
establishing common data definitions and information systems. Common data 
definitions help ensure that data used for common purposes would be 
consistently defined, collected, calculated, and interpreted. Partners might also 
identify existing information systems within each partner organization that might 
serve common interests and information that is already shared across partner 
organizations. 
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Crafting the partnership organizational infrastructure and underlying trust 
generally requires a number of shared experiences to become robust. Repeated 
interactions across the partners encourage their organizations to make 
investments in partnership processes and resources such as shared databases and 
specialized staff. Frequent interactions to exchange information and ideas build 
trust in the partnership and personal relationships. However, these interactions 
should not be left to chance or the individual efforts of those involved in 
managing or staffing the partnership. Part of the partnership organizational 
infrastructure and norms should include concrete activities and processes to 
build ongoing personal relationships over time. The partnership should hold 
regular – bimonthly, quarterly, or annual – meetings or forums to discuss issues 
and continue valuable face-to-face contacts. The partnership should encourage 
consistent member participation, building trust through members consistently 
attending and participating in the partnerships’ activities. Members should also 
be encouraged to consistently involve the same representatives and not rotate 
different people as representatives. 
In addition, the norms and understandings of the partnership activities should 
establish an atmosphere where each partner’s issues and expertise merit 
consideration regardless of his or her organization or the individual’s position in 
the organization. Procedures are also needed when there are violations of the 
understandings that dictate the governance and decision-making processes. 
Violations would undermine trust and thus the partnership purpose. The 
governance and decision-making structure should be designed to quickly resolve 
conflicts and concerns which, if left unchecked, can undermine the commitment 
of individual partners or even destroy the entire partnership. A formal 
communications plan also can stress constant sharing of information. 
Organizations should use several methods of communication to explain the 
purpose, processes, implementation strategies, and staff responsibilities for 
homeland security performance management and measurement. 
 
Joint Strategic Goals, Objectives, Measures, and Strategies 
The third enabling practice is setting joint regional strategic goals, objectives, 
measures, and strategies across regional jurisdictions to accomplish the strategic 
outcomes. This should be accomplished through regional and individual partner 
homeland security strategic and implementation plans that direct and coordinate 
regional programs to address joint priorities. 
The planning process and plans also can be used to enhance the ownership of 
and commitment to the regional performance management efforts. Managers 
and staff across the region should participate extensively in the development of 
goals, targets, and measures, hopefully securing agreement on what will be used 
for detailed joint and individual partner planning and program management. The 
strategic and implementation planning should provide a clear rationale or logic 
for how specific objectives and strategies and their related inputs for individual 
programs will deliver regional homeland security outputs that can be connected 
to intermediate and final regional homeland security outcomes. These 
descriptions, often called program logic models, are not necessarily the more 
extensive models that might be used in more comprehensive program 
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evaluations, but concise descriptions of the basic flow from inputs to outcomes. 
The exercise of developing logic models can help those involved in regional 
homeland security initiatives (1) see the progression from outputs to end 
outcomes across the region; (2) see how changes in joint and individual partner 
program components and outputs might more effectively impact homeland 
security outcomes; and (3) better understand specific resource contributions to 
desired homeland security results. Performance measures and strategies should 
be consistent with the rationale. 
Implementation plans across the regional partnership should clearly explain 
how regional goals, objectives, and measures will be implemented. These plans 
can serve as partnering agreements, whether formally or informally stated as 
agreements to implement.  Using a “family” of partner implementation plans can 
encourage the direct linkage of regional strategic goals and measures to 
operational and support goals, measures, and related activities across the region 
and by partners who are acting individually to support the regional aims. 
Implementation plans for regional goals across the partnership should be a 
valuable mechanism to ensure each partner’s goals can be carefully integrated 
with those of the other partners. In sum, these plans direct partners’ strategies 
and activities to be oriented toward achieving the principal regional strategic 
goals and help avoid contradictory homeland security goals or the supplanting of 
those goals across the partnership and within individual partner organizations. 
These implementation plans should define roles and responsibilities and 
resource commitments for achieving the regional goals and objectives. For 
example, part of the process should include establishing one lead organization or 
a specific leadership role among the partners for implementing the regional 
goals, perhaps even to the next lower objective level. To illustrate, Washington 
State’s Region 6 strategic plan notes that the region will implement each of the 
homeland security objectives by assigning to it a “coordinating lead.” The 
coordinating plan is to be responsible for bringing together any other entities and 
individuals engaged in implementing the objective. Consulting with any key 
stakeholders, the coordinating lead will develop an action plan mapping out the 
immediate steps necessary to accomplish the objective.26 
The plans also can be mapped to other plans of other jurisdictions to validate 
the content of the goals and their importance. For example, Washington State’s 
Region 6 plan includes two crosswalks. One crosswalk is of the regional 
homeland security strategic plan priorities to the Washington State and the 
National Preparedness Goal priorities and capabilities. The second crosswalk is of 
the Region 6 homeland security strategic plan priorities, goals, and objectives to 
the Washington State and Urban Area Security Initiative Seattle Urban Area 
Strategy.27 
The strategic and implementation plans are also important to the relationships 
in a partnership. The ability to work in partnerships requires mutual trust among 
the respective parties. The strategies and implementation plans articulate 
partnership priorities and commitments and facilitate shared beliefs and 
expectations that individual partners will carry out their part of the joint 
agreements. 
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The fourth enabling practice is providing resources from both joint and 
individual regional partner sources to initiate and sustain the regional goals, 
objectives, and related strategies. A regional partnership may have clear 
leadership and structure and well-defined strategies, but fail because resource 
allocation or commitments run into problems. Resources include tangibles such 
as financial resources, staff, assets, technology, and information, and such 
intangibles as knowledge, access, relationships, political support, and in-kind 
contributions. As mentioned earlier, partners have relative resource strengths 
and limitations, bringing different levels of resources and capacities to the effort. 
By assessing the resource strengths and limitations, partners can identify 
opportunities to address resource needs by leveraging each others’ resources 
needed for the joint strategies. 
Regional partners should recognize that one of the biggest incentives for 
homeland security performance-based management is seeing results information 
integrated into budgetary structures and decision making. This also is an aim of 
DHS, where grant allocation is tied to impact. The partners should align their 
individual budgets with regional homeland security program activities which, in 
turn, should be tied to agreed-upon goals, targets, and measures. To support the 
regional partnership, each partner should allocate or redirect existing funding 
and other assets to meet the partnership’s purpose. The degree to which resource 
allocation or redirection occurs is an important distinction between collaboration 
and a high-performance partnership. A regional partnership will fail if members 
retain independent control over the resources intended for the partnership or are 
free to change partnership commitments unilaterally. Each partner should 
understand what its organization is expected to contribute to the partnership and 
what it will receive in return. 
To coordinate and better leverage resources for the partnership, a business 
plan and related formal agreements, if necessary, should be prepared at the very 
beginning of the partnership. The partners should collectively decide on criteria 
and mechanisms for allocating resources effectively and establish performance 
measures to assess resource utilization. In addition, the partnership should scale 
the mission and goals to available resources, but have a plan for growing 
resources if necessary. For example, other partners could be recruited if there are 
resource gaps that cannot be filled by the existing partners. 
 
Partnership Performance Management Systems 
The final enabling practice is setting a regional partnership performance 
management system for outcomes and individual performance management 
systems to reinforce partnerships. The regional governance structure should 
ensure that partners are accountable for the implementation of performance-
based management by rigorously tracking and evaluating action items designed 
to implement strategic plans and meet performance expectations. Variances 
between actual performance and expected performance targets should be 
promptly identified and acted upon, with regional managers and staff actively 
CAUDLE, REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 




participating in the implementation and tracking of regional partner homeland 
security performance results. 
Performance management systems can motivate those in the partnership to 
more effectively work together and meet their commitments. Kettl observes that 
cross-cutting performance management can serve as a language for talking about 
common action, encouraging members in a network involving other 
organizations to recognize their individual contributions to shared goals and to 
assess their effectiveness in doing so.28 
The partnership performance-management system should serve the needs of 
partners. Outcome measures and baseline data designed to assess the impact of 
the partnership strategies should be the critical few on which all partners can 
agree and which focus the partnership (acting jointly) and jurisdictions (acting 
individually) to pay attention to the strategies. In addition, a partnership 
performance-management system is a valuable tool in enforcing partnership 
agreements and placing a check on destructive partnership behaviors such as 
shirking agreed-upon responsibilities. 
The partners also should use rigorous criteria to assess and select the actual 
measures that will be used in the partnership performance-management system. 
The selection criteria – such as availability, accuracy, validity, potential adverse 
consequences, balance, and relevance – recognize that meaningful performance-
based management requires the use of a manageable number of useful measures. 
Tracking more measures results in an increased data collection burden for all 
partners, more adversely affecting those with fewer resources to handle 
measurement and accountability reporting. Not carefully screening measures 
results in measures that can be similar to others or that might be irrelevant to 
program results and operational needs. The result might be a large volume of 
measures that overwhelm those measures considered truly important for decision 
making and guiding regional homeland security operations. 
However, as is the case with any other performance-management system, 
excessive monitoring and enforcement of partnership performance can breed 
difficulties. For example, excesses can create powerful disincentives for joining or 
sustaining a partnership. Those currently in the partnership or potential partners 
may fear possible reprisals and criticisms resulting from an overly-aggressive 
performance monitoring and enforcement approach. However, if properly 
constructed, performance-management systems and their performance reports 
can institutionalize the means to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of 
the partnership. They further can identify areas for policy and operational 
improvement or changes in other areas, such as the partnership’s organizational 
infrastructure. 
Individual performance-management systems should also reinforce individual 
accountability for regional partnership efforts through the performance 
agreements and appraisal processes. Performance expectations in individual 
performance plans or performance agreements would require executives, 
managers, and other key staff involved in partnership activities to identify 
partnership-oriented individual goals. For example, these plans or agreements 
could include required competencies in working across organizational 
boundaries, such as breaking down barriers between organizations. Specific 
CAUDLE, REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 




individual performance responsibilities and accountabilities for operating in a 
partnership can (1) increase the visibility and importance of partnership 
performance management results and (2) encourage managers and staff to pay 
attention to partnership performance information and outcomes.  In addition to 
the performance agreements and appraisals, the partners could also establish a 
firm link between the partnership performance expectations and monetary and 
non-monetary incentives. 
To support both partnership and individual performance management 
systems, the organizations involved in the partnership should recognize that to 
successfully implement results-oriented homeland security strategies, they need 
managers and staff competent in at least the basics of performance management. 
The competencies are needed for two purposes. The first purpose is to 
understand the rationale of performance management and how measurement 
can be used. The second purpose is to go beyond understanding and actually put 
performance management and measurement to use in directly improving 
regional performance for homeland security. The partners should seek to build 




It is encouraging that additional research is being done on regional preparedness, 
including standards. For example, the Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program pilot tested applying preparedness standards to the NCR, identifying 
additional components for regional assessments. These included (1) guidance for 
regional planning and coordination; (2) development of a regional online 
assessment tool to guide a region through self-assessment; and (3) table-top 
exercise(s) to test regional capabilities.29 The practices I have presented here are 
intended to serve as aids as jurisdictions enhance current regional arrangements 
or build new ones. In large part, they are applicable to any partnership 
arrangement, not just homeland security regional initiatives. However, these 
practices might be considered the base set on which to begin or assess regional 
homeland security approaches, not the complete set. 
A more complete set of practices would better inform the complexity and 
nuances of homeland security partnerships. For example, these practices might 
answer the following questions, beyond the scope of this article: 
• What criteria should be used to form a geographic region and the “right” 
set of partners? Will all jurisdictions within the geographic region be 
required to join? How should partnerships cross international borders? 
• What risk management approaches, on a regional basis, will inform 
strategic goals, objectives, and related measures? 
• What changes are needed in laws – whether state, local, or federal – to 
foster cross-boundary homeland security arrangements? 
• To what extent will DHS homeland security funding and regional-
approach requirements strengthen or weaken a region targeting its 
resources toward regional needs, not national needs? 
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• What can be done about “free rider” partners within a regional partnership 
who reduce their partnership contributions, but still want the partnership 
benefit? What can be done about partners who, because of size or 
resources, impose priorities on the other partners, perhaps lessening 
regional homeland security? 
• What incentives are needed to sustain a regional partnership and resource 
commitments over time when individual partners face pressure to 
prioritize non-homeland security programs? 
• What specific partnership skills and capabilities should be taught and 
developed for homeland security and how can these competencies be 
rewarded? What can be done about gaps in these competencies across a 
partnership? 
• What are the unintended consequences of homeland security regional 
partnerships, such as mutual aid agreements outside the region? 
• What is the right set of measures to judge ongoing regional partnership 
performance for “all hazards?” 
 
Answers to these questions and others should help us better understand, craft, 
and leverage regional homeland security partnerships. More importantly, 
stronger partnerships should overcome weaknesses in regional planning and 
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 The Department of Defense as Lead Federal Agency 
 




 Hurricane Katrina has forced us, as it should, to look with an unflinching eye at what the 
requirements may be, not in response to a major disaster – we’re pretty well prepared in that 
case – but a catastrophic event where tens of thousands of Americans may lose their lives where 
the first responder community is maybe taken out by the event and where a prompt response 
requires something bigger and faster than anything we’ve done before.
1
  
–Secretary Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense Homeland Security 
 
None of us believed that the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was that all answers can be 
found in Washington.  On the other hand, the call for increasing the military’s role in domestic 
affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can respond the way the military can? Who else can stand up 
when others have fallen? 
2
  




As the first anniversary of Hurricane Katrina has come and gone, images from the 
disaster are indelibly burned in our American psyche. During the height of the 
catastrophe, Americans stood by helplessly watching fellow citizens suffer and yet were 
powerless to hasten the pace of the government’s response. Hurricane Katrina was, 
inarguably, the most destructive storm in U.S. history. Katrina destroyed over 200,000 
homes in New Orleans alone, and could ultimately cost as much as $200 billion.3 The 
government’s slow response to Katrina makes us cringe with concern that, unless there 
is some radical “shake up” in the federal government, history is doomed to repeat itself.   
The federal government’s performance during Katrina calls into question whether we 
will truly be ready when the next large-scale catastrophe strikes. Although history will 
ultimately be the judge, contemporary accounting of the federal government’s Katrina 
response presents a sobering reminder of the complexities of a system of government 
that was tested under fire. By the president’s own admission, our government, at all 
levels, failed that test.4 While navigating through the crisis with the best of intentions, 
government leaders and agencies involved in the response effort seemed to talk past one 
another, or did not understand basic tenets of the National Response Plan (NRP) and 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Both the NRP and NIMS were 
designed to guide federal response efforts during catastrophic incidents like Katrina. 
Together, the two plans seek to define responsibilities and outline certain “triggers” 
where federal response actions would supplement but not supplant state emergency 
management actions.  
Reflection upon some of the key lessons learned from Katrina points to the need for 
an “all hazards” approach to all levels and types of catastrophic incident response 
planning – whether the crisis is natural or manmade. Along with a certain level of 
technical expertise and knowledge of federal emergency response protocols, government 
leaders must possess innate leadership abilities to reaffirm public confidence in 
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government, especially during times of crisis.  The next large-scale catastrophe could 
indeed paralyze our nation if our elected local, state, and national leaders do not grasp 
this simple fact and start training for it now. During a crisis we, as a nation, need not 
only a functioning and competent system of national incident response; we will require 
leaders who know the intricate inner workings of that response system and who are able 
to confidently communicate that knowledge to the public throughout the crisis.5   
During times of extreme national vulnerability, frightened Americans look for 
leadership and direction. Because of its unique culture and training to demonstrate 
authority, the U.S. military is often looked to as a solution in bringing order out of chaos 
during times of national crisis.6 
Some will argue it is the military, with its unique culture of discipline and 
professionalism, that stands out as the only institution that can really inspire the 
public’s confidence during crisis events like Katrina or a large-scale terrorist attack. Few 
could argue that the images of Joint Task Force-Katrina commander Lt. Gen. Russel L. 
Honoré and his “take charge,” John Wayne style ultimately restored calm and 
confidence among a frustrated and fearful public in the early days of the disaster.   
Perhaps out of sheer frustration or even fear the current federal civilian leaders 
responsible for overseeing the next catastrophic response effort lack the requisite 
leadership and training to get the job done, many are now looking to the military to fill 
that void. The U.S. military indeed has the resources, the training, the command and 
control, and the discipline to take on an expanded lead role in any future catastrophic 
federal response effort. The question remains, however, whether assigning this role to 
the military is compatible with American federalism and the constitutional foundations 
of our government. Congressional criticism of former Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Secretary Mike Brown and Secretary Michael Chertoff’s  actions during 
Katrina point to civilian leaders who were either hesitant, incapable, or simply too 
unfamiliar with the existing National Response Plan and its attendant Catastrophic 
Incident Annex to contain the unfolding crisis in New Orleans.7 Does this mean that 
only the military can be looked to in times of true national crisis? When asked this 
question, one U.S. Northern Command general shoots back, rhetorically, “Were we, as a 
nation, any less inspired by Mayor Rudy Giulliani’s commanding leadership style during 
9-11?” His point is well taken, and the debate over which federal agency is best suited to 
take on this lead role rages on.8 
 
Scope and Methodology 
This article examines President Bush’s request, in September 2005, that Congress 
consider whether the U.S. military should be granted broader responsibility and 
authority during catastrophic incident response, perhaps even shifting Lead Federal 
Agency (LFA) responsibility from the Department of Homeland Security to the 
Department of Defense (DOD).9 This article is not intended to be an official legal paper, 
but an analysis that discusses many of the legal and policy implications surrounding this 
possible transfer of government responsibility and accountability. The objective of this 
article is to analyze some of the principal issues that surface when contemplating such 
an historic shift of roles and responsibilities from civilian agencies (such as DHS and 
FEMA) to the DOD. These issues challenge the concepts of federalism, state sovereignty, 
and gubernatorial authority, as well as the constitutional underpinnings of our 
government. This article calls in to question the public’s ultimate willingness to accept 
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an expanded use of federal military forces on U.S. soil.  The author suggests that 
perhaps President Bush may have been premature in contemplating shifting LFA 
responsibility for catastrophic response from DHS to the DOD and recommends that 
our national leaders strive to work within the existing mechanisms of our civilian-
controlled system of government to build a stronger, more viable national response 
capability. 
The author reviewed current open-source government documents and press reports 
available from August 2005 through March 10, 2006, as well as Congressional 
testimony from senior DOD and DHS officials before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in November 2005, February 2006, and March 2006. In addition, the 
author interviewed officials from the U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, as well as one National Guard state adjutant general in order to gain further 
insight into both lessons learned from the military’s review and areas for future research. 
The U.S. Northern Command J-7 Education and Training Division provided oversight 
for the article and facilitated access to key command leaders. 
 
LFA TRANSFER TO DOD: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 
Four years after the frightening experience of September the 11
th
, Americans have every right 
to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency. When the federal government fails to 
meet such an obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution.
10
 
 – President George W. Bush, September 15, 2005, Jackson Square, New Orleans.  
 
After candid admission that the federal response to Katrina was “unacceptable,” 11  
President Bush called on Congress in September 2005 to consider a larger federal 
response role for the U.S. Armed Forces, perhaps even putting the military in charge of 
all recovery efforts during a catastrophic natural disaster or terrorist attack. 12 
Contemplating such a historic shift in the military’s role in domestic affairs is proving to 
be controversial. In response to the president’s request, Congress is currently examining 
all the complex dimensions of this issue, and conducted numerous hearings with top 
military and DHS officials in November 2005 and in February and March 2006. 
President Bush, in turning to the military for answers, suggested to Congress in 
September 2005 that there may be certain types of natural disasters or terrorist attacks 
“so vast and so destructive” that the military may be the only institution equipped and 
trained to respond.13 The president believes perhaps greater federal authority and a 
broader role for U.S. Armed Forces is warranted, given the military’s unique ability to 
surge massive logistical and operational support quickly during times of major national 
crisis.14  
A detailed legal analysis of this proposal raises many questions regarding the 
sufficiency of existing presidential legal authorities available to the commander-in-chief 
to protect and defend in support of his national security responsibilities. For example, 
should there be certain automatic “triggers” guiding presidential intervention into state 
matters, including the power to usurp a state governor’s sovereign power as 
commander-in-chief of his or her state National Guard forces? Should legislation be 
required to bring about changes in how the president can use Title 10 (federal) military 
forces within U.S. borders? These are just a sampling of the many complex legal 
questions currently under review by Congress, the administration, the DOD, and U.S. 
Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
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AN EXAMINATION OF PREVALENT LEGAL ISSUES AND AUTHORITIES 
Transitioning the role of the U.S. Armed Forces from one of support to one of “lead” for 
federal catastrophic response presents a very complicated and profound shift in public 
policy, perhaps requiring significant changes to existing laws governing the use of Title 
10 military forces for domestic purposes. Shifting the DOD into a more prominent 
decision-making role during times of catastrophic domestic crisis presents profound 
challenges to the philosophical underpinnings of our civilian-controlled government.  
The foundational principles of federalism come into play, as does the issue of state 
sovereignty.15 It would seem that any federal usurpation of state authority, regardless of 
the federal agency involved, presents the same fundamental questions or challenges to 
federalism and states’ rights. As one senior U.S. Northern Command attorney points out, 
whether it is FEMA, DHS, or the DOD, the challenges to federalism and to a governor’s 
right to refuse federal intervention in state matters are really the same.16 But when one 
considers assigning a more prominent role to DOD in any future catastrophic response 
effort, a more fundamental public policy question comes into focus: are Americans 
psychologically ready and willing to allow federal military forces into their local 
communities without permission of their state elected leaders? What are some of the 
significant state/federal balance of power issues that crystallize when National Guard 
forces are federalized against the will of state governors? Does putting the DOD in 
charge during domestic crises change the fundamental tenets of the concept of 
federalism as the delicate state/federal balance of power shifts toward allowing the 
president of the United States more discretion as to when, and to what levels, he can 
intervene in  state/local matters? Would the DOD be required to define clear limits on 
the use of federal military forces on U.S. soil, or will laws like the Posse Comitatus Act 
(PCA)17 need to be revised? Or, in cases of local or state government’s perceived 
malfeasance, would the president now have unilateral authority to take control of a local 
emergency response effort and deploy federal military forces in order to contain the 
situation?   
According to one U.S. Northern Command senior attorney studying these issues, it is 
psychologically one thing for Americans to give way to civilians from FEMA or DHS 
during times of crisis, but it is quite another for the citizenry to cede authority to the U.S. 
military. Expanding DOD authority during catastrophic response and perhaps 
broadening what is today a carefully proscribed and purposefully limited role for U.S. 
military forces within our borders should be scrutinized carefully. 18 In its published 
report, Hurricane Katrina Task Force Subcommittee Report, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) evaluated these and other legal issues to clarify the sufficiency of 
existing legal authorities available to the president and state and local officials during 
Katrina. The ABA report examines whether these authorities, during Hurricane Katrina, 
were and are today sufficient to deal with any future natural disaster of Katrina’s 
magnitude. As of April 2006, the ABA report is the only published non-government 
source examining in detail the complexities of the various legal authorities available to 
the president during the Katrina crisis.19 The ABA Task Force Subcommittee looked at 
the laws and regulations at federal, state, and local levels to determine the authorities 
under existing laws and how these authorities work together during all stages of 
emergency management.20 The report concluded that laws limiting use of the military in 
domestic society, such as the 128-year old Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), did not impede 
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the military from performing important support missions to state and local officials 
during Katrina and that the PCA should not be changed.   
An important concept in the American democratic system is that of the ultimate 
control of military power resting in civilian hands.  With the Stafford Act, and 
subject to Posse Comitatus, that structure is retained without sacrificing the 
capabilities held by the military  that can be of great assistance in a catastrophe. It is 
appropriate for those skills, funded by U.S. taxpayers, to be used in a time of great 
need by the citizens of this country. 21  
U.S. Northern Command lawyers generally agree with the major ABA report findings, 
echoing that the current laws available to the president (including the Insurrection Act 
and the Stafford Act, as well as his Article II authorities under the U.S. Constitution) 
provide the president with the requisite authority necessary to take control of a situation 
should the local or state leadership become unable to contain a quickly escalating 
national crisis.22 U.S. Northern Command’s attorneys are the first to note the sheer 
gravity of the president invoking the Insurrection Act.  Doing so should never be taken 
lightly as the very word “insurrection” conjures up images of anarchy and lawlessness 
beyond a local government’s control.23 In fact, the ABA report theorizes that, in the case 
of Katrina, our national leaders may have quickly backed away from invoking the 
Insurrection Act (as a viable option for quickly restoring order in New Orleans) for 
political rather than practical reasons.24     
To resolve certain political sensitivities, the ABA report suggests possibly changing 
the wording and applications of the Insurrection Act statute, perhaps even renaming it 
and clarifying its use under very specific circumstances (i.e. looting and other lawless 
behavior in the aftermath of a major catastrophe). Changing the name of the legislation 
from “Insurrection Act” to something like “The Domestic Disaster Relief Act,” or “The 
Domestic Disaster Relief and Insurrection Act,” is one way, the report suggests, to help 
remove any stigma involved in state and local governments requesting federal 
assistance.25 It might also help to address any political concerns local or state leaders 
may have of being perceived by their constituencies as somehow “failing” their citizenry. 
Although the Insurrection Act was a legal tool available to the president during 
Katrina, the report concurs with the administration’s decision not to employ such a 
drastic measure. Rather, the report supports the ultimate decision to keep National 
Guard forces under state control because it allowed the governor key access to resources 
that could be used for domestic law enforcement and other functions otherwise 
prohibited by the PCA. 26 
National Guard forces under gubernatorial control provide flexibility to use the state 
military for law enforcement and other security functions while staying within the legal 
confines of the Posse Comitatus Act. The PCA was passed in 1878 in response to federal 
military presence in the southern states during the Reconstruction Era. The PCA 
prohibits federal (Title 10) military forces from performing any civilian law enforcement 
functions in order to maintain a strong dividing line between civilian and military 
authority. 27 Although there are exceptions to the law, the PCA remains the principal 
deterrent to any misuse of the U.S. military in our civil society. In situations where 
national security is imperiled, U.S. Northern Command attorneys believe the current 
authority available to the president during domestic crisis or catastrophe provides an 
adequate legal framework within which the president can make decisions to use federal 
forces, if necessary, to provide for the nation’s defense.28 Retired Major General Walter 
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Huffman, the former judge advocate general (TJAG) for the U.S. Army and currently 
serving as Dean, Texas Tech University School of Law, agrees that the presidential 
authorities available through the Insurrection Act and under Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution are sufficient to allow the president to contain a crisis in which the nation’s 
security could be imperiled.29 Therefore, it could be concluded that the legal framework 
available to the president during Hurricane Katrina was adequate to federalize military 
forces should the situation in New Orleans have escalated to one of national crisis. 
Lawmakers and policymakers should consider this when proposing any radical changes 
in policy or legislation that would monumentally shift the DOD’s current support role to 
civilian authorities to one of lead federal agency. 
 
Unity of Command and the Dual-Status Commander Concept 
We in the military, in looking at the goal of maximum operational effectiveness, routinely try to 
achieve at least two things:  unity of command and unity of effort. The Constitution of the United 
States was not written to support maximum effectiveness in military operations. The Constitution 
was written to establish a federal system of government under that document, and that means 
that inevitably, at the beginning of a domestic military mission, the governors, pursuant to their 
authorities under the Constitution, will have command and control of their state National Guard 
forces. The President and the Secretary of Defense, under Article II of the Constitution will 
command the federal forces. So we start any domestic mission with a breach in that principle of 
unity of command.
30 
—Secretary Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense 
 
Secretary McHale addressed some of the challenges of dual-command military 
structures during the early days of the Katrina response in his February 9, 2006 
testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. 
He testified that during Katrina, many options were initially considered by the DOD and 
the Bush Administration to help achieve unity of effort, including the suggestion of 
establishing a “dual-status” commander who would direct the efforts of both federal and 
state National Guard forces.31       
The Katrina review process is currently evaluating the feasibility of creating a dual-
status chain-of-command structure during catastrophic incident response in order to 
help sustain unity of effort during national catastrophes like Katrina. As of this writing, 
the Dual-Status Commander (DSC) concept is being reviewed by both lawmakers and 
policymakers within the Department of Defense as to its feasibility and effectiveness.  
Catastrophic national events, whether natural or man-made, will involve all levels of 
government, with political and administrative leaders vying for decision-making 
authority in what will likely be a highly-charged, dynamic crisis environment. This 
scenario ultimately played out in the early hours of Katrina; Governor Kathleen Blanco 
testified in February 2006 to the pressure she felt – from the White House – to 
federalize the Louisiana National Guard as a way to achieve unity of effort. 32 The 
governor ultimately resisted any attempts to federalize Louisiana National Guard troops 
under a single commander who, in this case, was an active duty three-star U.S. Army 
general officer. After briefly considering federalizing Louisiana National Guard forces, 
the president offered Governor Blanco a “Memorandum of Agreement Concerning 
Authorization, Consent and Use of Dual-Status Commander” for joint task force (JTF) 
Katrina: making Lieutenant General Russ Honoré a member of the Louisiana National 
Guard. The proposal by the administration offered an alternative to federalizing the 
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Guard, and would have essentially placed Honoré under the governor’s command in the 
chain-of-command for National Guard troops in Louisiana.33 Honoré, in theory, would 
have served in two capacities: commanding both federal and state troops while serving 
two commanders, the president and the governor. 
The objective of the dual-status commander proposal was to establish a single 
commander for all military operations in Louisiana. Governor Blanco wrote President 
Bush on September 3, 2006 declining the proposal while agreeing to the importance of 
creating a single military commander for federal forces that “could enhance the 
contribution of over twenty-five National Guard states currently being commanded by 
the Louisiana state adjutant general.” 34 As a result, federal troops supporting Katrina 
operations remained under U.S. Northern Command and the president, and the 38,831 
state National Guard troops operating in the region stayed under the separate command 
of the Louisiana state adjutant general and Governor Blanco.35 History will ultimately 
judge the political motivations behind the governor’s decision not to utilize the dual-
status commander; many people agree in hindsight it was certainly a practical decision 
at the time. 
The dual-status commander concept was introduced in 2004 as a means of  
improving “unity of effort” between Title 10 (federal) forces and Title 32 (state) National 
Guard forces during non-crisis, pre-planned national events such as the G-8 Summit, 
the Olympics, and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. 36  Until 
Katrina, the dual-status commander concept had not been tested in a crisis environment. 
Although senior DOD leaders initially recommended the dual-status commander 
concept to the secretary of defense and the White House as a way to achieve unity of 
effort among disparate military forces operating in the Katrina Area of Operations, they 
quickly came face-to-face with the political obstacles to putting an active-duty military 
officer in command over state National Guard forces.37 When Governor Blanco rejected 
the dual-status commander concept, the administration was faced with two options:  it 
could either invoke the Insurrection Act or attempt to manage the response effort within 
two very distinct command structures. Secretary Paul McHale intimated in his February 
9, 2006 testimony that in a crisis environment the dual-status commander concept is 
simply unworkable given the frictions existing between two designated commanders-in-
chief, with two perspectives and possibly two different political ideologies. Secretary 
McHale went on to explain that in such an environment there will inevitably be 
differences of opinion between the president and the governor, who bring two different 
perspectives and serve two separate constituencies. These differences can put the dual-
status commander in the cross-fire between two chief executives. And although 
Secretary McHale concedes that the dual-status commander concept can and does work 
well in pre-planned national security events requiring state and federal military support, 
the concept is simply not viable in a crisis environment. 38  
Like Governor Blanco, many experts believe that when disaster strikes, no governor 
in America will openly or willingly cede authority of his or her National Guard to the 
federal government. 39  According to one poll, only two of thirty-eight governors 
questioned supported the president’s idea of more federal involvement during 
catastrophic incidents like Katrina.  The president’s own brother, Florida Governor Jeb 
Bush, strongly opposes the idea and was quoted in October 2005 as having said: 
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Just as all politics are local, so too are disasters. Federalizing emergency response 
to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Katrina. The most effective 
response is one that starts at the local level and grows with the support of 
surrounding communities, the state and then the federal government. 40  
This same article notes, interestingly, that many of the nation’s mayors would like to see 
the military take on a more active role in emergency response and have expressed a 
desire to tap into military help without the state’s approval. 41 One state National Guard 
adjutant general estimates that perhaps ninety-five percent of his fellow state adjutants 
general would support keeping the state chain-of-command structure during a major 
catastrophe unless there was an extreme circumstance where the state leadership was 
incapacitated.42 This issue again crystallizes a fundamental public policy issue that 
surfaces when considering shifting or expanding DOD’s role in catastrophic response:  
state sovereignty and local sensitivities to the use of federal military forces within a 
state’s sovereign borders. It also highlights some of the difficulties that will surface when 
federal forces are dispatched into local communities where they may be unwanted or 
unwelcome by the local citizenry.  
 
DOD as Lead Federal Agency and the Constitution  
The 10th Amendment reserves those powers not delegated to the United States, to the 
states: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.43   
Perhaps the most significant of the powers reserved to the states is that of police power.  
The states, not the federal government, have the primary responsibility to provide for 
the health and welfare of their citizens. If the federal government wishes to compel 
states to prepare for catastrophic incidents, or wishes to intercede during such an 
incident, it must do so by way of a constitutionally-delegated federal authority. Three 
legal avenues are generally available: the Commerce Clause, the National Defense Power, 
or exercise of the power to tax and spend. Legal experts concede that even with the 10th 
Amendment “check” on federal power, there remains sufficient legal authority for a 
federal response in a truly catastrophic incident.44 Although the federal government can 
respond, even with DOD personnel in the lead, the more difficult questions are (1) when 
should the federal government intervene, and (2) under what circumstances should 
DOD lead the federal response?  
Recognizing the risk that a large standing army poses to individual civil liberties, the 
Constitution incorporates a system of checks and balances to separate control of the 
military between the executive and legislative branches of government and to share 
control of the militia (National Guard) with the states.45 Our nation’s founders created a 
constitutional framework in which each state ceded some of its power to the federal 
government in order to create one central, yet limited, government. The framers 
envisioned a national government that could perform those functions the individual 
states could not or should not do, such as provide for the national defense, conduct 
foreign relations, or regulate interstate commerce.46    
Over time, the role of the federal government in disaster response has evolved to 
become more proactive; states may request assistance through the John T. Stafford 
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Act,47 which some describe as “centerpiece legislation” for providing federal aid to states 
during times of major disaster. 48  The Stafford Act defines the process by which  
governors can request assistance from the federal government when local or state 
resources are overwhelmed. Generally, under the Stafford Act the president must first 
receive a request from the affected state and cannot unilaterally deploy federal forces 
into a state or region without the full consent of the state governor. (Exceptions to this 
general limitation on presidential authority would include cases of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. President Clinton exercised this unique authority in response to the 1995 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City).49 
One central issue surrounding the question of the appropriateness of shifting the 
DOD role from one of support to that of lead during times of major national catastrophe  
is the receptivity of Americans to having federal military forces working within their 
state borders when they are not under the state governor’s control. As was briefly 
contemplated in the early hours of the Katrina crisis, the president considered 
federalizing all military forces within the state of Louisiana, to include National Guard 
forces, but determined that Guard response was being implemented effectively.50  
One senior civilian attorney at U.S. Northern Command notes that when 
policymakers consider putting Title 10 federal military forces in charge of all 
catastrophic response activities they should exercise caution, especially during times of 
extreme national vulnerability. He points out that it is our civilian-controlled military 
that distinguishes ours from all other styles of government.  Subordination of the 
military to civilian leadership is the envy of fledgling democracies throughout the world. 
It has provided stability to our nation and has kept the citizenry free of military 
usurpation of power, even during the most catastrophic of incidents. When considering 
a “doomsday” scenario where public fear is rampant and our vulnerabilities as a nation 
exposed, this Northern Command attorney posits that based upon our nation’s deeply 
rooted fears of a large standing army, we should ask “Is this really the time to put 
military forces in charge?” 51  
The policy of putting the military in charge during such extremely volatile times 
should be considered carefully in the long-term context of our civil-military traditions. 
When considering such a profound shift in control, accountability, and policy, our 
national leaders should again consider just why very these distinct lines were drawn 
between civilian and military authority in our society. Our nation’s founding fathers 
constructed a system of government that has withstood periods of national conflict and 
turmoil. Any decision by policymakers to reshape these underlying foundational 
principles should not be taken lightly. The House Select Committee echoed this 
sentiment when it concluded that when it comes to the issue of state/federal integration 
there are no easy answers:   
These are principles “rooted in the nation’s birth that cannot be discarded merely 
to achieve more efficient joint military operations on American soil.”52    
 
Defense Support to Civilian Authorities—Larger Role or Smarter? 
One’s perception of government failure often depends on where one sits – at the local, 
state, or federal level. Unfortunately, extensive problems of communication, interagency 
coordination and simple lack of understanding of the National Response Plan and its 
attendant Catastrophic Incident Annex, as well as insufficient working knowledge of 
GERESKI, DOD AS LEAD FEDERAL AGENCY 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org  
10 
 
NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) are cited as major contributors to the 
seemingly glacial pace of the federal government’s response during Katrina.53    
 Defense Department officials vehemently defend their department’s pace of response.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale responded to one 
senator’s scathing criticism that DOD’s preparation and initial response during Katrina 
was passive and “cobbled together”54 by testifying that DOD acted with an extreme sense 
of urgency.  Secretary McHale testified in February 2006 that the DOD felt a sense of 
urgency before, during, and after landfall, coordinating the support of 72,000 service 
members, 293 medium and heavy-lift helicopters, sixty-eight airplanes, twenty-three 
U.S. Navy ships, thirteen mortuary affairs teams, and two standing joint headquarters to 
support FEMA’s planning efforts. He also noted in direct response to the senator that 
the DOD response was the largest, fastest deployment of military forces for a civil 
support mission in our nation’s history, processing Requests for Assistance (RFAs) as 
quickly as it received them from FEMA.55   
Major General Richard J. Rowe, Jr., director of operations for U.S. Northern 
Command, testified in November 2005 that even before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in 
Louisiana and Mississippi, U.S. Northern Command established staging bases and 
deployed defense coordinating officers and defense coordinating element teams to 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to help manage DOD response efforts in 
coordination with state and federal officials.56 In a major catastrophe, the U.S. military 
can play a critical role in bringing unique resources such as airlift capability, 
communications, and medical support units to assist local first responders in their 
ongoing rescue and recovery efforts.  
By many accounts, the U.S. Armed Forces – National Guard, Active Duty, and U.S. 
Coast Guard – were the only federal agencies with the operational capabilities necessary 
to get movement on the ground for true crisis response and recovery during the early 
hours and days of Katrina. The military was able to quickly get communications 
infrastructure, logistics, search and rescue, and planning capabilities into the 
operational area to begin some kind of effective response to save lives and ease human 
suffering.57 There is a unique opportunity for DOD, through U.S. Northern Command, 
to play a crucial leadership role in catastrophic response planning without having to 
serve as the federal lead. In determining the wisdom of shifting the role of DOD in 
catastrophic response to one of lead rather than support, the administration should 
consider the political realities and Constitutional difficulties presented by this historic 
policy change. Instead, the administration should direct its attention and resources to 
melding the strengths of the U.S. military into the established structure and framework 
of its existing civilian response agencies.   
 
 
SHIFT FOCUS NOT ROLES: BUILD CAPABILITIES INTO CIVILIAN 
RESPONSE AGENCIES 
In his role as a principal advisor to the president, the secretary of defense should 
recommend that the civilian agencies responsible for national response be strengthened 
through proper and mandatory training, participation by top DHS, FEMA, and DOD 
principals in joint-interagency exercises (not just their staffers or principal 
undersecretaries), and accountability through implementation of a stronger results-
based civilian personnel rating system. Participation in large-scale interagency training 
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exercises like TOPOFF58 should be mandatory for federal civilian agency representatives 
and evaluated as part of the civilian performance appraisal process.   
The importance of training was emphasized by the White House Katrina Lessons 
Learned report, which noted that one of the main factors contributing to the failed 
government response during Katrina was that key decision-makers, at all levels of 
government, were not familiar with the NRP and NIMS, two critical base plans that 
delineate government roles and responsibilities and define “triggers” for initiating 
federal response mechanisms. According to the Lessons Learned findings, it was a lack 
of understanding of basic Incident Command System (ICS) principles and real-world 
practice in the Joint Field Office (JFO) that led to ineffective coordination between 
federal, state and local response efforts.59     
 
Institutional Reform within DHS and FEMA: Civilian Training/Planning 
and Accountability is Key 
In my opinion, our investigation has shown a gross lack of planning and preparation by both the 
Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. And that guaranteed that the response to 
Hurricane Katrina – or, for that matter, any other catastrophe that might have happened – was 




–Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn), Ranking member, Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee 
 
Institutional cultural reform in both the DHS and FEMA will be necessary if these 
civilian agencies are to continue serving as lead agencies for federal catastrophic 
response. The administration should use the lessons learned from Katrina and begin 
reviewing DHS and FEMA’s existing federal employee and contractor accountability 
systems to identify weaknesses in the personnel management system that may have 
contributed to the agencies’ performance during Katrina. Where DHS and FEMA 
officials refuse to demonstrate competencies in these basic federal response plans, 
department leaders or principals should be held accountable. According to the House 
Select Committees’ Report, the “single biggest failure” of the federal response was that it 
failed to recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize 
federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the flooded city.  
Within the emergency management community, there are a handful of potential 
catastrophes that keep disaster professionals awake at night. Perhaps the most 
troubling has been a category 3 or larger storm striking New Orleans because of 
its high likelihood of occurrence, the extreme vulnerability of the city to long term 
flooding and the difficulty of evacuating a large urban population over limited 
evacuation routes. As a result, this scenario has been studied, planned and 
exercised perhaps more than any other potential catastrophic disaster in the 
country. A senior disaster professional would be well aware of the consequence of 
such a storm, recognize the challenges of responding to such a disaster, and 
appreciate the need for timely and proactive federal assistance…. [T]wo days 
before landfall the National Weather Service predicted Katrina would strike New 
Orleans as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The governors of Louisiana and 
Mississippi declared state emergencies and the President issued an emergency 
declaration for Louisiana. At this point in time, it was extremely likely FEMA’s 
worst case hurricane scenario was about to unfold.  Chertoff should have declared 
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an INS (Incident of National Significance) in recognition of the severity of the 
situation and to allow for the immediate convening of the Interagency Incident 
Management Group (IIMG), designation of the PFO, and invocation of the NRP-
CIA (National Response Plan-Catastrophic Incident Annex).61  
In other words, the civilian federal officials entrusted with invoking the National 
Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) should have intuitively 
known what do and, for all intents and purposes, they did not. They simply did not 
understand their role in igniting the match that would have “set the fire” to engage 
federal military support under the guidelines of the NRP-CIA. According to the Select 
Bipartisan Committee’s findings, there was confusion within DHS and FEMA as to the 
specific roles and responsibilities these civilian agencies had in the incident response 
process. In addition, the report cites as critical Secretary Chertoff’s failure to invoke the 
NRP-CIA, which would have quickly switched the federal effort from a “reactive to 
proactive mode of operations.” 62  Civilian response agencies within the federal 
government must be required to participate in joint-interagency planning exercises, and 
top leadership should be held accountable for training civilian personnel in the 
intricacies of the NRP, its Catastrophic Incident Annex, NIMS, and the overall ICS 
structure.   
 
Strengthen Interagency Partnerships between DHS and DOD 
According to the House Select Committee’s Katrina Report, it was unclear how much 
DOD support was in place before the storm arrived. DOD leaders including U.S. 
Northern Command Commander Admiral Timothy Keating, Homeland Defense 
Secretary Paul McHale, and Chief of the National Guard Bureau Lieutenant General H 
Steven Blum all testified to the readiness and professionalism of all the military players 
– Active Component, National Guard, Coast Guard, and U.S. Northern Command – and 
that all shared a sense of urgency in responding to requests for assistance by FEMA as 
quickly as they came into U.S. Northern Command. As an example, Secretary McHale 
testified that DOD did all that was asked of it under the existing guidelines of the NRP. 
In fact, DOD was asked to take over all logistical operations for Katrina on September 1, 
2005 and processed a FEMA request for an unprecedented one billion dollars of 
assistance within twenty-four hours of receiving the request.63    
DOD leaders willingly admitted that there were problems getting DOD resources 
where and when they were needed. Lack of situational awareness, because of the 
extensive damage to critical communication infrastructure, hindered U.S. Northern 
Command’s ability to get up-to-date information about rapidly changing conditions and 
further contributed to its inability to get the appropriate resources to the target site 
precisely when they were needed.64 Lack of situational awareness also contributed to 
communications difficulties between National Guard forces on the ground and both the 
JTF-Katrina commander and U.S. Northern Command military planners.65 Without an 
ability to communicate with those physically located in the Area of Operational 
Responsibility (AOR), it is virtually impossible for military operators to know what is 
needed, how much, and where. Vague requests from FEMA and DHS on logistical 
requirements also contributed to confusion over the extent of what was needed in the 
early hours and days of the crisis.66  
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Although DOD leaders testified in March 2006 that they work daily and in close 
coordination with DHS, the liaison between these two agencies must be strengthened 
through increased DOD staffing and support to federal civilian homeland security 
agencies during non-surge periods. Often referred to throughout U.S. Northern 
Command as “right of the semi-colon missions,”67  it is recommended that DOD, 
however hesitatingly, accept certain aspects of the homeland security mission as a 
critical bridge to its more outwardly-focused, “primary” homeland defense mission. In 
the past, DOD has seemed reluctant to fully accept homeland security as a key aspect of 
its mission to protect and defend the United States. Rather, DOD, through U.S. 
Northern Command, functions as a supporting partner to homeland security lead 
agencies like DHS and FEMA and only fully engages upon receiving an official request 
from those agencies. As played out during Katrina, DOD followed the construct of the 
NRP-CIA and pre-positioned many assets in anticipation of Katrina. But by its own 
admission, DOD performance could have been improved upon with better attention 
“pre-Katrina” to interoperable communications difficulties with first responders and 
more integrated planning with the National Guard and the DOD Joint Staff.68   
The After Action Reports still being compiled by the military will most certainly 
address whether there was “hesitancy” on the part of the military, awaiting more 
guidance by civilian authorities as to what resources were needed where. According to 
the Bipartisan Committee’s Failure of Initiative Report, the NRP “creates confusion” 
about federal military involvement due to “unresolved tension” between the possible 
need for active-duty military assistance when state and local officials are overwhelmed, 
and a presumption that a governor will know how and when to request active-duty 
military support.69 By some accounts, civilian response agencies within the federal and 
state government lacked the experience to identify what they needed, when, and the 
logistics “tail” required to get relief to needy victims quickly. The lessons of Katrina 
should help DOD to accept that there is indeed a critical nexus between the missions of 
homeland security and homeland defense and that in many ways these two missions are 
inseparably intertwined. The nexus is anchored by the concern that a failed reaction to a 
catastrophic incident (like Katrina) could openly expose our nation to terrorist 
vulnerabilities, assuming our enemies have the capability to inflict harm on an 
adjustable timetable. Policymakers should reexamine whether new legislation is needed 
to allow DOD, in certain prescribed “scenarios,” to preemptively place limited military 
forces into a state or region when there is a looming threat that could diminish our 
national security posture. Additionally, DOD should provide immediate funding 
authority for dedicated staff positions to strengthen the cooperative liaison between 
DOD and DHS; this would ultimately strengthen both agencies’ pre-disaster planning 
functions. 
 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION:  A KEY TO FUTURE SUCCESS 
As the months pass, a variety of Katrina’s lessons learned will be assembled, reviewed, 
staffed, and published as part of a complex administrative policy process review. One 
area that could be improved upon immediately is interagency cooperation between DOD 
and DHS. DOD can step in to help lead the federal government’s effort to build better 
interagency cooperation between and among all the disparate players at all levels 
involved in catastrophic emergency response planning. As an alternative to putting DOD 
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in the official federal “lead,”  the administration should build upon the civilian assets it 
already has in place by melding DOD’s military leadership, culture, and operational and 
planning capabilities into the FEMA regional staff offices throughout the U.S. and at 
DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C. To do this, DOD should dedicate full-time 
military positions to help build up a “non-surge” staffing structure at both DHS and 
FEMA in order to thoroughly integrate military operational planning throughout the 
federal civilian response process. These full-time DOD positions are necessary for 
military leaders to have experience working side-by-side with these civilian agencies 
before the next large-scale disaster strikes.  By creating full-time senior staff positions at 
the field grade officer level, these military staff officers would work with the civilian 
planning functions of FEMA and DHS responsible for catastrophic emergency response. 
Integrating military staff into these civilian agencies will allow the departments to 
understand completely the operational requirements for requesting large-scale military 
support under the NRP-CIA and know how to fully integrate that support during 
national emergency situations where time will be critical in pre-positioning military 
personnel, equipment and other logistical support. 
The DOD should also consider creating full-time Defense Coordinating Officers 
(DCOs) and integrating these positions into existing FEMA regional response staff 
offices (or position several at U.S. Northern Command headquarters in Colorado 
Springs). These full-time DOD assets would be working on interagency issues full-time 
at the strategic planning level and would be extremely valuable to any future federal 
response effort. Having senior military officers dealing with interagency issues full-time 
is preferable to having them designated to “surge” only immediately before or after a 
crisis strikes.  
The National Guard, which prides itself on strong historic ties to local communities, 
is ideally suited to take on such a role. These DCOs could be Title 10 National Guard 
Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officers, who could provide the requisite leadership 
necessary to build FEMA response teams into capable operational assets that can 
respond quickly and effectively during the next catastrophe. The dual-mission National 
Guard brings a unique dimension to the civil-military relationships that played out 
during Katrina. The Guard’s ability to navigate within the local communities won the 
praise and admiration of the American people, the DOD leadership, the media, and 
Congress. Because the Guard is a grassroots, community-based military organization, it 
is well suited to serving among the first military responders when disaster strikes. The 
Guard’s membership is often comprised of soldiers and airmen who own the local 
businesses, serve in municipal or state government, or are first responders in the 
communities where they live and work. The Guard leadership knows the political “lay of 
the land” and can often bring innovation and experience to solving problems at the local 
level. 
Admiral Timothy Keating, the commander of Northern Command, has acknowledged 
that there are many advantages to using the National Guard during a Katrina-like 
disaster: in the majority of circumstances, it will be the Guard who is first on the scene 
in a state active-duty status even before DOD is asked to respond. In addition, the 
admiral was quoted in the Select Bipartisan Committee’s Katrina Report A Failure of 
Initiative, as saying he believed the Guard’s close ties with first responders, such as local 
and state law enforcement and firefighters, can enable the military to capitalize on pre-
existing relationships built over time.70 By identifying senior National Guard officers 
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who could serve as full-time Defense Coordinating Officers, the DOD and the 
administration would be strengthening the often-strained relationship between DOD 
and DHS by building ongoing working relationships solidified over time and trust. By 
tapping into the military’s leadership and operational expertise, the administration 
could bolster operational response capabilities within FEMA and DHS and direct these 
civilian agencies toward better understanding of the incident response system.  
The U.S. Coast Guard provides another model the Bush Administration could look to 
in order to capitalize on the unique operational capabilities of military forces while 
helping to bridge the civil-military divide between American citizens and any lingering 
concerns about military overreach. The U.S. Coast Guard, whose very culture 
historically embraces interoperability and interagency mission tasking, could also be 
looked to as a key resource as the DOD navigates the thorny process of building 
interagency constituencies in a support, rather than lead, policy-making role.71  
Another concept suggested by a former chief of staff of U.S. Northern Command 
currently serving as the adjutant general for the state of Oregon, is building up a joint 
interagency capability regionally throughout the country based upon the Joint 
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) concept. Members would include representatives from 
FEMA, DHS, U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the state National 
Guard to improve and facilitate training and exercises and promote the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) as a model for coordinated federal interagency 
response. These JIATF teams could be placed regionally throughout the country, 
working closely with respective state agencies, and perhaps located within the ten 
existing FEMA regions or within the military’s regional Joint Task Force headquarters 
offices.72 It is important that these teams be spearheaded by either a U.S. Coast Guard 
officer, senior executive service federal manager, or a senior state National Guard 
official serving in a Title 10/federal status, to ensure balance in the civilian-military 
policy formulation process as it affects future national homeland security initiatives.  
(Assigning an active component Title 10 federal military officer could give the subtle 
impression to fellow team members that DOD is too heavily influencing the scope and 
direction of its policy initiatives and could undermine the civilian-military spirit of 
cooperation necessary to formulate a credible interagency process.73)  
At the national level, the White House should seek to establish a subordinate council 
or branch of its existing Homeland Security Council. This committee should be 
comprised of key stakeholders responsible for policy planning and coordination in 
preparing for the nation’s next catastrophic response.74 This Homeland Security Council 
subcommittee, or sub-council, could be created by either presidential executive order or 
by statute, and should seek representation of agency principals from DOD, DHS, FEMA, 
U.S. Coast Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Northern Command, meeting 
quarterly to work through strategic level issues of catastrophic incident planning. This 
sub-council would, in turn, advise senior members of the Homeland Security Council on 
all unresolved matters requiring DOD and DHS cooperation. This interagency approach 
is called for in the White House Lessons Learned report. A lack of regional planning and 
coordination was identified in the report as a “final structural flaw in our current system 
for national preparedness.”75 A homeland security interagency team, based upon a 
regional JIATF concept as well as establishment of a sub-council of the existing 
Homeland Security Council, would support the White House’s recommendation for 
better coordination within government while providing a more strategic approach to 
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catastrophic incident response planning and policy formulation between the federal, 
state, and local levels.   
 
“Reviving” FEMA 
Its mission had been marginalized. Its response capability had been diminished. There's the 
whole clash of cultures between DHS's mission to prevent terrorism and FEMA's mission to 
respond to and to prepare for responding to disasters of whatever nature. 
— Former FEMA Secretary Michael Brown on why FEMA failed during Katrina.
76
  
When FEMA was officially transferred to DHS in March 2003, it lost its Cabinet-level 
status as the 2,500 person agency was absorbed into the 180,000 member umbrella 
organization.77 According to one Congressional document, eighty million dollars was 
transferred from FEMA in March 2003 to help pay for DHS overhead. Over the next two 
years, FEMA lost an additional $169 million to its parent agency to pay for other DHS 
agency expenses.78 FEMA officials in Louisiana and Mississippi testified before the 
House Select Committee as to what could be described as an agency’s bloodletting; the 
agency was left to atrophy with limited staffing, resources, and lack of funding. Officials 
also note that FEMA suffered from a “brain drain” of trained and qualified senior 
leaders and personnel who either left the agency for the private sector or retired from 
federal service.79 According to some experts, a new emphasis on terrorism rather than 
on an “all hazards” approach to emergency response only further marginalized FEMA, 
ultimately contributing to its failed response during Katrina.80 
According to the Select Bipartisan Committee report, one of the most critical links in 
the federal response system is the team of FEMA personnel that deploys to a disaster 
site to coordinate and direct federal response operations. These teams, in theory, are 
intended to be on call and ready to deploy at a moment’s notice. FEMA officials have 
testified that the readiness of these teams was drastically reduced by 2004, due to 
funding that dried up after 2002. The Select Bipartisan Committee report notes that, in 
just a few short years, “FEMA’s emergency response teams had been reduced to ‘names 
on a roster’.”81 These FEMA teams, or a similar civilian rapid response capability within 
DHS, should be revived immediately, and DOD should consider dedicating staffing to 
augment these teams during all training exercises and during real-world “surge” 
response operations.   
It is recommended that FEMA’s capabilities for disaster response be reestablished 
and that an “all hazards” emphasis be built into those capabilities. One author writes:  
“Currently, FEMA is like a patient in triage.  The President and Congress must decide 
whether to treat it or let it die.”82 Giving up on FEMA and just turning to the military to 
solve the difficult problem of disaster response is admitting defeat. Rather, the 
administration should focus on reviving the organization, injecting the agency with the 
funding, resources, qualified personnel, and strict accountability measures necessary to 
bring life and purpose back to an agency diminished by lack of attention and loss of 
focus on the part of federal policymakers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If we are to be first responders – and in retrospect, we wish in this case someone had been a more 
effective first responder – but if we are to be the first responders, you have to change the character 
of the training and the equipment, as well as the legal authorities of the Department of Defense.
83
  
–Paul McHale, ASD-HD 
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There are very few advantages in the long run to the DOD being appointed lead federal 
agency role in Catastrophic Incident Response. Although unity of command would be 
achieved, and a quick and rapid response would most certainly occur during times of 
catastrophe, what would be the cost to our nation’s constitutional principles, our 
federalist traditions, and our way of life? Turning LFA status over to DOD would most 
assuredly detract from the military’s missions in the Global War on Terror, redirect 
resources and attention to missions more appropriately assigned to local and state first 
responders, and could result in Americans perceiving that their civil liberties are at 
risk.84   
Our nation’s policy makers must not turn to the military just because it can 
accomplish the mission. Rather, turning over LFA to the DOD should be the right thing 
to do; given the legal and policy issues discussed throughout this paper, one must 
conclude it is not. Rather, our nation’s policy makers must make tough choices and 
devote the time, attention, resources, and care to resuscitate and, if need be, completely 
rebuild civilian agency response capabilities at the local, state, and federal level. Doing 
so will ultimately empower all stakeholders to more effectively manage the next crisis. 
It certainly is not the easy path.  But as Robert Frost once concluded in his famous 
and beloved poem “The Road Less Traveled,” the benefits that come with taking a 
different path often bring richness and reward to those courageous enough to try “...and 
it has made all the difference.”85 
Taking the road less traveled will ultimately strengthen our government and our 
nation. Redirecting the current working relationships between DOD and DHS is another 
step toward ultimately strengthening our government and nation in times of crisis.  Just 
as all politics are local, so too is disaster response. It is important for our nation’s 
leaders to provide the funding necessary to allow state and local leaders the ability to 
manage these crises and, when it becomes necessary, to know when and how to ask for 
federal help. Federal civilian agencies responsible for coordinating the response effort 
must get the training and resources to do their jobs and be held accountable when they 
do not.   
The practical administrative issues associated with the implementation of these 
recommendations could take months or even years, yet they are certainly worthy of 
immediate, further study. Future research into the feasibility, potential cost, and 
identification of existing organizational cultural barriers could begin the list of topics for 
exploration.  
The notion of expanding the military’s role to lead federal response efforts may one 
day be judged by historians as a well-meaning yet misguided reaction to mounting 
political pressure on our president to act more decisively in the immediate aftermath of 
a major national crisis. Ultimately, the DOD can play a critical leadership role in 
building civilian agency capabilities – without ever having to formally assume the 




Author’s Note: On April 27, 2006 the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee delivered a statement calling for the dissolution of FEMA because of systemic 
problems of failed leadership and the lost confidence of the American people. The Committee 
recommended action to create, in FEMA’s place, the “National Preparedness and Response 
GERESKI, DOD AS LEAD FEDERAL AGENCY 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org  
18 
 
Agency” which would be provided with the resources and training to “organize the extraordinary 
resources of the federal government of the United States to prepare for, mitigate and respond, 
and oversee the recovery from disasters, and particularly the catastrophes that are beyond the 
resources of the state and local government.” This recommendation is consistent with the 
premise of this article, drafted months before the publishing of the Committee’s report.  The 
author’s recommendations are consistent with the Senate Committee’s latest findings: that 
leadership, resources, and training must be dedicated to rebuilding FEMA or a FEMA-like 
agency to revive the civilian response capabilities of our government. Ultimately, these agencies 
must be held accountable for their actions. Whether this capability is called FEMA or something 
else, the requirement to shelve the old FEMA and “begin anew” remains the same.   In addition, 
since the initial drafting of this article, DOD has since fielded ten, full-time Defense 
Coordinating Officers (DCOs) at the military grade of Colonel (06) throughout the ten FEMA 
regions.   
 
The conclusions and recommendations stated in this article are solely the author’s and 
do not reflect any agency or agency representative interviewed or consulted for 
background research. 
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Strategies for Managing Volunteers during Incident Response: A 
Systems Approach 
 




During disasters, large numbers of people with no pre-planned role arrive at the scene 
to offer assistance. “Convergence,” which is mass movement or attempted movement 
towards a disaster site, is not a new phenomenon. In his dissertation, Samuel Prince 
described the convergence of people and supplies in response to the 1917 Halifax 
shipping explosion.1 This same phenomenon was recently observed after the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and the Kashmir 
Earthquake of 2005. Although estimates of the number of volunteers are pending for 
these events, other recent disasters document substantial volunteer response. After the 
1985 Mexico City earthquake, ten percent of the population (over two million people) 
assisted others.2 In 1989, sixty percent of the population of San Francisco and seventy 
percent of the population in Santa Cruz, California responded to the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake.3 Following 9/11, over 40,000 unsolicited volunteers arrived at Ground Zero 
in New York.4 
Volunteers* can be a significant resource of timely manpower, skills, and abilities, 
while providing valuable insight on a community’s needs. Often, volunteer assistance is 
important because it can be quickly provided by people living or working close to 
damaged areas. Especially in the case of collapsed structures, the actions of volunteers 
can save lives.5 Volunteers can also augment emergency staff with basic skills and 
support activities, allowing responders to focus their efforts on specialized work.6 
Volunteers may bring skills that are lacking or provide them at an economic savings.  
Florida emergency management professionals determined that the economic 
advantages alone are significant enough to justify making volunteers a part of 
emergency plans, and regularly incorporate them during hurricane clean-up.7 In 
addition to helping others, some believe that participating in volunteer service is helpful 
to disaster victims. Volunteerism has been suggested as an avenue to reduce stress, as 
an outlet for rage, as part of the healing process, and as a means of empowering 
victims.8   
Although the media often present volunteer efforts as exclusively positive, serious 
issues and risks are commonly associated with massive convergence. Spontaneous 
volunteers can actually hinder disaster response by creating health, safety, and security 
 
*Volunteers can be categorized by their relationship with the incident command system. Volunteers on an assigned 
resource have a specific assignment within the incident command system (e.g. a volunteer member of a rescue 
squad). Recruited volunteers are personally requested by the incident command system to assist in the effort due to 
their unique and needed skills (e.g. an owner/operator of rare equipment needed for search operations).  
Spontaneous volunteers are not on assigned resource nor have they been specifically recruited (e.g. a citizen that 
wishes to help by distributing supplies). Spontaneous volunteers agree to provide service without additional or 
specific compensation. Unless otherwise noted, the term ‘volunteer’ is used generically in this paper to refer to 




issues, distracting responders from their duties, and interfering with response 
operations. Volunteer efforts can be ineffective because organizations and management 
systems have not prepared for nor considered how to integrate the volunteer resources. 
As a result, response personnel are diverted from their primary duties to consider how 
spontaneous volunteers will be used, to create and assign tasks, to manage logistics 
related to volunteers, and to supervise actions. This commonly occurs in an ad hoc 
manner and because of that can be very inefficient.9 Large numbers of volunteers can 
overwhelm the capacity of an unprepared organization to effectively engage them.10 
Often, there are more volunteers than defined tasks for them to perform.11  As Tom 
Weidemeyer, chief operating officer of United Parcel Service and president of UPS 
Airlines, stated, “It is a paradox — people’s willingness to volunteer versus the system’s 
capacity to use them effectively.”12    
In the absence of a strong volunteer management system, individuals seek to 
perform services using only their own judgment and narrow view of the incident. This 
can result in health and medical issues caused by activities such as medical freelancing 
and contaminated food dissemination.13 Individuals who fill response roles in the early 
stages of an incident may later be unwilling to recognize official response leaders. These 
individuals, referred to as “rogue volunteers,” can cause safety problems.14   
Although volunteers do not receive financial compensation, they do incur costs and 
stress limited resources. Volunteers may arrive ill-equipped, requiring logistical support 
such as food, shelter, and protective equipment.15 Well-meaning individuals can cause 
roadway congestion that prevents the movement of emergency vehicles.16 They can also 
endanger themselves and others in hazardous environments. It is not surprising that 
formal responders can find spontaneous volunteers to be, as depicted by Walter Green, 
"more effort on the part of a strained system than they contribute to the resolution of 
the problem."17 At the same time, significant ill-will can be generated by brusquely 
turning away volunteer assistance, particularly when personnel shortages are obvious to 
the media and the public. 
The challenge for incident managers is to capitalize on the availability of volunteer 
resources while ensuring safety and maximizing the responders’ ability to effectively 
perform tasks within the established incident command system.18 A search of the 
literature reveals that even though sociologists have been documenting this issue for 
almost a century, a comprehensive model for a disaster volunteer management system, 
from incident recognition through recovery, has not been published.  Existing plans 
have contributed a great deal, but gaps remain.   
We found that many existing systems are limited in scale, scope, and operational 
detail. Some examples of under-addressed elements include how the volunteer 
management system is integrated with the incident management system, how 
volunteers are channeled (physically or through information) to avoid unsafe 
conditions, how spontaneous volunteers requiring advanced credentialing are 
processed, how transition to recovery related to volunteers is addressed, and what 
volunteer follow-up is needed post-incident. Existing volunteer management plans and 
systems are also limited in that they often focus on processing volunteers to work for 
only one organization, or focus primarily on pre-incident volunteer registration.   
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If we are to advance our ability to manage the consequences of disaster, it is 
important to examine the use of volunteer assistance in a careful, systems-based 
manner. To accomplish this, the following questions may serve as guidance: 
• What is the impact of a massive volunteer response? 
• What are the essential disaster volunteer management functions that will 
leverage opportunities and manage volunteer-related risks? 
• What strategy can be used to organize the volunteer management functions so 
they can be managed effectively during emergency response? 
• What resources are required to support a volunteer management system? 
 
This article presents a systems-based approach to planning for volunteer management 
in disasters.19 Through analysis of existing volunteer management literature, systems, 
and plans, a comprehensive model is developed to address pre-response, response 
management, and post-response issues relating to volunteers. The methodology is also 
applied to develop and test a real-world volunteer management system for public health 
emergencies in Arlington County, Virginia. There are two driving motivations for 
Arlington’s system: (1) after 9/11, the county experienced a considerable number of 
people who wanted to volunteer assistance and (2) the county’s plans for responding to 
a mass public health event require extensive manpower that exceeds county resources. 
The county plans to use volunteers in the operation of a mass dispensing/ immunization 
clinic and for telephonic monitoring during quarantine and isolation.   
 
Methodology 
A “systems approach” as defined in Emergency Management Principles and Practices 
for Healthcare Systems is a “management strategy that recognizes that disparate 
components must be viewed as inter-related components of a single system, and so 
employs specific methods to achieve and maintain the overarching system. These 
methods include the use of standardized structure and processes and foundational 
knowledge and concepts in the conduct of all related activities.”20  The systems approach 
described in this paper involves analysis to understand the domain and frame the 




We first recognized the issues associated with spontaneous volunteer management 
through professional experience.21 From an incident management perspective, the 
benefits and risks that accompany this spontaneous response are evident.  Although 
various adaptations of volunteer management protocols occurr to address the risks and 
issues, they are generally not addressed in a systemic manner. We conducted a literature 





A comprehensive literature review of the domain revealed specific risks, issues, and 
opportunities that could be categorized into three major areas: spontaneous volunteer 
behaviors, disaster volunteer management issues, and existing volunteer management 
systems and plans. Topics of the literature review appear in Table 1. Sources included 
field studies, after-action reports, news articles, interviews, existing system descriptions, 
and unstructured interviews with emergency managers and disaster volunteer 
management practitioners. The literature review is documented in greater detail in 
other papers,22 but some highlights are provided here. 
Table 1. Literature Review Subject Areas 
Spontaneous Volunteer Behavior 
 
Disaster Volunteer Management 
Issues 
Existing Volunteer Management 
Systems and Plans 
- Who Volunteers  
- Why They Volunteer 
- How They Volunteer 
- Will Volunteers Respond if there is 
a Perceived Threat? 
- Matching Volunteers to Needs can 
be Challenging  
- Volunteer Coordination Requires a 
“Common View” of the Incident 
- Disaster Response Needs are 
Dynamic 
- Volunteer Health and Safety Issues 
- Security and Access Issues 
- Volunteer Response will occur 
Regardless of a Request for their 
Assistance 
- Perception of Volunteer Response 
- Voluntary Agency Volunteer 
Management Planning 
- State Volunteer Management 
Planning 
- Federal Volunteer Management 
Planning 
- National Initiatives 
 
 
Spontaneous volunteer behavior is documented in a number of incident-specific papers 
and a handful of retrospective studies.  The literature revealed that predicting who will 
volunteer is difficult. There is no consistent evidence that gender, ethnicity, wealth, or 
community involvement affects disaster volunteerism;23 however, close proximity to the 
site and personal identification with the victims may increase volunteerism.  The reason 
many people volunteer is to meet a perceived need. Immediately after a disaster, 
traditional emergency responders are often affected themselves and are needed to 
organize incident management. This period can be characterized by perceived poor 
coordination and a “vacuum of authority” during which a number of spontaneous 
volunteers self-organize to address apparent needs.24   
Important disaster volunteer management issues identified through experience and 
literature search include: 
• Volunteer Response will occur regardless of a request for their assistance. The urge 
to “do something” can be overwhelming for those who do not have a formal role in 
the response.18 Even if they were not requested, people will respond if they perceive a 
need or are unable to confirm that what they can offer is not needed. Communication 
of response needs can break down as the complexity and magnitude of a disaster 
grows.   
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• Matching volunteers to needs can be challenging. Organizations that are a part of 
the formal response often turn away spontaneous volunteers because the 
organization is unprepared and has not considered how to integrate them.   
• Volunteer Health and Safety Issues. Spontaneous volunteers at a disaster site can 
cause confusion, compromise response efficiency, and create complications for scene 
safety.25 Although exposed to the same hazards as traditional emergency responders, 
spontaneous volunteers often have less training and protective equipment. 
 
Planning for spontaneous volunteers generally exists at three different levels: 
• Some individual organizations have systems to directly incorporate volunteers. The 
American Red Cross has been a leader in spontaneous volunteer management. These 
systems are limited, however, in that they focus on processing volunteers to work for 
their own organization. (For example, the Red Cross processes volunteers to support 
mass care operations, but it may not be able to integrate citizens to assist in pet 
rescue.) 
• A small number of states and local areas have systems to direct spontaneous 
volunteers to one or more volunteer agencies. Florida and California have strong 
plans and guidance in this area.26 
• At a federal level, the National Response Plan identifies supporting roles and 
functions of the federal government in volunteer management, but notes the primary 
responsibility lies with state and local government.27   
As discussed in the introduction, these systems and plans provide excellent practices 
and concepts, but are also limited in scale, scope, and operational detail.      
 
Structuring (Developing the Issues and Functions Model) 
In the next step, the literature review findings were structured to support systems 
development. Risks and opportunities were mapped against the stages of an incident.  
We then analyzed the risks and opportunities to document interventions (activities that 
mitigate the risks or leverage the opportunities) from existing plans and systems and to 
develop new interventions that we did not find in the literature.  This technique 
(depicted in Figure 1 and applied with examples in Figure 2) is an adaptation of a 
causal-chain framework developed by Johan van Dorp et al. for a maritime risk 
















































Risk: Volunteers come without being 
requested 
Intervention: Recognize the need for 
volunteer management: 
• to manage unsolicited volunteers, 
• to manage identified incident 
requirements that may be met by 
known volunteer capabilities, or 
• to manage the message that no 
volunteers are needed and the 






Risk: Volunteers may lack 
clarity on assignments
Intervention: Provide ‘trouble 






Opportunity: A period of altruism 
follows disaster, predisposing 
people to volunteer if opportunity 
presents
Intervention:  Network with 
professional associations to 
solicit volunteers.
 
Figure 2: Example Issues and Functions 
 
Once high-level functions are identified, functional decomposition was used to identify 
sub-functions and processes for the disaster volunteer management system.29  
Functional decomposition is the “breakdown of the activities of an enterprise into 
progressively [finer] increasing detail.”30 Additional requirements tables are developed 



































Figure 3: Example of Functional Requirements Diagram 
 
As previously discussed, the literature review revealed that volunteer response will occur 
regardless of a request for assistance. An intervention was identified to recognize the 
need for volunteer management to manage unsolicited volunteers and/or the message 
that no volunteers were needed (see example in Figure 2) and then decomposed in the 
“manage volunteer convergence” function. This function contains sub functions for 
perimeter management, information management, and volunteer perception 
management. Figure 3 provides a high-level depiction of functional decomposition.      
 
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
The systems-based analysis provided an understanding of the problem domain and 
assisted in identifying the major functions of the system. This general model was then 
used to develop a comprehensive system for managing volunteers.   
 
Identification of Goals and Objectives 
It is easy to get carried away in developing many processes/activities to better manage 
disaster volunteers. However, every activity has associated costs and benefits. A clear 
description of system goals and objectives can be used to evaluate the impact of different 
management strategies and associated activities. This step is at the heart of “systems” 
development because it defines the intended effects of the overarching system. 
Volunteer management goals and objectives were documented in an objectives tree (see 




A volunteer management system which will lessen the impact of the 


























Objectives to achieve the goal
 
Figure 4: Goals and Objectives Tree 
 
Concept of Operations 
The concept of operations describes a strategy behind organizing the multiple volunteer 
management functions into a system. Several alternate strategies that expand upon 
current programs and practices were considered: 
 
a) Pre-incident, citizens could develop autonomous networks that would be able to 
respond in their community. The citizens would receive training to work in a 
hazardous environment, provide aid, and have access to appropriate equipment 
and supplies. This strategy is largely that of the Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) program. CERT members are trained to assist in their 
neighborhoods following an event when traditional emergency responders are 
not immediately available.31 This strategy was not selected because it was found 
that a large number of citizens are motivated to assist after an event has 
occurred.32  Increasing the preparedness of citizens is very important; however, 
having a relatively small number of pre-trained citizens would likely not 
minimize the disruption to the responder community, nor provide for the safety 
of large numbers of untrained spontaneous volunteers. Any network such as this 
must still be integrated into the incident through credentials verification, specific 
job assignment, a briefing on the job tasks and connection to the job supervisor.  
In 2005, the Harris County, Texas Citizen Corps responded to the need to shelter 
15,000 people in the Houston Astrodome. Keys to success did not point to the 
individual preparedness of its membership, but rather the Citizen Corps’ ability 
to organize pre-registered and spontaneous volunteers and integrate with the 
incident management system.33  
 
b) During a disaster, articulate needs and encourage emergence of independent 
efforts. This strategy is an outgrowth of what has largely occurred in the past.  
Appeals for assistance are observed or made through the media, and independent 
organizations work to meet those needs. This type of response was documented 
after Hurricane Andrew.34 Uncoordinated efforts can lead to misconcentration of 
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aid and duplication of resources.35 To reduce duplication and foster coordination, 
researchers found it is important to have defined organizational roles, task 
management, division of labor, and an overarching management system.36 The 
strategy of encouraging independent efforts may leave critical response needs 
unfilled and result in health and safety issues where too many resources 
converge. 
 
c) Develop a system coordinated by the “formal” responders and pre-trained 
volunteers that can integrate a large number of spontaneous volunteers. This 
strategy essentially transforms spontaneous volunteers (individuals with or 
without specialized skills) into an assigned resource.  We have seen this strategy 
implemented by individual organizations,37 but less often are volunteer needs 
and resources coordinated across organizations. There are often barriers to inter-
organizational coordination such as differences in terminology, procedures, and 
operating structures.38 Potential volunteers may have to search several 
organizations before being able to contribute their skills.  This strategy seeks to 
coordinate a wide variety of volunteer resources against incident needs being met 
by different organizations. 
It is important to note that this strategy is predicated on the following 
assumptions: 
! The emergency management community can recognize that volunteers will 
come; 
! Mechanisms can be created to inform volunteers, and volunteers will act on 
this information; 
! Volunteers will respond to authoritative direction and act responsibly within 
their assigned area. 
 
System Modeling 
One of the core contributions of this systems approach is that it provides ways to 
operationalize, measure, and test the various strategies and procedures to implement 
them. It allows empirical examination of the complex interactions of the system, 
identifies process options that lead to different outcomes, and helps to validate the 
effectiveness of proposed plans before field exercises or an unfortunate accumulation of 
real disasters. The functional analysis (described above in the Systems Based Analysis 
section) provides a wide array of functions and procedures that can be included in a 
volunteer management system. However, it may not be feasible to incorporate all 
identified functions due to cost, timeliness, staff resources, political acceptability, and 
other constraints. While the functions mitigate risks, implementing too many functions 
can also significantly impair the ability of volunteers to quickly contribute to the 
response. For example, implementing background checks of all volunteers may 
contribute to the safety of responders and the community, but the resources needed to 
conduct background checks and the delay it would cause in filling response personnel 
needs may not be worth the “cost.” Spontaneous volunteers may also personally decide 
to circumvent the volunteer management system if they feel it is delaying needed 
assistance they can provide.  Systems modeling can be used to evaluate these tradeoffs.   
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We provide an example of this systems modeling in Figure 5. This is a model for 
Arlington County’s volunteer management system for public health emergencies. It 
begins by translating the concept of operations and system functions into an operational 
flow. Note that the functional analysis was performed from the stage of incident 
recognition through recovery. The modeling work discussed here covers only the 
operations phase and does not depict critical functions such as integration with logistics 
in the incident command system. A full description of the Arlington County Volunteer 






















































Figure 5: Process Flow Chart 
 
This operationalization of the model allows for both the further decomposition of the 
various management steps and provides an opportunity to measure the inputs and 
outputs. These estimates can be derived from comparable industry studies and may be 
obtained from subject matter experts. Analytically, this representation of the volunteer 
management system can be used in the following ways: 
• The model can help pose “what if” questions that are essential to policy and 
tactical decision-making. For example, by altering the rate of at which volunteers 
arrive, processing times, and other design parameters, the model can provide an 
estimate of the end result or impact on the disaster response.   
• This model provides a way to inexpensively experiment with the design that may 
become very useful during a real event. By developing generalized estimates or 
rules of thumb on resource requirements for processing volunteers under various 
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conditions, the model provides a tool to adjust the various parts of the response 
system on the fly, as it were, during incident management.39 For example, if 
managers know that the system can process thirty volunteers per hour with a 
given set of resources, but the incident needs many more volunteers, it can decide 
to devote additional resources for volunteer processing in a calculated manner. 
• The model may identify gaps in the previous requirements analysis, which should 




An adage of disaster management is that planning must be based on valid assumptions 
of the actions people are likely to take.40 It has been repeatedly demonstrated that 
spontaneous volunteers will respond to disasters regardless of a request for assistance, 
and this response is significant. Registration of volunteers pre-incident can help to 
catalog personnel with relevant skills to be called upon in an emergency. However, the 
planning cannot stop there.  It must also consider how these individuals will “plug in to” 
the incident management system, how oversight of their actions will be maintained, how 
their safety and security will be assured, and especially how to manage the many 
volunteers who will spontaneously respond even though they never pre-registered. If a 
specific system is designed before analyzing potential issues, risks, and opportunities, 
there is a danger it will not be realistic and fail. By developing an all-encompassing and 
realistic model, these issues can be anticipated and pre-planned for various scenarios, 
and each volunteer-related activity can be established as an integrated component of a 
single, coordinated system. The strategic approach to model development can also pay 
dividends in training volunteer management staff, because the concepts and objectives 
of the systems can be succinctly presented before delving into task-specific details. 
Providing this “big picture” can be a powerful training tool. 
A comprehensive systems approach is useful not only for pre-plans, but as 
mentioned above may also be used during an incident (i.e., the “incident action 
planning” described in Incident Command System training). Incident managers can 
rapidly develop alternative strategies because the comprehensive model has identified 
decision points and available options/alternative actions, making incident planning 
more efficient. For example, the registration and credentialing of volunteers can be 
designed one way for an event that requires many people with general skills, and 
differently for an event that requires many people with highly specialized skills. For an 
event that requires general skills, basic information (name, address) could be gathered 
by the volunteer processing center using a driver’s license or other acceptable form of 
identification. For incidents requiring specialized skills, procedures can be implemented 
to confirm medical certifications and employment before being credentialed for the 
incident. If approximate processing times for the different types of personnel are 
known, informed decisions can be made “on the fly” about whether to register and 
credential highly skilled personnel separately or together in one queue.  
Resources to register specialized personnel can also be increased or decreased based 
on the quantity and timing of response needs. 
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The strategy selected to provide this illustration of a systems-approach to planning – 
“Develop system coordinated by the “formal” responders and pre-trained volunteers 
that can integrate a large number of spontaneous volunteers” – seeks to ‘fit’ volunteers 
into the broader incident management system. During disasters, of course, many 
volunteers are organized in alternate ways that may complement or undermine the goals 
of the incident management team. By having a holistic set of expectations about how 
one strategy affects the entire incident’s response, the model will quickly identify these 
alternate activities and highlight potential areas of both positive and negative 
consequences. Exceptions to the model – or alternate forms of spontaneous behavior – 
may then be incorporated into the planning model rather than treated as aberrant or 
unproductive behavior.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Paradoxically, one of the most important new challenges in incident management is to 
plan for the unplanned. Spontaneous volunteers, who represent a significant and 
flexible asset in disaster response, also represent a clear management problem if a 
system does not exist to incorporate them through established procedures. The 
challenge for incident managers is to capitalize on the available volunteer resources 
while ensuring safety and the responders’ ability to effectively perform tasks within the 
established incident command system.   
In this article, we have described a systems-based approach to planning for 
spontaneous volunteers that provides a clear analytical roadmap for identifying 
opportunities for intervention and the associated costs and consequences. Intervention 
can occur at various stages in the incident. This systems-based approach identifies ways 
to engage in pre-planning activities, operational actions during the incident, and 
throughout the recovery phase. 
Our current model needs to be implemented and tested against a wide variety of 
disaster scenarios. Currently, the model provides a framework for organizing the many 
disparate findings reported by other researchers and emergency managers. It also 
highlights and makes transparent the planning goals and assumptions. In the end, the 
proposed systems approach challenges emergency managers to reconsider their current 
volunteer management capabilities. At the same time, it provides a pathway for 
managers to think more broadly about the problems of managing spontaneity and 
guidance to prepare their systems to capitalize on the sometimes chaotic, but 
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WHY STRATEGY MATTERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Donald J. Reed 
 
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel. 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment.  “That may 
be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.” 
  !Conversation in Hanoi, April 19751 
 
 
“We thank God for appeasing us with the dilemma in Iraq after Afghanistan.  
The Americans are facing a delicate situation for both countries.  If they withdraw 
they will lose everything and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death.” 




The two statements above, separated by twenty-eight years of history, reflect the 
views of enemies who, unable to defeat the United States militarily, adopted 
similar long-term strategies of attrition to defeat instead the American national 
will. One had just defeated the United States, and the other has declared itself at 
war with the United States. In 1973, after more than ten years of conflict in 
Vietnam and Southeast Asia (at an average annual cost of sixty-one billion dollars 
a year in FY2006 dollars3 and more than 211,000 American casualties, including 
more than 58,000 American dead4) the Vietnam War ended in the United States 
suffering the first defeat in its history. It is difficult to grasp how a Western 
industrialized superpower could be defeated by an underdeveloped agrarian 
nation – with a fraction of its population and no gross national product to speak 
of – without accepting that the larger nation’s overall objectives and strategy in 
that war were flawed. The lesson of Vietnam, a war of policy and limited political 
objectives, is that while the United States military accomplished every tactical 
objective it set on the battlefield, in the end North Vietnam emerged strategically 
victorious.   
From a strategic perspective comparisons to the current war on terror are 
possible. After more than five years of conflict, with more than 28,000 American 
casualties (including more than 5,900 combatant and noncombatant deaths)5  
and a total cost that by some estimates could exceed one trillion dollars (thereby 
exceeding the cost of Vietnam),6 the United States finds itself involved in another 
war of limited objectives against non-state entities with extremely small 
memberships, no gross domestic products, and no national boundaries to defend. 
In the war on terror - the U.S. response to the al Qaeda attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 - the final outcome has yet 
to be determined and may not be decided for generations to come. Whether or 
not the United States will be able to apply the lesson of Vietnam to avoid a similar 
outcome in the war on terror remains to be seen. It is more certain that while it is 
possible to learn from past wars, each war is a special case and it is necessary to 
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focus on the task at hand.7 However, as with Vietnam, it is difficult to understand 
how an information-age superpower could be defeated by a non-state entity 
without accepting that the superpower’s overall objectives and strategy were 
flawed. For the nation to repeat its failure in Vietnam by achieving all its 
objectives in the war on terror, yet failing to achieve strategic success, would have 
grave consequences for both the United States and the international community. 
 
Premise 
In labeling its post-9/11 efforts the “war” on terror, the United States invoked a 
specific metaphor to galvanize the national effort. In doing so it has tied success 
or failure to the doctrinal rules of war.  Evidence of the war metaphor can be 
found in the opening words of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism: “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by 
a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder” [italics added].8 This article 
uses the metaphor to look at the war on terror from the vantage point of the new 
strategic reality facing the United States in the information age. It examines 
issues confronting the nation along five lines of inquiry: definition, doctrine, 
policy, strategy, and transformation. The United States will continue to confront 
these issues as it seeks to achieve success, or even to define success, in the war on 
terror. In this sense, these issues and United States’ efforts to achieve success are 
connected. 
In addition, the U.S. is confronted with a dynamic and evolving strategic 
environment, rather than the relatively static strategic environment that 
characterized the Cold War era. It has been said that while the United States 
continues to operate at the speed of doctrine, its adversaries are adapting and 
evolving at the speed of business.9 In this environment the future security of the 
U.S. will depend not only on how it deals with the present but also on how well it 
prepares itself for the types of warfare that will follow the war on terror in the 
information age. It can begin by approaching the situation in a manner similar to 
successes in past wars: with clearly defined and obtainable national objectives 
and a unified national strategy to obtain those objectives.  At the same time, the 
United States can establish a clear long-term vision for transitioning its efforts 
and its institutions from the industrial age to the information age as the new 
paradigm for waging war. Parameters for this new paradigm can be found in the 
strategic lessons from past wars, evaluated in terms of emerging concepts of 
warfare. 
For example, when the strategic reasons for the loss in the Vietnam War are 
considered in light of current efforts in the war on terror, parallels are evident.10 
The United States expended the majority of its strategic effort against the Viet 
Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, which it viewed as the main North 
Vietnamese effort. Although U.S. forces succeeded in destroying the Viet Cong 
insurgency, they did not thwart North Vietnam’s strategic objective of 
undermining American public support for the war. The United States was forced 
to withdraw from South Vietnam, leaving it open to conquest by conventional 
forces. It can be argued that the destruction of North Vietnam’s regular forces, 
which ultimately overran South Vietnam, should have been the main strategic 
objective of the United States.   
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In the war on terror, the United States is expending the bulk of its strategic 
military efforts against insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq (which can be 
viewed as fronts in the larger Global War On Terror11) and the global insurgency 
being waged by the al Qaeda terrorist network. However, the United States has 
not adequately defined the nature of its adversaries, nor its overall strategic 
objectives in the war on terror. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, has clearly stated its 
intent to bleed the U.S. economy as a means of weakening the American public’s 
support for the war. The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely not the 
main threat faced by the United States; it is far from certain that in its 
engagement against them the U.S. is winning the war on terror.   
The effectiveness of the military engagement in Iraq has come under scrutiny. 
One of the  conclusions of the Center for Strategic and International Studies is 
that the trends exhibited by the United States’ effort against the insurgency in 
Iraq indicate “cycles in an evolving struggle, but not signs that the struggle is 
being lost or won…There have, as yet, been [no] decisive trends or no tipping 
points: simply surges and declines.”12 This conclusion is further reinforced by the 
August 2006 Department of Defense Quarterly Report to Congress, Measuring 
Stability and Security in Iraq, which states that  
…the violence in Iraq cannot be categorized as the result of a single 
organized or unified opposition or insurgency; the security situation is 
currently at its most complex state since the initiation of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom… Conditions exist that could lead to civil war in Iraq…13 
In a manner reminiscent of Vietnam, public opinion polls reflect that, while the 
American public continues to support the overall war on terror, it has grown 
increasingly disenchanted with the war in Iraq. As in the Vietnam War, the 
argument can be made that the first strategic objective of the United States 
should be to direct its primary efforts against al Qaeda and other, similar, 
terrorist networks.  
The conceptual challenge for the United States in the war on terror will be to 
transform its current strategic approach away from industrial-age military 
concepts that focus primarily on conventional, symmetrical threats and 
responses suitable to maneuver-style warfare. Instead, it will need to develop 
information-age concepts that include the capability to deal with non-
conventional, asymmetrical threats employing network warfare. The practical 
challenge will be to address existing weaknesses and gaps in strategy, adapt to 
fundamental changes in the national security environment as it transforms from 
the industrial age to the information age, and develop a grand strategy for 
success. The nation must rise above the current military operations underway in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and embrace network concepts utilizing all the elements of 
national power on a truly global scale.   
The Vietnam War was an ideological struggle between a western industrialized 
world power and an Asian agrarian nation, fought using industrial-age methods 
and weapons. The war on terror is a war fought along cultural lines between a 
western information-age superpower and information-age non-state entities. It is 
being waged with methods and weapons that focus more on the power inherent 
in networked organizations and processes rather than military strength. 
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Information-age technology, which has eliminated concepts of time and distance, 
virtually guarantees that the war on terror will again be brought to U.S. soil, as it 
was on 9/11. The situation facing the nation, if it is to prevent or minimize this 
probable outcome, has been summarized by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld: “Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It’s really to 
prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we 
have to understand will be the unexpected. That may seem on the face of it an 
impossible task, but it is not.”14   
 
THE NEW STRATEGIC REALITY 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 introduced the United States to a new strategic 
reality, one that will continue to confront the nation in the information age. No 
longer can the U.S. rely on the conventional protections of time and distance as a 
result of being surrounded by vast oceans and air space. Instead, non-
conventional attacks may come with little or no notice, and they may be carried 
out against citizens and interests at home as well as abroad. In the war on terror, 
future attacks on the United States may originate from within as well as from 
outside the nation’s borders. 
Nor can the nation rely on the time between wars to reconstitute itself and 
focus on future threats. The new strategic reality, the context within which the 
nation finds itself fighting the war on terror, is similar to that in which the United 
States Army finds itself; a steady state of war is now the norm, and not the 
exception.15 It is a protracted and continuous war of finite conventional resources 
arrayed against infinite asymmetrical threats and capabilities, unlike any the 
nation, or the world, has ever faced. The implications of this new strategic reality 
are clear:  failure to understand the character of the threat and adapt accordingly 
will invite challenges to American political, economic, and military leadership 
throughout the world.   
  Figure 1, adapted and modified from the United States Army Posture 
Statement, reflects the Army’s view of the new strategic reality that confronts the 
United States today, as well as its dilemma. While most of the nation’s 
conventional military resources are postured to deal with traditional military 
threats, the more immediate and likely threat – to which the United States is 
more vulnerable, according to the Army – comes from unconventional threats 
from either state or non-state entities. These threats have been the focus of 
United States efforts since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Ultimately, the greatest 
immediate threats to the nation may not be military at all, but may come from 
non-state entities utilizing non-military methods to wage war. 
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Figure 1.   The New Strategic Reality.
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Perhaps the most significant aspects of the new strategic reality are its persistent 
nature (resulting in a blurring of the familiar distinctions between war and 
peace), its potential for eliminating the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants, and the erasure of the foreign-domestic divide. These are the by-
products of the information-age paradigm for waging war. The Department of 
Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006) acknowledges the nature of 
the new strategic reality in its opening statement: “The United States is a nation 
engaged in what will be a long war.”17 Military leaders and government officials 
have taken to calling the war on terror the “long war” in recognition that there is 
no apparent end in sight.18 
The implication is that, in the war on terror, there can be no time for a 
strategic pause to reset or to plan for the future, as there was in the past between 
wars or between campaigns. Instead, a perpetual reassessment of strategic gaps 
in preparedness and performance is necessary, while remaining engaged in the 
war. Traditionally, the strategic planning time horizon has been measured in 
months, years, and even decades. While this traditional approach may still be 
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minutes, and hours in which asymmetrical attacks can occur.  These timelines are 
incompatible and must be reconciled.   
Yet, more than four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
many issues concerning the war on terror, and U.S. strategy in conducting it, 
remain in transition and continue to lack clarity and resolution. The issues that 
shape the war on terror are found in the lines of inquiry mentioned at the 
beginning of this article: issues of definition to achieve a focused national effort, 
issues of doctrine as a tool for shaping the national effort, issues of policy to guide 
the national effort, issues of strategy to accomplish the national effort, and issues 
of transformation of the national effort from the industrial age to the information 
age.   
 
Issues of Definition 
The lack of definition in the war on terror is problematic. While it allows national 
leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political 
purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From an operational perspective, it 
potentially leads to lack of clarity and understanding, and thus lack of focused 
national effort along with its attendant risk of failure. The very phrase “war on 
terror” lacks definition, and therefore presents the United States with a strategic 
issue that inhibits its efforts to prosecute the war effectively.  As multiple sources 
have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” on terror, neither terror 
nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and terrorism is a tactic.  
From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism takes on the characteristics of 
entities that can be defeated in the traditional sense.   
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White 
House, defined America’s enemy as “terrorism” in general.19 The 9/11 
Commission, perhaps recognizing the difficulty posed by the White House’s 
definition, provided a more precise description when it declared that “the enemy 
is not just ‘terrorism,’ some generic evil,” but must be the “threat posed by 
Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its 
ideology.”20 However, even this clarification by the 9/11 Commission does not 
resolve the issue.  As Jason Burke notes, definitions are important. In Al-Qaeda: 
The True Story of Radical Islam, he points out that current definitions are 
subjective and, since terrorism is a tactic, the adoption by the United States of the 
phrase “war on terrorism” is nonsensical.21 From an operational perspective, it 
does not allow a precise description of the problem confronting the nation. Earl 
Tilford goes even further in The War on Terror: World War IV and establishes a 
link between definitions and strategy when he declares that, in the aftermath of 
the attacks of 9/11, when the Bush Administration labeled its efforts the “war” on 
terror, it made a basic and fundamental strategic error.22 From Tilford’s 
perspective, the error is so grave that it places the United States in the position of 
fighting a war that it could lose, similar to Vietnam, because it has misjudged the 
nature of its opponent. 
It is notable that the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and 
the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism use 
identical wording in defining the enemy as “a transnational movement of 
extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-
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state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use 
terrorism for ideological ends.”23 This definition continues to restrict the 
definition of the enemy by assigning it a connection to Islam. It also applies a 
mixed metaphor by establishing a connection between radical Islam – which is 
essentially a religion – and political ideological philosophies (rather than 
religious philosophies, which are cultural). Neither the White House, nor the 
Department of Defense, nor the 9/11 Commission adequately addresses non-state 
entities (whether domestic or transnational in origin) not connected to Islam. In 
the information age these networks represent a potential threat to the nation as 
great as that currently posed by al Qaeda. 
Lack of definition further complicates efforts to come to grips with the entity 
known as “al Qaeda.” If al Qaeda represents the primary, or at least the most 
visible, opponent of the United States in the war on terror, its precise nature 
remains unclear. Depending on the source, al Qaeda is either a terrorist group,24 
a stateless network of terrorists that represents a radical movement in the Islamic 
world,25 a venture capitalist firm that sponsors a terror network of networks,26 or 
not a terrorist group at all but a worldwide insurgency.27 Understanding the 
nature of al Qaeda is critical if the U.S. is to develop a clear strategy against it. 
Conventional strategic thinking calls for identifying and attacking an enemy’s 
centers of gravity. Each of the various definitions of al Qaeda invokes a different 
strategy; failure on the part of the United States to employ the correct strategic 
approach invites failure overall. Ultimately, in order to prevail against al Qaeda as 
a precursor to success in the war on terror, it may be necessary to accept several 
conditions: that al Qaeda is a non-state entity that possesses elements of each of 
the definitions above; that it is constantly evolving its methods, tactics, and 
philosophy, i.e., the very essence of what it is; that it is very successful in 
attracting adherents; and that it may represent the forerunner of both terrorism 
and warfare in the information age.  In this sense conventional strategic thinking 
may not be effective against al Qaeda. 
The definition of victory, or even success, in the war on terror is also 
problematic. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism establishes 
this when it states: “The long-term solution for winning the war on terror is the 
advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” 28 The 
means to be used by the United States to advance democracy are not clear.  How 
will the United States know when it has advanced democracy far enough that it 
can declare victory in the war on terror? The implication of this definition is that 
it offers no definable end state, no reasonable expectation that the war on terror 
can be brought to a conclusion. As a matter of practicality, it may not be possible 
to defeat or eliminate terrorist groups entirely. The strategic alternatives of 
rollback or containment of terrorism may be more feasible.29 
A final definition that poses difficulty for the United States is the legal status of 
its adversaries. Are individuals who carry out terrorist acts against the U.S. and 
its interests criminals or armed combatants? The difference is critical in crafting 
a wartime strategy that bridges the foreign-domestic divide defined by the 9/11 
Commission.30 A primary example is the legal status of the al Qaeda detainees 
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the 
United States develop a coalition approach for the detention and humane 
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treatment of captured transnational terrorists, possibly structured on Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict. This is at least tacit 
acknowledgment that the detainees are recognized as armed combatants and 
should be accorded some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.31   
However, in a decision that was issued nearly simultaneously with the release 
of The 9/11 Commission Report, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2004 
that detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their cases (that they are unlawfully 
imprisoned) to the American court system.32 The Court further reinforced its 
position in 2006 when it ruled against Bush Administration efforts to conduct 
war crimes trials for some detainees at Guantanamo Bay.33 The impact of the 
Court’s rulings is that they call into question whether the United States is legally 
at war, or pursuing a law enforcement action. By offering the protection of the 
United States legal system to the detainees, it appears that the Supreme Court 
does not recognize the war on terror as a war according to legal and historical 
definitions. 
As indicated above, many of the issues that currently affect the war on terror 
can be traced to lack of definition, lack of clarity, and a diffused rather than 
focused effort. This has the benefit of allowing policy makers to maintain 
flexibility in defining and re-defining success in many ways. However, it poses 
great difficulty in developing effective strategy and conducting focused 
operations. Lack of definition also affects, for good or bad, the application of 
doctrine, policy, and transformation concepts to the war on terror.  
 
Issues of Doctrine 
The war metaphor terror renders U.S. efforts subject to analysis by the doctrinal 
rules of war. Contemporary United States doctrine for fighting wars derives its 
foundation – its “rules of grammar” – from the writings of nineteenth-century 
Prussian General Carl Philipp Gotlieb von Clausewitz, particularly his seminal 
thesis, On War.34 Published posthumously in 1831, On War continues to shape 
current American military thinking and remains the authority on the essence of 
war. It is considered by many to be the greatest work on war and strategy ever 
produced by Western civilization, and its key concepts can be used to put current 
efforts in the war on terror in perspective.   
In his chapter on war as an instrument of policy, Clausewitz writes that “war’s 
grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.”35 By invoking the logic of war 
in declaring the “war” on terror the United States committed itself to its rules of 
grammar, or means. Tilford explains Clausewitz’s concept of grammar in the 
following way: 
The logic [nature] of war, violence directed by political intent, remains 
constant but the grammar [character] changes. Logic is a constant 
regardless of age, sex, ethnicity, nationality or cultural factors. On the 
other hand, how one addresses a particular problem or issue, the methods 
used, is subject to a large number of factors such as age, sex, physical 
condition, resources, culture, religious beliefs and values. Applied to war, 
there is then a distinctly American way of war that differs significantly 
from the way Chinese or Russians or Zulus make war. There is also a 
distinctly Muslim fundamentalist way of making war. Clausewitz’s point is 
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that although nations and groups make war in different ways based on a 
large number of factors, they go to war for one logical reason only: to 
force an enemy to do their will.36   
The first concept that Clausewitz offers is his definition of war as “an act of force 
to compel our enemy to do our will.”37 From the vantage point of Clausewitz’s 
definition, the war on terror is not unique and it would be a mistake to view it in 
any other strategic context. First, Clausewitz’s definition of war can be broken 
into three elements: the effort is directed toward an identified opponent; it 
involves violence or use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will; and 
(by implication) we know our national will. The war on terror does not present a 
new problem from Clausewitz’s logical perspective; it is merely a modern 
application of an ancient concept. 
Second, Clausewitz declared that all wars could be considered acts of policy. It 
is absolutely essential, therefore, that: 
[t]he first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test 
the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor 
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first 
of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.38 
To understand the true nature of the war on terror requires not only a refined 
definition of the enemy, but also a knowledge and comprehension of the nature of 
the war itself. For the United States to stray from this principle, again, invites 
failure.   
This leads to a third principle established by Clausewitz, that of the political 
objective. To paraphrase, the political object is the goal, war is the means for 
reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.39 
Only upon establishment of the objective of the war can a strategy be devised to 
achieve it. Following the logic of Clausewitz, if al Qaeda is the most visible enemy 
in the war on terror, and perhaps the forerunner of adversary networks in the 
information age, then the United States must understand the nature of al Qaeda, 
as well as the nature of its conflict with al Qaeda. It can then develop clearly 
defined, decisive, and attainable objectives, with attendant strategies to prevail 
against al Qaeda. Lack of clarity of strategic objectives, in the long-term, has the 
potential to lead to a wearing-down of American resolve, which can ultimately 
lead to failure. This is evocative of the lack of clarity of strategic objectives, 
described very clearly and eloquently by Harry Summers, that contributed to 
America’s failure in Vietnam.40 
Clausewitz proposed two additional sets of concepts that offer insight into the 
war on terror: fog and friction, and efforts that constitute preparations for war 
versus war proper. The concept of “fog” in war refers to the uncertainty of the 
information available to the commander.41  Uncertainty can make problems 
seem, without perspective, larger than they really are. In the absence of 
information, that which is unknown is left to chance. “Friction” is the idea that 
“everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and that 
difficulties accumulate.42 Clausewitz envisioned an army as a very simple 
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machine, but with a multitude of moving parts, each of which retains its 
independent capability to generate friction.   
Both fog and friction can be observed throughout the war on terror. The effects 
of fog can be found in the lack of clarity of information that exists at the policy, 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of effort. Friction can be observed in the 
homeland security related interagency conflicts between international, federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private agencies.  Both fog and friction have impacted the 
strategic gaps that exist between agencies such as that between the Department 
of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense; in the foreign-domestic 
divide described by the 9/11 Commission; in the lack of interoperability between 
agencies at all levels nationwide; and in the failure to share intelligence across 
agency boundaries. Examples of fog and friction abound in the war on terror.  
Finally, Clausewitz said that, “The activities of war may be split into two main 
categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and [those that 
constitute] war proper.” Preparations for war produce “the end product,” trained 
and equipped fighting forces. War proper “on the other hand, is concerned with 
the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purposes of 
[waging] the war.”43 The purpose of war is presumed to be the imposition of one’s 
will upon the enemy. Similarly, the application of effort to the war on terror 
should be divided into those activities that are preparations for war and those 
that are the conduct of the war proper. Both activities are necessary, but each 
should be considered separately and not confused one for the other when 
evaluating success. Nor can they be separated from objective and strategy. 
The outcome of the Vietnam War is an example of what can occur when 
preparations for war and war proper are confused with objective and strategy. In 
referring to the United States defeat in Vietnam, Summers asks the question, 
“How could we have succeeded so well [tactically and logistically], yet failed so 
miserably [strategically]?”44 He opens his analysis of the Vietnam War with this 
declaration: 
At the height of the war, the Army was able to move almost a million 
soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house 
them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain 
them better than any Army had ever been sustained in the field. To 
project an Army of that size halfway around the world was a logistics and 
management task of enormous magnitude, and we had been more than 
equal to the task. On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable.  In 
engagement after engagement, the forces of the Viet Cong and of the 
North Vietnamese Army were thrown back, with terrible losses. Yet in the 
end it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged 
victorious.45 
The Army’s accomplishments in Vietnam could not have been carried out without 
the application of preparations for war on a large scale.  In essence, the Army did 
everything it was designed to do in Vietnam, but its successes did not lead to 
victory. The failure can be viewed in two ways.  First, the activities that 
constituted preparations for war, e.g. logistics, personnel, and resource 
management, were not always distinguished from war proper, resulting in 
misdirection of priorities. The result was a systems analysis approach to the 
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Vietnam War that overrode strategic planning. More importantly, both 
preparations for war and war proper were directed toward a flawed objective and 
strategy. Regardless of the success of the military effort, it was in support of a 
flawed national objective and strategy that doomed the overall effort to ultimate 
strategic failure. The negative effects of its strategic failure in Vietnam produced a 
lingering effect on the United States, both in its institutions and the American 
public, which remains today. The durability of the potential negative effects of 
strategic failure in the war on terror are visible in the current debate in public 
forums on the nature and implications of the perceived threat to the nation. 
How does the United States avoid making a similar mistake in the war on 
terror? Much of the current homeland security effort in the war on terror – e.g. 
reorganization of government, critical infrastructure protection, and scenario-
based planning – are defensive actions that take on the guise of preparations for 
war. They do not, in and of themselves, directly impose America’s will on al 
Qaeda or any other adversary. It is not certain that they are even effective 
deterrents. Only those offensive diplomatic, information, military, law 
enforcement, and economic actions that do apply force directly to terrorist 
adversaries, to force them to accept the will of the United States, are examples of 
war proper. In the final analysis, it will be necessary for the United States to 
ensure that its efforts, both those that constitute preparation for war, as well as 
those that constitute war proper, are directed toward clearly defined, decisive and 
attainable national objectives and facilitated by a clear and effective strategy for 
success.  This will require a transformation of strategic thought. U.S. war-fighting 
doctrine, founded in Clausewitzean principles of war between nation states, must 
be adapted in order to prevail against non-state entities. 
 
Issues of Policy 
In the realm of policy, first and foremost, the question must be asked: Is the 
United States truly “at war” in the war on terror? The determinations of the 9/11 
Commission Report indicate that the United States is in popular deed, if not in 
legal fact, a nation at war, and lead to the Commission’s recommendations for 
establishing national objectives and a national strategy for conducting the war on 
terror.46 The findings of the 9/11 Commission meet two of the three critical 
elements in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war. First, the effort is 
directed toward an identified opponent and, second, it involves violence or use of 
force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. According to the 9/11 
Commission the United States’ opponent in the war on terror consists of the 
terrorist groups and their allies, particularly the global al Qaeda network, that 
form the threat of Islamist terrorism, thereby satisfying the first element of war: 
an effort directed at an identified opponent.47 Although there are problems with 
this definition, particularly that it falls short of defining the full scope of the 
threat to the United States, it represents a start in developing a national objective 
and strategy. The use of American and allied forces to find and destroy terrorist 
groups, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, partially fulfills the second 
element of war: the use of violence or force to compel our opponent to meet our 
will.48 The unresolved issue is whether the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are the right enemy, at the right time, and in the right place. 
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The third element in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war - that we 
know our national will - is partially satisfied by Public Laws 107-40 and 107-243. 
These laws, from a legal perspective, do not constitute a formal declaration of 
war. However, they give the President broad powers to prosecute the effort that 
has come to be known popularly as the war on terror. Under the provisions of 
Public Law 107-40, the President is authorized to use force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons who planned and carried out the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and those who harbored them, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.49 
Public Law 107-243 authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the 
United States to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, and to enforce 
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.50 Based on these 
laws the first component of the national will – the political will of the United 
States – is presumed to be established, even without a formal declaration of war. 
The second element of the national will, the public will, remains uncertain. 
This raises a number of policy issues in the war on terror. The rules for 
invoking the national will are embedded in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which gives to Congress the power to declare war. A declaration of 
war – to establish the national will – therefore becomes a shared responsibility 
between the political will of the government and the popular will of its 
constituents.  This is more than just a formality: Failure by Congress to declare 
war in Vietnam led to a failure to mobilize the second element of the national 
will, the popular will of the public, and ultimately contributed to the U.S. defeat. 
A declaration of war gives the President clear-cut military authority, as well as 
non-military options, including internment of armed combatants and seizure of 
foreign funds and assets. A formal declaration of war in the war on terror might 
have precluded the Supreme Court’s decision to grant detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay access to the protections of the judicial system. Further, according to William 
F. Buckley: 
To declare war is not necessarily to dispatch troops, let alone atom 
bombs. It is to recognize a juridically altered relationship and to license 
such action as is deemed appropriate. It is a wonderful demystifier… 
[leaving] your objective in very plain view.51 
An acknowledgement of the need to establish objectives in the war on terror, and 
to develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, is found in the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation that the United States should “consider what to 
do – the shape and objects of a strategy,” and “how to do it – organization of 
[the] government in a different way.”52 The Commission’s recommended 
objectives are to attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the continued 
growth of Islamist terrorism, and protect against and prepare for terrorist 
attacks. The Commission says the strategy must incorporate offensive actions, 
with coalition partners, to counter terrorism; defensive actions with 
responsibilities for the nation’s defense clearly defined; a preventive strategy that 
is both political as well as military; and, finally, a responsive strategy that deals 
with attacks that are not prevented. Finally, the Commission recognized that if a 
national strategy is to be successful in the long-term, it must use all the elements 
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of national power: intelligence, covert action, diplomacy, economic policy, foreign 
aid, and homeland defense.53 From its recommendations it appears that the 9/11 
Commission is suggesting a single overarching strategy for the United States in 
the war on terror. 
 
Issues of Strategy 
Issues of strategy can be found in the proliferation of national strategies, of which 
there are no fewer than twenty addressing various aspects of the war on terror. 
These strategies deal with the problems of homeland security, homeland defense, 
and the war on terror in piecemeal fashion, resulting in an approach that thus far 
is fragmented in its organization and disjointed in its application. A reading of 
the various national strategies does not render a clear understanding of overall  
policy, objectives, or strategy. History, in the form of the lessons learned in 
Vietnam, dictates that a failure of national strategy has the potential to lead to an 
overall failure in the war on terror. Strategic issues are illustrated in the two 
national strategies that come closest to offering a grand strategy that creates an 
overarching umbrella for the other national strategies: the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. 
The 2002 National Security Strategy pre-dates, but broadly parallels, the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding what the United States 
should do (employ all the elements of national power) and how it should do it 
(transform the major institutions of American national security to meet the 
requirements of the post-9/11 era).54 The 2006 version reinforces the original 
tenets from 2002 and lists examples of progress made in the past four years. It 
reserves the option of preemptive actions to disrupt and destroy terrorist 
organizations with global reach. In this sense, it forms a loose overarching 
strategy to secure the United States against terrorist attack. It defines America’s 
enemy as terrorism and terrorist networks in general, but it makes the 
fundamental strategic error espoused by Tilford, in that it does not clearly 
identify the enemy, nor national objectives regarding that enemy.55   
In its language, the 2006 National Security Strategy may contribute 
inadvertently to the motivations of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. It clearly 
states that “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”56 In Imperial Hubris: 
Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Michael Scheuer argues that it is 
precisely American policies and actions of the past thirty years in Muslim 
nations, including pressure to conform to democratic principles, that have lead to 
the war on terror. American policies and actions “provide Muslims with proof of 
what bin Laden describes as ‘an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and 
plunder carried out by you against our Islamic ummah. It is therefore 
commanded by our religion that we must fight back.  We are defending ourselves 
against the United States. This is a ‘defensive jihad’ as we want to protect our 
land and people.’”57 Scheuer supports this argument with public opinion polls in 
the Muslim world, which indicate an overwhelmingly negative view of the United 
States.58  
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Whether democracy is a clear and obtainable objective in the war on terror is 
questionable. In Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World, Ralph Peters 
takes the position that “Democracy must be earned and learned. It cannot be 
decreed from without. In a grim paradox, our [United States] insistence on 
instant democracy in shattered states…is our greatest contribution to global 
instability.”59 Efforts to impose democracy on other sovereign nations may be 
perceived by those nations and their cultures as the ultimate example of 
American hubris. This may be a causal factor in members of other cultures 
responding to calls for war against the United States. 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security also predates the 9/11 
Commission Report.60 Its stated purpose, “to mobilize and organize the nation to 
secure the homeland from terrorist attacks,” seems to be a goal that would be 
more applicable to the National Security Strategy.61 Its objectives – preventing 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and response and recovery to terrorist attacks – are focused inward on 
domestic preparations and constitute a primarily defensive and preventive 
strategy. It is an example of what Summers describes as taking the strategic 
defensive, which led to United States defeat in Vietnam.62 Much of what it 
prescribes for homeland security also conforms to Clausewitz’s definition of 
preparations for war instead of the conduct of war proper. It does not provide 
an objective or a strategy for offensive actions to counter terrorism, to preempt it 
at United States borders, or for taking the strategic offensive in the war on terror. 
In its current form, the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a 
good blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security but, despite having a 
segment devoted to American federalism and homeland security, it does not 
provide any authority for directing how the various federal agencies are to work 
in synchronization to prosecute the war on terror. Ultimately, in its call for the 
implementation of homeland security measures costing hundreds of billions of 
dollars, it may serve al Qaeda’s strategic objective of bleeding the United States 
economy as a means of defeating American resolve.63 Ironically, al Qaeda’s 
strategic objective is similar to that employed by the United States when it bled 
the economy of the former Soviet Union into bankruptcy in the Cold War arms 
race. 
The nature of the war on terror – against the unknown, the uncertain, and the 
unexpected, as Rumsfeld indicated – makes strategic thinking difficult. The 
proliferation of national strategies that partition the war on terror into segments 
further complicates the effort. An example of how this occurs is in Clausewitz, 
Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, in which Alan Beyerchen includes 
a discussion of the way chance is associated with Clausewitz’s concept of the fog 
of uncertainty in war, which obscures or distorts most of the factors on which 
action is based.64 According to Beyerchen, chance as a function of analytical 
blindness, as described by the late 19th century mathematician Henri Poincaré 
and displayed in Clausewitz’s work, results in an inability to see the universe as 
an interconnected whole. To paraphrase Beyerchen’s argument and apply it to 
the war on terror: The inability to see the war on terror in its entirety has resulted 
in multiple national strategies that break it down into segments more easily dealt 
with. Yet it happens that these segments interact and the effects of this 
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interaction seem to be due to chance. The result is that the effort to comprehend 
the war on terror through analysis, the effort to partition off pieces of it to make 
them individually amenable to strategic thought, creates the possibility of being 
blindsided by the partitioning process. 
According to Beyerchen, Clausewitz had a profound sense of how the 
understanding of phenomena – in this case the war on terror – is truncated by 
the bounds placed on it for analytical convenience. Clausewitz stressed the failure 
of theorists to develop effective principles because they insist on isolating 
individual factors or aspects of the problems presented in war. Beyerchen quotes 
Clausewitz to illustrate his point: 
Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, 
rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed 
to take an adequate account of the endless complexities involved.  As we 
have seen, the conduct of war branches out in all directions and has no 
definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a 
synthesis….[these attempts] aim at fixed values; but in war everything is 
uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They 
[theorists] direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, 
whereas all military action is entwined with psychological forces and 
effects. They [theorists] consider only unilateral action, whereas war 
consists of continuous interaction of opposites.65 
This is not to indicate that strategy in the war on terror is without value: quite the 
opposite.  While strategy as a plan, or product, is problematic (as indicated in the 
preceding discussion), strategy as process brings great value. Strategy as process 
brings together often disparate elements to understand and confront a war that is 
in many ways at odds with historical record. The issue for the United States is 
how it will transform its strategic processes to meet the requirements of the 
information age. 
 
Issues of Transformation 
A growing body of literature, including such authors as Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
Huntington, Kaplan, Hammes, and van Creveld, suggests that future war will 
move away from the principles of conventional trinitarian war (conducted 
between warring nation states and founded on the relationship between the 
trinity of each state’s government, army and people) established by Clausewitz.66 
It will be replaced by modern, non-trinitarian war between state and non-state 
entities organized as networks along social, economic, criminal, terrorist, gang, 
special interest, and ethnic lines to name but a few. It will take on the 
characteristics of war without national boundaries, where the distinctions 
between public and private, government and people, military and civilian – i.e., 
combatants and noncombatants – will again become blurred as they were prior to 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.67 Arthur Cebrowski describes the change, as it 
relates to war, in the following way: 
Warfare, conflict, and instability are inherent features of our world.  
Warfare is a pattern of human behavior that spans recorded history. The 
nature [what Clausewitz referred to as “logic”] of warfare, and conflict 
between nations and states is fundamentally unchanging – it is organized 
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force for political ends. However, because war is both a political action 
and a social institution, the character [what Clausewitz referred to as 
“grammar”] of warfare is changing just as societies, political entities and 
technologies change.68   
Against this backdrop the war on terror, an existential war of ideas, has been 
called “the first great war between nations and networks.”69 Five years after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States’ ongoing involvement in the 
simultaneous conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against the global al Qaeda 
insurgency, represents a juncture for the nation that continues to severely test its 
political and public will. At the same time, it must move beyond its traditional 
industrial-age approach to warfare and prepare to engage adversaries both in 
new forms and in new domains of conflict. In short, it must redefine its strategic 
canvas.  
The premise of this approach is that America’s future adversaries, whether 
they take the form of terrorist or other types of networks, are not invincible. In 
fact, their structures and operations can be very fragile and certainly can be 
defeated. However, it is necessary to move away from the inductive Cold War 
approach of the past fifty years – looking for weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies, 
and determining how to exploit them – and toward deductive thinking and an 
adaptive capabilities-based approach in the war on terror – a conscious search 
for the unexpected and the outer bounds of feasibility.70 
The key tenet of this approach, as shown in the strategic transformation 
canvas in Figure 2, is that transformation from industrial-age concepts and 
methods to information-age concepts and methods is essential to long-term 
success in the war on terror and beyond. The emergence of al Qaeda as the likely 
forerunner of terrorist and other types of networks in the information age will 
drive strategic transformation from industrial-age domains of conflict (land, air, 
maritime, space, and cyber) to information-age domains of conflict (physical, 
informational, cognitive, and social). Traditional concepts of waging warfare 
against an adversary’s centers of gravity will be replaced with a focus on the 
elimination of critical systems, nodes, and links of information-age networks. 
Network warfare will replace conventional warfare in the information age as both 
nation states and non-state entities come to realize its dialectical advantages.  
The current operational paradigm employed by the United States in the war on 
terror evolved from the experience of its military during the industrial-scale wars 
of the twentieth century. It is rooted in industrial-age concepts that focus on 
conventional, symmetrical threats and responses, and hierarchical command and 
control. It is geographically based across territory and space. Its standard for 
defending the United States against external threats is a layered defense across 
the operational domains that comprise the industrial-age global commons – the 
land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. 
This paradigm is based on the concept that an active, layered, and 
comprehensive defense is necessary if the United States is to detect, deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats as early and as far from its borders as possible and to 
recover from them when they do occur. Its primary weakness is that it presumes  
attacks will originate outside the homeland and be conducted in a conventional 
manner. It presumes military force will always be the first line of defense. 
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However, as stated above, the information age will see the end of conventional 
warfare. The overwhelming battlefield successes of the United States military in 
the Persian Gulf wars (1991, 1993) have initiated the demise of large-scale 
maneuver warfare by illustrating its limitations. The reaction in many corners of 
the world is that there are no nations still capable of sustaining the costs of 
competition with the United States in conventional warfare.71 Instead of relying 
on military force to wage war, strong and weak nations alike will find other ways 
to wage war, in other domains, by redefining the strategic canvas. Further, this 
development will not be limited to nation states, but will also be available to non-
state entities and networks, including super-empowered individuals and groups.   
The emerging information age paradigm is a network-centric approach based 
on the premise that a fundamental shift in power has occurred from industry to 
information. It is rooted in information-age concepts that focus on non-
conventional, asymmetrical threats and responses, and non-hierarchical 
command and control. It expands beyond the geographical base of territory and 
space. Its standard for defending the United States against both internal and 
external threats is a universally networked defense across the operational 
domains that comprise the information-age global commons – the physical, 
information, cognitive, and social domains. Network-centric operations seek to 
create an information advantage and translate it into an operational advantage. 
This approach accepts that military force, while essential, may be neither the first 
nor the most significant line of defense. The information-age domains are defined 
as:72 
Physical – the traditional domain of warfare where a force is moved 
through time and space. It includes the land, sea, air, and space realms. 
Information – the domain where information is created, manipulated, 
and shared. It includes the cyber realm. 
Cognitive – the domain where intent, strategy, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures reside. It is the domain where decisive 
concepts and tactics emerge. 
Social – the domain which comprises the necessary elements of any 
human enterprise. It is where humans interact, exchange information, 
form shared awareness and understandings, and make collaborative 
decisions. It is also the domain of culture, values, attitudes, and beliefs, 
and where political decisions are made. 
The strategic transformation canvas in Figure 2 draws on business concepts of 
strategy to demonstrate the transformation of warfare that must occur.73 As the 
canvas indicates, in the industrial age large and small powers compete for the 
same thing – conventional military supremacy in the physical and cyber domains 
that comprise the industrial-age global commons. Relative advantage or 
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Al Qaeda, as a forerunner of terrorist networks and non-state entities in the 
information age, rejects the logic of trying to compete with conventional military 
forces. As a non-state entity it lacks the necessary resources to employ 
conventional warfare in order to achieve its strategic objectives. Instead, it seeks 
to redefine its strategic canvas and to make conventional warfare irrelevant by 
embracing an information-age paradigm for warfare. It seeks to leverage the shift 
in power from industry to information. In so doing, it tries to avoid conventional 
warfare in the physical and cyber domains of the industrial-age global commons; 
it seeks instead to transfer the conflict to the domains of the information-age 
global commons where it can compete by employing its asymmetrical strengths 
to its advantage.    
The implication of the strategic transformation canvas is that all participants, 
greater and lesser powers alike, including nation states and non-state entities, 
will be able to acquire infinite capabilities and compete on equal terms in the 
information-age domains. However, scale can still play a decisive role in 
achieving and maintaining the strategic advantage. The United States can retain a 
significant advantage by adopting a strategic approach similar to that of al Qaeda 
and other potential adversaries, and by leveraging the shift in power from 
industry to information. This will allow it to bring to bear all the elements of its 
national power in the information domains, while continuing to use superior 
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resources and knowledge capacity to develop strategies to overcome non-state 
entities such as al Qaeda. The war on terror, and conflicts that follow, will be won 
or lost in the domains of the information-age global commons. 
 
CONCLUSION: ON INSTITUTIONALIZING IMAGINATION 
In its report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
revealed four kinds of American failure, foremost among them a failure in 
imagination.75 In this failure the Commission states that “Imagination is not a gift 
usually associated with bureaucracies….It is therefore crucial to find a way of 
routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination.”76 This assertion is 
followed by a chapter on global strategy and a concluding chapter offering 
recommendations on reorganizing the federal government in order to achieve 
unity of effort in securing the nation against future attacks.77   
However, when considered against the war metaphor adopted by the United 
States after 9/11, the simple reorganization of government – the re-ordering of 
existing departments and functions – is insufficient both as a means to secure the 
nation and as a means to prepare it to conduct the war on terror and any conflicts 
that follow it in the information age. Instead, true institutionalization of 
imagination can be found in the transformation – a redefinition of form and 
function using deductive reasoning – of government. Writing nearly a year after 
the 9/11 attacks John Arquilla provides a more accurate description of the nature 
of the problem confronting the United States: 
In the last year, our defense posture has shifted. We used to be focused 
exclusively on nations; now we are also focused on networks. Networks 
like Al Qaeda are dangerous adversaries. They have loose, difficult-to-
trace organizational structures. Vigorous efforts must be made to connect 
the dots of the network and its various dark allies. Yet, for all our new 
focus on winkling out networked terror, we seem to have learned few 
lessons about the nature of "netwar”… 
Our leadership and, indeed, most other leaders around the world are 
new to this type of warfare. Clearly, the most important step they all can 
take right now is to learn all they can about networks and network-style 
conflict. Raising their level of awareness would open up the possibility of 
waging this war in new ways, rather than continuing to stumble along in a 
more traditional and ineffectual fashion.78 
This article arrives at a similar conclusion. The issues of definition, doctrine, 
policy, strategy, and transformation are not merely academic but will remain 
central to success in the war on terror. They are strategic in nature and must be 
addressed if the United States, in the application of its “war” metaphor, is to first 
avoid the strategic mistakes that lead to defeat in Vietnam and, second, 
simultaneously transform its strategic canvas for the information age.   
The overall effort has already raised questions in academic and military circles 
over whether current doctrines of war, especially those based in Clausewitzean 
theory, have become irrelevant. Clausewitz’s philosophy of war, his description of 
the essence of war and its immutable principles, is broad enough to remain 
relevant, but it must be adapted to the information age. His definition of war as 
REED, WHY STRATEGY MATTERS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org  
20 
“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” remains valid but its 
elements must transform. 
   The nature, or logic, of war – the use of force to compel an opponent to one’s 
will – has not changed. From this perspective the United States must arrive at a 
clearer definition of its adversaries and define its objectives and strategy, 
pursuant to these adversaries, in obtainable terms. This is necessary for the war 
metaphor the nation has chosen to pursue. 
War’s character, or grammar, however, will take on a new form in the domains 
of the information-age global commons. It becomes necessary to redefine 
success, which may or may not be defeat or victory over one’s enemy in the 
traditional sense. The definition of force and the means to apply it to achieve 
success must also be redefined to include means of force that are outside, or go 
beyond, military force alone as envisioned by Clausewitz. In the end, rollback and 
containment of terrorist organizations through disruption of the processes that 
enable them to operate as networks, thereby rendering them irrelevant, may 
replace concepts of victory and defeat. The stakes are high. The alternative, if the 
United States fails to exercise imagination to define the strategic terms of the war 
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Assessment of Public Health Infrastructure to Determine 
Public Health Preparedness 




The role of public health at the national, federal, state and local level has become 
an important component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Homeland Security has elevated public health personnel to first-responder 
status.  However, public health has not received sustained funding to address the 
new directives and tasks it has been mandated to perform. Congress passed two 
landmark bills, the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 (PL-106-
505) and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (PL-107-288), 
that directed approximately ninety-nine million dollars to rebuilding public 
health capacities.1 While the additional funding was helpful in initiating 
bioterrorism planning, the funds were only temporary. Therefore, they could only 
address changes in tools, hardware, communications, and similar items but not 
fundamental personnel issues. This funding strategy relied on the assumption 
that public health has a fully functional infrastructure that can simply be 
refocused and aimed in new directions. However, all evidence points to the 
contrary; public health infrastructure has been cut to a point where most health 
agencies are barely staffed to operate during a normal workday.2 Questions arise 
whether public health departments have the requisite manpower to perform the 
duties required of them – from basic functions of public health to managing, 
coordinating, and deploying bioterrorism emergency surge responses. These are 
not the manpower issues for solving surge-capacity limitations, but rather 
manpower issues for the basic public health functions and critical planning, 
organization, and infrastructure development supporting bioterrorism 
preparedness. These are not recent developments, but while the gaps have been 
highlighted with ensuing dire predictions, efforts to quantify these workforce 
gaps are missing.3    
The problems and perils associated with the current state of the public health 
infrastructure have been the subject of many reports and publications for well 
over fifteen years. A 1988 report by the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) warned of 
the deteriorating public health workforce.4 In a 2002 follow up report, the IOM 
felt that little improvement had been made since the first report.5 In 2001, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) prepared a report for a 
Congressional appropriations committee revealing that the public health 
community was still structurally weak in nearly every area and there were critical 
gaps in workforce capacity and competency.6 Other studies conducted by 
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prominent public health associations – the National Association of County and 
City Health Officials (NACCHO) and the Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials (ASTHO) – supported these findings. In October 2001, NACCHO 
conducted a nationwide study that highlighted current infrastructure deficiencies 
by identifying the workforce duties and compositions of local health agencies and 
in 2004 reported that the lack of public health workers constitutes a crisis for 
national public health preparedness.7 
In addition, public health workforce studies reveal infrastructure shortages 
due to budgetary neglect and an aging workforce. Local health agencies (LHAs) 
have been hit hard with up to forty-five percent of staff approaching retirement, 
vacancy rates as high as twenty percent, and employee turnover rates as high as 
fourteen percent.8 The closest attempt to quantify the extent of the workforce 
shortage was a 2004 study by Kristine Gebbie who described the scope and 
content of work done by the public health workforce in the field.9 
Despite the plethora of reports, there have been no published efforts to 
determine optimal workforce staffing levels needed within a community to 
accomplish the public health and bioterrorism preparedness mandates. It is 
essential that stakeholders become aware of the actual, rather than the perceived, 
day-to-day functions of public health. In addition to the workload required to 
meet basic public health mandates, it is also necessary to assess the impact of the 
bioterrorism preparedness mandates in the daily functioning of LHAs. In order to 
effectively advocate for supplemental funding from state legislators and other key 
political stakeholders, it is necessary to quantify the number of personnel needed 
for baseline functioning. This article develops an empirical method to simply and 
transparently determine workforce requirements. The resource requirements can 
then be used to develop realistic, defensible funding targets.  
This article details the methodology, including detailed calculations and 
assumptions, for one example: Union County, New Jersey (NJ). The staffing 
requirements presented here are applicable only to Union County (and 
potentially other counties that have a similar population and public health 
structure). However, the framework used to estimate manpower requirements 
will be applicable to other counties and states in their own assessment of local 
public health infrastructures. The proposed estimation method (shown in Figure 
1) can easily be modified to reflect the demographics and circumstances of other 
counties, enabling them to establish clear staffing needs and funding requests 
that will be compelling to their stakeholders. Investments in the public health 
infrastructure serve a dual purpose: improving the delivery of health services at 
the local level and improving the response capability of public health as a partner 
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Figure 1:  Method for Workforce Estimation 
 
Step 1:   Determine demographics of community. 
Step 2:  Determine all available staff connected to the local public health 
departments (there may be several agencies, as is the case in 
New Jersey). 
Step 3:   Identify and define regular public health mandates by staff 
position and assess amount of field work required. 
Step 4:  Identify and define bioterrorism preparedness mandates by staff 
position and assess amount of hours required to support basic 
preparedness tasks. 
Step 5:  Estimate the available field hours available per year by staff 
position. 
Step 6: Calculate differences. 
 
 
UNION COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 
Union County has a population of 522,541 individuals in 100 square miles. It is 
home to the Elizabeth Port (a critical part of the port of New York/New Jersey), 
major railroads and highways (including the New Jersey Transit Railroad 
System, the New Jersey Turnpike, and the Garden State Parkway), and the 
Newark International Airport. Surrounding the county is the East Coast’s largest 
petroleum port, the largest auto port, and Newark, the largest city in New Jersey 
and a major international airport hub. These illustrate the county’s target-rich 
critical infrastructure and opportunities for potential exposure to natural or man 
made biological threats. 
Table 1 provides base year 2000 Census information in Union County.10 
Almost fourteen percent of the population is over age sixty-five.  Approximately 
8.4% of the population lives below 200% of the poverty guideline ($31,340). The 
Union County demographics in Table 1 are used to calculate the target segments 
of the population for specific public health services.  This is the basis for the 
workload calculations; it is an underestimate of the true workload since there is a 
significant undocumented foreign population living within the community, but it 
is the most defensible estimate.   
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Table 1:  Demographics1 of Union County, New Jersey 
(2000 Census) 
      
(Total Population: 522,541) N 
N < 200% 
of Poverty
2 
Sex   
     Male 251,372 30,165 





by Age and Gender   
     Children < 5 years of age 18,702 2,244 
     Children < 2 years of age 14,576 1,749 
     Teenagers 15 - 19 years of age 31,451 3,774 
     Females 15 - 64 years of age 173,727 20,847 
     Females < 20 years of age 35,776 4,293 
     Females > 40 years of age 145,235 17,428 
     Males > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627 
     Adults 22 - 61 years of age 285,766 34,292 
     Adults > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627 
     Adults > 50 years of age 212,651 25,518 
     Adults > 65 years of age 117,976 14,157 
 
Notes:  
1 Numbers derived from the Union County, New Jersey 2000 Census. 
2 < 200%  defined as households earning < $31,340 annually per the Department of Health and Human 
Services Guidelines. Reporting poverty distribution facilitates calculation of workload associated with 
public health mandates. 
3 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report.  Data were derived from the 2004 LHER Reports.   
There are significant manpower issues in public health in Union County and in 
New Jersey in general. For Union County’s population of 522,541, there are only 
forty-seven public health employees within ten local health departments. This 
represents a ratio of nine public health workers per 100,000 population.  
Nationally, the ratio of public health workers was 158 per 100,000 in 2000.11 
RICHTER & SANTIAGO, ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOL. II, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2006) http://www.hsaj.org 
 
5 
Based on this statistic, Union County is well below the national average in the size 
of  its public health workforce. 
A graphic example of the workload dilemma was witnessed in April 2005 when 
New Jersey hosted the congressionally-mandated international terrorism 
exercise known as TOPOFF3 (T3). T3 was designed to identify vulnerabilities in 
the State of New Jersey by exercising the plans, policies, procedures, systems, 
and facilities of federal, state, and county/local response organizations against a 
biological attack.  The scenario was a bioterrorist attack using pneumonic plague 
as the agent. Officially, the public health agencies met the expectations of the 
week-long exercise. However, in reality, the manpower needs were filled by 
mobilizing “notional” resources, interpreted as using imaginary public health 
workers to meet the expectations of the exercise. One epidemiologist was 
expected to conduct contact disease case investigations for more than 19,000 
victims and participate in all public health/law enforcement responses. Clearly 
more manpower was needed.   
In addition, the Local Information Network Communication System (LINCS) 
agency (a division of the county-wide public health team) was responsible for 
opening a Points of Distribution (POD) to provide mass prophylaxis for the entire 
county.  Using a pharmaceutical distribution-staffing model developed by the 
Weil/Cornell Medical School, the Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak Response 
Model (BERM),12 we can predict staffing needs for POD to provide prophylaxis 
for Union County. LHAs are mandated to vaccinate their entire jurisdiction 
within ten days.13 To meet this target, BERM estimates that a staff of 1,232, each 
day, is necessary to accomplish the task.  The Public Health Workforce 
Enumeration 2000 credits New Jersey with a local public health workforce of 
2,244 people. Union County would need to utilize fifty-five percent of the total 
local public health workforce in the state to meet the target timetable. Clearly 
there is a need for a large surge capacity.  But even supposing volunteers are 
drawn from local Community Emergency Response (CERT) and Medical Reserve 
Corps (MRC) teams, or provided by other states, public health would be 
responsible for the monumental tasks of set-up, coordination, and management 
of these individuals. When the response is to a real epidemic and no longer a 
practice exercise, it will be necessary to find, recruit, train, and organize 
thousands of real people to replace the “notional” staff positions used during the 
exercises. In point of fact, New Jersey does not have enough manpower or 
infrastructure to meet its needs as demonstrated by the exercise, but officials 
ignore this lesson.  
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) sets 
policy and standards for statewide public health programs; regulates and licenses 
health care facilities, practitioners and public health professionals; maintains a 
BioSafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory; administers various grants for public health 
programs; and collects and analyzes communicable disease data. In New Jersey, 
a local health agency (LHA) is defined as a county, regional, municipal or other 
governmental agency organized for the purpose of providing health services, 
administered by a full-time health officer and conducting a public health program 
pursuant to law.14 Public health services are provided almost exclusively at the 
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local level, yet fifty-five percent of the entire New Jersey public health workforce 
is employed by the NJDHSS.15  
New Jersey LHAs are established by state statute and local ordinance and 
operate under a “home rule” format that grants municipalities partial autonomy 
of self-government. One problem with home rule is that local health agencies 
serve population bases that are too small to financially support the level of service 
required by federal and state mandates. To solve this problem, many agencies 
resort to contracted labor, part-time positions or employees being utilized in a 
dual-role capacity. The result is a pool of public health personnel being shared by 
multiple agencies or across disciplines. This works passably well when there is no 
undue stress on the system, but is easily and quickly overwhelmed with even 
small-scale events. In an emergency, part-time employees will be expected to 
discharge full-time duties in more than one municipality, simultaneously. 
In 1997, New Jersey was awarded approximately sixteen million dollars to 
enhance the public health infrastructure at the local level for bioterrorism 
preparedness. The NJDHSS established twenty-two LINCS agencies, strategically 
positioning them in twenty counties and within two core cities. Over time, LINCS 
has evolved, as a matter of convenience to the NJDHSS, into the lead public 
health agency in every county throughout the state. NJDHSS used the existing 
LINCS program to channel new homeland security responsibilities and 
bioterrorism money to the local level. This evolution occurred without 
considering the existing legal structure and authority of LINCS employees within 
their counties.  Today, the goal and vision of LINCS is to facilitate a regional 
response by enhancing the public health infrastructure while also being asked to 
fill in the gaps of providing essential health services.16   
The new response structures, established with the creation of LINCS, 
duplicated and complicated an existing public health communication system. 
Public health communications must flow to and from a newly established health 
command center (HCC) instead of the traditional New Jersey Office of 
Emergency Management (NJOEM). The HCC creates a parallel public health silo 
alongside NJOEM.  Further complicating this issue is another NJDHSS creation, 
the regional Medical Coordinating Center (MCC). At this point, it is unclear what 
role the MCCs will play. However, they are worrisome in that there will be a third 
communication silo and responders will have to repeat messages three times to 
assure that information reaches all required receptors. This greatly increases the 
reporting burden associated with all bioterrorism-related tasks. 
New Jersey has two significant public health mandates that provide LHAs 
operational direction: the Local Core Capacity for Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Grant (also called Attachment C) and Public Health Practice Standards for Local 
Boards of Health (also called Practice Standards). To conduct the manpower 
analysis to determine the minimum staffing level required by the bioterrorism 
preparedness goals stated in the bioterrorism grant and the public health 
mandates of the NJDHSS, a state-sanctioned manpower formula, the NJSDHSS 
formula “Estimating Registered Environmental Health Staffing Needs for Local 
Health Departments,”17 was used. This tool was originally developed to determine 
the number of staff required to handle the workload for the registered 
environmental health staff. However, its modification for use with the other core 
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positions is straightforward. The four core public health positions examined in 
this article are:   
 
1. Public Health Nurse. A licensed professional who conducts the 
personal health programs of the LHA.  This individual is 
required to have a master’s degree in public health nursing.   
2. Health Educator. The Certified Health Educator Specialist 
(CHES) conducts health education programs designed to 
encourage lifestyle modifications that will eliminate or reduce 
risk factors of chronic diseases. This individual is required to 
have a master’s degree.   
3. Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS).  A 
licensed professional who conducts the environmental program, 
including investigations and enforcement of applicable laws and 
statutes.  
4. Epidemiologist (EPI). A professional who investigates 
reportable disease cases and conducts infectious disease 
surveillance.  This individual is required to have a master’s 
degree in public health with two years’ experience.   
The staffing level required to fulfill the mandates is compared to the actual 
staffing level with Union County, including all the LHAs and the LINCs agency 
operating within the county.   
 
Workload Estimates for Public Health Mandates 
Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health, 
promulgated by the NJDHSS, were adopted by the state Public Health Council as 
the model system to provide local public health activities. The standards are 
intended to “assure the provision of a modern and manageable array of public 
health services to all citizens of New Jersey”18 and are enforced by the LHAs. 
Each of the core staff positions has corresponding responsibilities enumerated in 
the Practice Standards; these mandates are imposed on every LHA regardless of 
population base or staffing levels. The core component of the Practice Standards 
includes disease screening, vaccinations, disease monitoring, inspections (food 
establishments, pools, camps, etc.), educational classes and other disease 
prevention activities, as well as performance monitoring and evaluation of local 
programming and services. LHAs are expected to conduct community surveys, 
health risk assessments, and resource inventories as well as form public health 
partnerships with outside agencies and disciplines. 
To assess the workload associated with these Practice Standards in Union 
County, the first step was to determine the population served by the LHAs. We 
used a conservative approach and limited population served to individuals living 
below the 200% poverty line. Families above the 200% of poverty guideline will 
be more likely to have health insurance or have regular access to health care and 
are therefore less likely to need or utilize public health clinics. This calculation 
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represents a lower limit on services requested since some services, such as 
cervical cancer screening services, are well established and accepted by 
individuals of all income categories. In addition, although the 200% of poverty 
guideline was also employed in the Older Adult Health Services target estimates, 
seniors of all income categories typically utilize these services. These calculations 
underestimate the actual level of need ensuring that a conservative (minimum) 
estimate of additional workforce requirements is calculated. 
Once the target population size was determined, the target activities were 
calculated using the Adult Health Services Guidelines, published by NJDHSS.19 
These guidelines are performance objectives and provide detailed targets for 
public health services. For example, the cancer education targets are five percent 
of women aged fifteen to sixty-four for breast cancer and three percent of both 
sexes for colo-rectal cancer; eighty-five percent of children under two years of age 
are targeted for screening for lead poisoning. The guidelines form the basis of the 
Local Health Evaluation Report (LHER) that each LHA must submit to NJDHSS 
every year. The LHER is a very detailed assessment of a number of core tasks that 
forms the basis of the Practice Standards. Appendix A shows the workload for the 
epidemiologist, health educator/risk communicator (HERC), public health nurse, 
and registered environmental health specialist (REHS) positions. 
When the delivered services (as reported in the LHER) are compared to the 
targeted services (as specified by the Practice Standards) there are numerous 
gaps that become apparent, especially in health education and public health 
nursing (data available from the corresponding author). To quantify the 
manpower needs to conduct the minimum service levels identified by NJDHSS 
we apply the formula on the State Health Department website that enables health 
officers and Board of Health members to estimate the Registered Environmental 
Health Specialist manpower needs.20  
As detailed in Appendix B, we estimate an annual number of hours available 
for fieldwork per year to be 1,313 hours for the epidemiologist, public health 
nurse and HERC, and 983 hours for REHS. These two numbers differ because 
travel is a significant portion of the REHS’ workday, since this person inspects all 
food service locations (restaurants), camps, public pools, public health nuisance 
reports, rabies, and zoonosis control. The other positions have limited expected 
travel time.  Dividing the number of hours needed to meet target performance 
levels by the hours-per-manpower year, we can determine the optimal manpower 
level for each position.   
Tables 2 summarizes the estimated manpower needs of core public health 
positions to comply with the New Jersey Public Health Practice Standards. The 
manpower estimates for the four core positions reveal the need for three 
epidemiologists, three health educators, seven public health nurses and ten 
registered environmental health specialists to comply with New Jersey Practice 
Standards. These are conservative estimates since we are restricting targeting to 
residents living at 200% of the poverty level or less. If the income restriction is 
removed, the manpower deficit would increase dramatically. Providing just this 
minimum level of staffing would significantly increase the public health 
workforce in the county. This would permit the department to be in compliance 
with official mandates for day-to-day functioning. Even with the additional 
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personnel, the county would still be well below the national average of 158 public 
















Personnel Required to 
Complete Workload        
3 5 28 27 
Available Personnel     0 2 21 17 
Manpower Deficit  3 3 7 10 
1 Health Education/Risk Communication Specialist 
2 Registered Environmental Health Specialist 
 
 
Workload Estimates for Bioterrorism Preparedness Mandates 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security was developed in July 2002 as a 
directive for local, state and federal agencies in their planning efforts for 
protecting the homeland.21 When the strategy was unveiled it made clear that 
public health sectors are to be involved with:   
• protection of the food, water and public health critical infrastructures, 
• surveillance for defending against catastrophic threats, and 
• quick and effective response with other first responders.22  
 
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 (HSPD 8): National Preparedness, which establishes policies, 
procedures and goals to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies. HSPD-8 introduced the concept of “all hazards 
preparedness” based on the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and 
equipment to maximize the effectiveness of a multi-discipline response effort in 
the event of any type of emergency.23 The all hazards preparedness approach 
requires the underlying infrastructure to be solid enough to support all 
emergency situations. 
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The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act of 2002 allocated close to one 
billion dollars to improve state and local public health capabilities.24 CDC used 
the money to establish Public Health Emergency Preparedness “Cooperative 
Agreements” to aid state and local governments in their bioterrorism 
preparedness and planning efforts. As of 2005, the all hazards approach, 
stressing nine preparedness goals that measure public health system response 
parameters,25   was adopted in the Cooperative Agreements.   
The Local Core Capacity Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Grant, aka 
Attachment C, is the New Jersey version of the CDC Preparedness Goal Grant 
with additional reporting requirements. The bioterrorism preparedness 
mandates for public health, specific to the core LINCS staff in Union County, 
requires compliance with the nine CDC preparedness goals. To better understand 
the workforce requirements of these mandates (presented in Table 3), they are 
summarized below:   
Prevent: (1) Increase the use and development of interventions 
known to prevent human illness from chemical, biological, 
radiological agents, and naturally occurring health threats.  
(2) Decrease the time needed to classify health events as terrorism 
or naturally occurring in partnership with other agencies. 
Detect/Report: (3) Decrease the time needed to detect and report 
chemical, biological, radiological agents in tissue, food or 
environmental samples that cause threats to the public’s health.  
(4) Improve the timeliness and accuracy of information regarding 
threats to the public’s health as reported by clinicians and through 
electronic early-event detection, in real time, to those who need to 
know. 
Investigate: (5) Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, 
and appropriate interventions for those affected by threats to the 
public’s health. 
Control: (6) Decrease the time needed to provide 
countermeasures and health guidance to those affected by threats 
to the public’s health. 
Recover: (7) Decrease the time needed to restore health services 
and environmental safety to pre-event levels.  
(8) Increase the long-term follow-up provided to those affected by 
threats to the public’s health. 
Improve: (9) Decrease the time needed to implement 
recommendations from after-action reports following threats to the 
public’s health. 26 
 
There are many quarterly grant reporting requirements. In addition to the 
general reporting requirements, there are additional reporting requirements 
required by the NJDHSS. A conservative estimate of the “reporting-only” 
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manpower drain is one full-time equivalent (FTE). Almost twenty percent of the 
county’s preparedness effort is devoted to satisfying NJDHSS oversight. This 
reporting time is not accounted for in these manpower estimates, to ensure that 
we use the most conservative approach. 
Table 3 details the time estimate, evaluated by each core position, needed to 
complete each of Preparedness Goals and over seventy-eight required critical 
tasks in the Bioterrorism Preparedness Grant. To obtain these estimates, the 
Local Core Capacity Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Preparedness grant was 
reviewed by each core position and each critical task. Registered environmental 
health specialists do not have any specific additional duties associated with 
bioterrorism preparedness. Since most tasks require local health agency 
cooperation, a local time estimate was included, but is not specifically assigned to 
any of the four positions. A LINCS coordinator role was included in this analysis. 
The current grant funds one epidemiologist, one public health nurse, one LINCS 
coordinator, and one health education/risk communication specialist (HERC), as 
well as a government public health partnership coordinator (GPHP) and an 
information technology specialist (IT).   
Table 3 shows that given the workload requirements, the grant-funded 
positions are not adequate. One more epidemiologist, one more HERC, and one 
more LINCS coordinator are required. In addition, successful completion of each 
of the grant’s critical tasks requires a significant local commitment and 
substantial cooperation, necessitating the addition of three FTEs at the local 
level.   
 



















1. A.  All Hazards 
Planning 884 109 109 109 109 
2. A.  Information 
Collection/ Threat 
Recognition 40 364 7 388 364 
2. B.  Hazard 
Vulnerability Analysis 20 0 7 7 30 
4. A.  Health Intelligence 
Integration/ Analysis 385 962 234 7 982 
5. A.  Public Health 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 280 153 153 28 153 
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Communications 0 24 24 1,113 133 
6. B.  Emergency Public 
Information 30 64 36 47 162 
6. C.  Worker Health 
Safety 120 72 21 7 72 
6. D.  Isolation and 
Quarantine 2,120 52 52 52 60 
6. E.  Mass 
Prophylaxis/Vaccination 70 205 205 205 331 
6. F.  Medical & Pub 
Health Surge 0 46 102 18 18 
7. A.  Economic & 
Community Recovery 0 0 0 21 84 
8.  Recovery 0 32 4 14 32 
 
Total Hours (Annual) 3,949 2,083 947 2,016 2,530 
Manpower Needed (N)
4        3 2 1 2 2 
Current Staff (N)               0 1 1 1 1 
Total  Deficit                      3 1 0 1 1 
Notes:   
1 Local Information Network Communication System 
2 Health Education/Risk Communications 
3 Not specified to one of the four positions 
4 = Total hours/Available Yearly Hours.  Numbers are rounded to nearest whole number 
5 Goal 3 (detect) & 9 (improve) were intentionally left out. Goal 3 has no critical tasks assigned to this area.  
It is related to laboratory testing and the state department of health is responsible for this area. Goal 9 does 
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The mantras of “all hazard preparedness” and “dual-use functionality” cannot 
overcome the basic problem of insufficient manpower. All hazards preparedness 
begins by strengthening the response elements common to a spectrum of 
emergency situations. Training and equipping an inadequate workforce does 
little to improve preparedness.   Dual-use functionality assumes that there were 
sufficient resources for “single” use. 
Table 4 is a summary of the total manpower deficit for public health 
professionals in Union County, New Jersey. To be in compliance with New Jersey 
practice standards and conform to the bioterrorism preparedness goals, twenty-
nine additional staff members must be added to the public health workforce. This 
is a very conservative estimate, restricting the service population to documented 
residents living at or below the 200% of poverty line. At its most optimistic, 
Union County is currently staffed at sixty-eight percent of the needed public 
health workforce.   
 
Table 4:  Summary of Manpower Requirements for Compliance with Practice 















Epidemiology 3,867 2,083 5 1 4 
Health Education/Risk 
Communication 6,155 2,530 7 3 4 
Public Health Nurse 36,402 947 29 22 7 
 
Registered Environmental 
Health Specialist 26,819 … 27 17 10 
 
LHA2 Support for 
Bioterrorism Grant   
(unspecified labor category) … 3,949 3 0 3 
LINCS Coordinator … 2,016 2 1 1 
Total         73          44  29  
Notes: 
1 BT: Bioterrorism 
2 LHA:  Local Health Agency 
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Susan Klitzman and Nicholas Freudenberg suggest that a standing workforce, 
with not only the capacity to provide recognized health services but a reserve 
capacity as well, is needed to effectively meet the challenges of a large-scale 
emergency.27 Clearly there are not enough funded positions even to provide the 
absolute minimum level of services required by the NJDHSS. In the 2004 edition 
of America’s Health: State Health Rankings; A Call to Action for People and 
Their Communities, New Jersey ranked a dismal forty-first out of fifty in per 
capita spending on public health.28 As if this ranking was not bad enough, 
between 2003 and 2004 New Jersey witnessed an eleven percent decrease in its 
public health budget.29 In 2004, New Jersey fell to forty-eighth, decreasing 
spending from thirty-two to fourteen dollars per person.30 Public health will have 
a more difficult time meeting New Jersey mandated bioterrorism efforts and 
traditional health services at the local level as the state’s 2006 budget is posted 
with an expected decrease of 13.2%.31 To close the manpower gap in Union 
County, in addition to not having a budget cut, an additional, sustained three 
million dollars per year needs to be added to the public health budget to fund and 
equip an additional twenty-nine full-time employees. 
Clearly, these personnel are not sufficient to meet a surge in demand due to a 
catastrophe (natural or man-made). The additional personnel are for the critical 
planning and organizational development needed to orchestrate a response to a 
crisis. If the basic infrastructure is in disarray, the system will be non-functional 
even if supplemental (federal or state) resources are available to handle surge 
requirements. The system will not be able to quickly deploy the additional 
resources to good effect if the basic structures are not in place and operational.    
This study has shown that the Union County New Jersey Public Health 
infrastructure is inadequate, from a manpower standpoint, to meet either state 
and federal health objectives or biopreparedness functions. The methodology 
detailed herein permits quantification, in terms of both the numbers of positions 
and the funding levels, to create a sustainable infrastructure. On September 13, 
2006, the New Jersey legislature’s Joint Committee on Government 
Consolidation and Shared Services requested this exact type of information from 
the NJSDHSS.32 The assistant commissioner of health was asked, “Are we able to 
compare what’s going on in terms of cost and number of personnel by 
municipality?” The commissioner replied by saying “I don’t think we’re 
sophisticated enough…I don’t think we have that type of formula.”33 This study 
and the methodology discussed here answers that question and can provide 
critical insight to key stakeholders in New Jersey in an effort to obtain needed 
funding and positions.   
Given the reports on the state of public health throughout the U.S., we believe 
similar questions are being asked in many other states. Other public health 
departments needing a simple, transparent methodology to estimate the 
manpower required to support basic public health and bioterrorism preparedness 
mandates can apply the methods described in this article.   
The Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the need for a robust public 
health component to respond to and recover from a range of emergencies from 
the biological dangers posed by an influenza pandemic to the use of toxic agents 
in a terrorist attack. It calls for public health to become an “indispensable pillar of 
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our national security framework.”34 This Strategy relies on the same 
infrastructure that has proven incapable of meeting U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services National Health objectives. Public health resources need to 
be aligned with the new planning goals. If manpower infrastructure capacity is 
not the first step in public health preparedness, each succeeding step will be 
addressed by taking resources from other mandated programs. Trade-offs 
between mandated programs will be necessary. It will not be possible to support 
all programs, resulting in a tug-of-war of daily priorities without concern for the 
actual service levels of any program. Investments in manpower capacity should 
be targeted according to population-based health objectives if we are to maximize 
the dual domestic preparedness/public health uses. Federal and state spending 
priorities need to be re-aligned for public health to become a partner in the 
mission of homeland security. This study argues that the goal of sustainable 
funding for public health begins with an accurate measure of the capacities of the 
system in relation to the demands placed upon it. Without such a measure, public 
health will continue to fail in its primary functions and lack the capacity to meet 
homeland security goals.   
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Developing Workload Estimates for Public Health Mandates 
 
In order to develop workload estimates for each of the core positions 
(epidemiologist, public health nurse, registered environmental specialist, and 
health educator/risk communicator), the target activities were extracted from the 
Adult Health Services Guidelines published by the NJDHSS. Time estimates were 
developed for each activity. 
Table A1 details the results of the manpower estimates for the epidemiologist 
position. There are no local epidemiologists in the LHAs. There is only one 
epidemiologist employed and assigned to Union County LINCS. Therefore, all 
investigations were conducted by staff other than an epidemiologist.   
Table A2 shows the results of the manpower estimates for the health education 
position.  Using the LHER reported number of clients served, divided by the 
number of health education sessions conducted (also listed in the LHER report), 
yields a result of fifteen clients per session. The number of sessions conducted 
divided by the available health education man-hours yields a time frame of 6.3 
hours per session. Based on experience, this is a reasonable figure to use for 
planning purposes when class preparation time, class time, outreach, follow-up, 
and reporting are considered as components making up one session. Health 
education population targets are based on Adult Health Services Guidelines, 
divided by fifteen clients per session, multiplied by 6.3 hours per session. This 
result, divided by 1,313 work hours per year, yields the estimated number of 
Health Educators needed to reach objectives. 
Table A3 details the results of the manpower estimates for the public health 
nurse. Each of the required activities is assigned an hourly rate derived from LHA 
experience. These time estimates are multiplied by the target population number 
and then divided by 1,313 hours to arrive at the full-time equivalent manpower 
estimate.   
Table A4 shows the manpower estimates for the Registered Environmental 
Health Specialist (REHS).  Manpower estimates are obtained by following the 
same procedure as in Table A3.  It is interesting to note that a general rule of 
thumb calls for one Registered Environmental Health Specialist per population of 
15,000.35  Using this ratio would result in a more serious staff deficiency. 
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Table A1:  Epidemiology Manpower Requirements for Practice Standards 
Compliance 
 









Target Activity     
 
Reportable Disease 
Investigation    
  Cases 0.33  2,106 695 
  Follow-Up  2 966 1,932 
Communicable 
Diseases     
 
Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STD)    
  Cases 1 539 539 
  Follow-Up  1 539 539 
 Tuberculosis (TB)    
  Cases 0.33 64 21 
  Follow-up  1 141 141 
Annual Required 
Workload Hours 




       1,3133 
Epidemiologists Required 
to Complete Workload 
Hours (N)   
            
                      
3 
Available Epidemiologists 
(N)     
    0 
Manpower Deficit 
Epidemiologists (N)                      3 
Notes: 
1 0.33 hours (or 20 minutes) is based on local health experience 
2 As no targets are available, actual workload in terms of cases and follow-up were obtained from 
the Local Health Evaluation Report forms  
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in Appendix B 
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Table A2: Health Education/Risk Communications (HERC) Manpower Requirements 
for Practice Standards Compliance 
 













Alcohol: Target 56.5% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 538 3,389 
 
Smoking: Target 20% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 191 1,203 
 
Physical Fitness: Target 22% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 210 1,323 
 
Drug Abuse: Target 36% of teenage 
population between 15-18 years of age 6.3 38 239 
 




per HERC      1,313 
 
HERCs Required to Complete 
Workload Hours (N)      5 
Available HERCs (N)       2 
 




1 6.3 hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
2 Target numbers based divide hours/category by hours/unit 
3 Hours calculated by multiplying hours/unit by target sessions 
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Maternal and Child Health   
Maternal and Child Health 
Clinics: Those at ! 200% poverty 0.75 2,244 1,683 
 
Lead Screening: 85% " 2 years 
of age and those at ! 200% 
poverty 0.40 1,487 595 
 
Improved Pregnancy Outcome 
(IPO): Females ! 20 years of age 
receiving prenatal and post 
partum visits and those at ! 
200% poverty 2.25 482 1,085 
Childhood Immunizations: Those 
at ! 200% poverty 0.40 2,244 898 
Cancer Screening and Education   
Cervical/Breast Cancer 
Screening: 3% of females 15-64 
years of age 0.45 625 281 
Prostate Cancer Screening: 5% 
of males " 40 years and these at 
! 200% poverty 0.54 881 476 
Mammography: 50% of females 
" 40 years and those at ! 200% 
poverty 1.10 8,714 9,585 
Cancer Education 0.40 10,221 4,088 
Adult Health and Diabetes   
Diabetes Screening: 1% of adults 
" 50 years  0.40 2,127 851 
Diabetes Education 0.40 2,127 851 
Adult Health and Cardiovascular Disease  
Cardiovascular Disease 
Screenings: 1% of adults " 50 
years 0.30 2,127 638 
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Education 0.40 2,764 1,106 
Older Adult Services: ! 65 Years of Age  
 
Influenza and Pneumonia 
Vaccinations: 20% of Older 
Adults 0.75 16,989 12,742 
 
Health Screenings: 1% of Older 
Adults 0.40 1,180 472 
School Health    
Public School Audits 2.50 230 575 
Private and Preschool 2.50 191 478 
Annual Required Workload 
Hours  
2





per Public Health Nurse 
3
           1,313 
 
Public Health Nurses Required to 
Complete Workload Hours (N)   28 
Available Public Health Nurses 
(N)   21 
 
Manpower Deficit Public Health 
Nurses (N)       7 
Notes:   
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
2As reported in Local Health Evaluation Report LHER report 
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Table A4:  Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) Manpower 
Requirements for Practice Standards Compliance 
 











Bathing Place    
 Inspection 2 83 166 
 Re-inspection 1 22 22 
Youth Camp     
 Inspection 2 60 120 
 Re-inspection 1 15 15 
Food Establishment Surveillance    
 Inspection 2.5 3,026 7,565 
 Re-inspection 2 696 1,392 
 Complaint 2 545 1,090 
 Plan review 1 151 151 
Public Health Nuisance    
 Complaint 1 5,566 5,566 
 Investigation 1 5,984 5,984 
Childhood Lead Poisoning    
 Risk assessments 2 466 932 
 Residences abated 8 40 320 
Rabies and Zoonosis Control 
2
    
 Animal bite investigations 1 1,280 1,280 
 Pet shop inspection 2 9 18 
Other     
 Schools and Institutions 2.5 230 575 
 Court/Enforcement action 3 541 1,623 
 
Annual Required Workload Hours
 




per REHS   1,313 
 
REHSs Required to Complete Workload 
Hours (N)       27 
 
Available REHSs (N)        17 
 
Manpower Deficit REHSs (N)      10 
Notes:  
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience  
2 Zoonosis:  Diseases transmitted from animals to humans 
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in Appendix B 
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Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel 
Availability for Field Work per Year 
 
Step 1: Determine total man-hours per year. 
   35 work hours per week x 52 weeks = 1,820 total annual work hours 
 
A thirty-five hour work week is used because most New Jersey government 
employees work an eight hour day but are not paid for an hour lunch.   
Thus 40 - 5 = 35.   
    
Step 2: Determine total man-hours per year expected to be absent.  Apply 
standard basic government benefits package of two weeks vacation, two weeks 
combined sick leave, and federally mandated holidays for government workers.  
Training time is also explicitly accounted for in the New Jersey system. 









Vacation 7 12 84 
Holidays 7 13 91 
Sick 7 7 49 
Personal 7 2 14 
Training 7 7 49 
Expected 
time off due 
to absences 
   
287 
 
Step 3: Calculate total (net) available work hours. 
    1,820 total annual work hours - 287 expected time-off hours  
= 1,533 total available work hours 
 
Step 4: Determine administrative requirements (travel and office time). 
  
4a. Office Hours: Time dedicated to office coverage, filing, reporting, and 
research.  This affects all positions. 
 







1 5 44 = 220 
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4b. Travel Time: This is a significant component of work only for the 
registered environmental health specialist. This position is responsible 
for all inspections of restaurants, food preparation locales, camps, 
public pools, public health nuisance complaints, rabies, and zoonosis 
control.  
 







1.5 5 44 = 330 
  
 









Epidemiology a 1,533 -220 1,313 
HERC a 1,533 -220 1,313 
Public Health Nurse a 1,533 -220 1,313 
REHS b 1,533 -550 983 
 
 
Step 6: Determine annual workload hours for each core position in LHA by 
multiplying the hourly average of each activity by the target number of activities 
per year 
 
Step 7: Determine the number of core positions needed (Step 6 ÷ Step 5) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:   
a Travel time is not a significant component of the work  
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